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Abstract 
Given  the  pervasive  nature  of  information  technology,  the  nature  of 
evidence presented in court is  now less likely to be paper-based and in most 
instances will be in electronic form . However, evidence relating to computer 
crime is significantly different from that associated with the more ‘traditional’ 
crimes  for  which,  in  contrast  to  digital  forensics,  there  are  well-established 
standards, procedures and models to which law courts can refer. 
The key problem is that, unlike some other areas of forensic practice, 
digital  forensic practitioners work in a number  of  different environments and 
existing process models have tended to focus on one particular area, such as law 
enforcement, and fail to take into account the different needs of those working in 
other areas such as incident response or ‘commerce’. 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in the field of 
digital forensics by developing a new process model for digital data acquisition 
that addresses both the practical needs of practitioners working in different areas 
of the field and the expectation of law courts for a formal description of the 
process undertaken to acquire digital evidence.  
The methodology adopted for this research is design science on the basis 
that it is particularly suited to the task of creating a new process model and an 
‘ideal approach’ in the problem domain of digital forensic evidence. The process 
model  employed  is  the  Design  Science  Research  Process  (DSRP)  (Peffers, 
Tuunanen, Gengler, Rossi, Hui, Virtanen and Bragge, 2006) that has been widely 
utilised within information systems research. 
A review of current process models involving the acquisition of digital 
data  is  followed  by  an  assessment  of  each  of  the  models  from  a  theoretical  
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perspective, by drawing on the work of Carrier and Spafford (2003)
1, and from a 
legal perspective  by reference to  the Daubert test
2.  The result of the model 
assessment  is that none  provide a description  of a generic process  for the 
acquisition of digital data, although a few models contain elements that could be 
considered for adaptation as part of a new model. 
Following the identification of key elements for a new mod el (based on 
the literature review and model assessment) the outcome of the design stage is a 
three-stage process model called the Advance Data Acquisition Model (ADAM) 
that comprises of three UML
3 Activity diagrams, overriding Principles and an 
Operation Guide for each stage. Initial testing of the ADAM (the Demonstration 
stage  from  the   DSRP)  involves  a  ‘desk  check’  using  both  in-house 
documentation relating to three digital forensic investigations and four narrative 
scenarios. The results of this exercise are fed back into the model design stage 
and alterations made as appropriate.  
The  main  testing  of  the  model  (the  DSRP  Evaluation  stage)  involves 
independent verification and validation of the ADAM utilising two groups of 
‘knowledgeable  people’.  The  first  group,  the  Expert  Panel,  consists  of 
international ‘subject matter experts’ from the domain of digital forensics. The 
second group, the Practitioner Panel, consists of peers from around Australia that 
are digital forensic practitioners and includes a representative from each of the 
areas of relevance for this research, namely: law enforcement, commerce and 
                                                 
 
 
1 Who provide a list of the essential requirements for a digital forensic process model 
2 This is a test originating from the United States that has been used by courts to assess 
‘scientific’ evidence in various jurisdictions (for instance it is mimicked in a discussion paper by 
the Law Commission for England and Wales (Edmond, 2010)).  
3 Unified Modeling Language  
vi 
incident response. Feedback from the two panels is considered and modifications 
applied to the ADAM as appropriate. 
This thesis builds on the work of previous researchers and demonstrates 
how the UML can be practically applied to produce a generic model of one of 
the fundamental digital forensic processes, paving the way for future work in this 
area that could include the creation of models for other activities undertaken by 
digital forensic practitioners. It also includes the most comprehensive review and 
critique of process models incorporating the acquisition of digital forensics yet 
undertaken.  
vii 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the research 
This thesis addresses the fundamental issue that there is no comprehensive 
description for the process of acquiring digital evidence that can be applied by 
Australian practitioners operating in the different digital forensic areas of law 
enforcement,  incident  response  (who  tend  to  work  mainly  within  their  own 
organisation)  and  third-party  providers  of  digital  forensic  services  (who 
undertake their work on behalf of external clients, often lawyers). This is not an 
isolated weakness within the subfield of acquisition of digital evidence because, 
as  Cohen  (2011)  points  out,  the  whole  field  of  digital  forensics  still  lacks 
consensus in fundamental areas. By providing a formal model for a significant 
aspect of the digital forensic process this research will not only be of immediate 
value to digital forensic practitioners but it will establish a starting point from 
which other researchers can continue to develop the field’s scientific credentials. 
1.1  Background 
Given  the  pervasive  nature  of  information  technology  the  nature  of 
evidence presented in court is less likely to be paper-based as has previously 
been the case and in most instances will be in electronic form (Stanfield, 2009). 
However,  evidence  relating  to  computer  crime,  regardless  of  definition,  is 
significantly different from that associated with the more traditional crimes for 
which there are well-established standards and procedures (Smith, Grabosky, & 
Gregor Urbas, 2004; Stanfield, 2009). This has required the courts in Australia 
and elsewhere to consider how to deal with this type of evidence.  
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In Australian courts the admissibility of evidence is governed by both 
statute and common law. Each State and Territory have their own Evidence Act, 
with some combined to echo the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Mason, 2007). The 
general principle adopted by these courts for copies of documents presented as 
evidence is that a copy of a document is recognised as equivalent to the original 
and that this applies to computer records. As with other types of evidence, the 
courts  make  no  presumption  that  such  evidence  is  reliable  without  some 
evidence of empirical testing in relation to the theories and techniques associated 
with  the  production  of  the  copy  (Mason,  2007).  Edmond  (2010)  states  that 
“…reliability assessments should focus on the technique and its accuracy as well 
as the proficiency of the operator/analyst” (p. 94). This issue of reliability means 
that courts pay close attention to the manner in which digital evidence has been 
obtained and in particular the process in which the data is captured and stored 
(Cohen, 2011; Hargreaves, 2009; Kessler, 2010; Mason, 2007).  
Because  the  tools  and  procedures  employed  by  digital  forensic 
practitioners are generally outside the knowledge and understanding of the courts 
and juries they need to be described in such a way that they can be understood by 
the  layperson.  In  addition,  they  should  also  conform  to  some  standards  of 
practice  and  be  recognised  by  other  practitioners  working  in  the  field 
(Armstrong, 2003; Kessler, 2010).  
Australian Courts may apply methods used for testing scientific evidence 
to  digital  evidence  presented  before  them  and  this  is  commonly  based  on 
American practice (Kessler, 2010; Moles, 2007) which is to apply the Daubert 
test, named after Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (U.S.) (1993). In this 
case the US Supreme Court determined that it is the duty of a trial judge to  
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scrutinise evidence, particularly  if  it  is of an  innovative or unusual  scientific 
nature, to ensure that it  meets with the requirements of the  Federal Rules of 
Evidence rule 702 (Committee on the Judiciary, 2010)
4. According to these rules 
the process for determining the  admissibility of evidence requires that expert 
testimony must be derived from  ‘specialised knowledge’ requiring that reliable 
principles and methods have been applied.  This led to the court in Daubert v 
Merrell  Dow  Pharmaceuticals  (U.S.)  (1993)  establishing  what  has  become 
known as the Daubert test. In practice the Daubert test is often summarised as 
four
5 components that provide clarity around determination of ‘sufficient facts or 
data’ and ‘reliable principles and methods’ (Gosh, 2004a; Stephenson, 2003a): 
 
  Whether  the  theory  or technique  in  question  can  be  and  has  been 
tested 
  Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review 
and publication 
  The theory or technique’s known or potential rate of error  together 
with  the  existence  and  maintenance  of  standards  controlling  the 
technique’s operation 
  The  degree  of  acceptance  of  the  theory  or  technique  within  the 
relevant scientific community. 
 
Another  American  case,  Kumho  Tire  Company  v.  Carmichael  (U.S.) 
(1999),  expanded  the  Daubert  test  to  allow  for  non-scientists  to  give  expert 
                                                 
 
 
4 This has often been identified as the judge taking on the role of ‘gatekeeper’ (Kessler, 2010) 
5 This thesis uses the list from the original court transcript although some references list a five-
component test in which ‘error rate’ and ‘standards’ are separated.  
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evidence, such as engineers and other technical witnesses, as noted more recently 
by Gianelli (2007), Calhoun (2008) and Rogers (2006). This shows that despite 
the fact that the Daubert case was heard in 1993 its influence is still strong in 
relation to digital evidence, further demonstrated by the more recent consultation 
paper issued by the Law Commission for England and Wales which effectively 
mimics the Daubert test (Edmond, 2010). However, when applying the Daubert 
test  to  cases  involving  digital  forensic  tools  and  techniques  it  appears  that 
regarding digital forensics as a science causes some issues, in particular the lack 
of  generally  accepted  standards  and  procedures  (Carrier,  2002;  Meyers  & 
Rogers, 2004). Peisert et al (2008) suggest a reason for this is that the discipline 
has been developed without the typical initial research that would have provided 
the sound scientific basis necessary for admitting digital forensic evidence. This 
view  has  also  been  strongly  expressed  by  Meyers  and  Rogers  (2004),  who 
warned of digital forensics being labelled as ‘junk science’ due to the lack of 
certifications, standards or peer-reviewed methods. This view is understandable 
given  that  the  practice  of  digital  forensics  was  initially  undertaken  by 
practitioners who were not scientists but law enforcement officers and only more 
recently has it become a role for IT professionals. 
The  United  States  Computer  Emergency  Readiness  Team  (US-CERT, 
2012) also identify the immaturity of digital forensics as a significant issue and 
comment: 
 
Because  computer  forensics  is  a  new  discipline,  there  is  little 
standardization  and  consistency  across  the  courts  and  industry.  As  a 
result, it is not yet recognised as a formal ‘scientific’ discipline (p. 1).  
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Contrary to the contention of Buskirk and Liu (2006), who suggest that 
digital evidence is automatically presumed to be reliable, we have a situation in 
which, in the absence of anything better, courts are often using methods that 
apply to ‘classical’ science to determine the reliability of objects from digital 
forensics  (Calhoun,  2008;  Cheng,  2007;  Kenneally,  2005;  Kessler,  2010; 
Limongelli,  2008;  Meyers  &  Rogers,  2004).  In  relation  to  this  question  of 
evidence reliability, two of Palmer’s (2001) six phases of digital forensics relate 
directly to the acquisition of digital evidence; Preservation and Collection. These 
two acquisition phases are open to challenges in relation to breaks in the chain of 
evidence,  the  integrity  of  the  evidence,  the  completeness  of  the  evidence  or 
questioning the policies, procedures and resources used to gather the evidence. 
As  Rogers  (2004)  points  out  “If  doubt  is  cast  on  the  initial  collection  and 
management of evidence, output from the other phases is moot” (p. 12).  
The  multi-jurisdictional,  multi-environmental  nature of cases results  in 
different  applications  of  digital  forensic  principles  being  seen  by  courts  in 
different  ways;  therefore  the  methodology  employed  by  digital  forensic 
practitioners  will  always  come  under  scrutiny  (Kessler,  2010;  Rogers,  2006). 
This  issue  is  not  confined  to  the  law  enforcement  environment  as  it  applies 
equally to the activities of many commercial practitioners working in the field of 
digital  forensics  and  incident  response  who  may  also  be  involved  in  legal 
proceedings (Kohn, Eloff, & Olivier, 2006; Meyers & Rogers, 2004; Peisert, et 
al., 2008; Turnbull, 2008).  
Ciardhuáin  (2004)  suggests  that  a  comprehensive  model  would  have 
general benefits for IT managers, auditors and others not necessarily involved in  
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the legal process due to the increasing incidence of crimes involving computers. 
Ciardhuáin goes on to state: 
 
A  comprehensive  model  of  cybercrime  investigations  is  important  for 
standardising  terminology,  defining  requirements,  and  supporting  the 
development of new techniques and tools for investigators (2004, p. 1).  
 
Going further still, Trcek, Abie, Skomedal and Starc (2010) suggest the 
notion of an widely agreed-upon ‘template legislation’ that would harmonize the 
practice of digital forensics on an international basis.  
Many  researchers  writing  in  this  field  have  adopted  their  own 
terminology for describing their digital forensic process model. However, rather 
than  being  generic  these  models  have  often  been  aimed  at  particular 
environments, such as  law enforcement  (Rogers, 2006) and incident response 
(Cummins  &  Lowry,  2003;  Mandia  &  Prosise,  2001;  Stephenson,  2003b). 
Although some researchers have tried to utilise existing formal languages and 
methods rather than invent their own terminology they too have tended to focus 
on a particular environment (M. M. Pollitt, 2007). There has therefore been little 
progress  in  refining  and  defining  a  generic  digital  forensic  process  since  the 
initial  meeting  of  the  Digital  Forensic  Workshop  in  2001  (Cohen,  2011; 
ISO/IEC, 2011; Nance, et al., 2010; Scholtz & Narayanan, 2010; Trcek, et al., 
2010;  US-CERT,  2012).  Furthermore,  Agarwal  et  al  (2011)  note  that  recent 
process models have been mainly ad hoc and they recommend that more research 
should be carried out in this area.    
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1.2   Research problem  
These considerations lead us to the research problem which is that: 
There is no formal generic process model for the acquisition of digital data 
that encompasses the activities of practitioners  working in the different 
environments of law enforcement, commerce and incident response such 
that  it  can  assist  courts  of  law  in  determining  the  reliability  of  the 
acquisition process employed to collect potential digital evidence. 
1.3   Research objective and questions 
1.3.1  Research objective 
The research objective is to develop a formal model of the process for the 
forensic acquisition of digital data that is generic in that it can be employed by 
digital  forensic practitioners  in the  fields of commerce,  law  enforcement and 
incident response. The objective therefore consists of two goals: 
 
  There must be a formal representation of the model  
  The  model  must  be  relevant  to  the  fields  of  commerce,  law 
enforcement and incident response. 
1.3.2  Research questions 
In order to achieve the research objective the following  three research 
questions need to be answered: 
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1.  What  are  the  essential  components  necessary  in  a  model  that 
describes  a  generic  and  forensically  sound  digital  data  acquisition 
process? 
2.  How  can  the  identified  components  for  a  generic  and  forensically 
sound digital data acquisition process be combined  into a working 
model? 
3.  What is a suitable way for describing, presenting and using model for 
acquiring digital data? 
 
In obtaining answers to these research questions this research will enable 
the development of a new model for the forensic acquisition of digital data that 
can  be  used  by  practitioners  working  within  the  fields  of  law  enforcement, 
incident response and third-party services. 
1.4   Research Scope      
1.4.1  Limitation of process scope 
McKemmish (1999) defines the process of forensic computing as “…the 
process of identifying, preserving, analysing and presenting digital evidence in a 
manner that is legally acceptable” (p. 1). McKemmish also describes four key 
elements associated with this process:  
 
  The identification of digital evidence 
  The preservation of digital evidence 
  The analysis of digital evidence 
  The presentation of digital evidence.  
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Although many attempts have been made to develop a model that covers 
all aspects of this definition of digital forensics the process scope of this research 
will be limited to the context of digital evidence acquisition which only covers 
the first two elements of McKemmish’s (1999) definition. This limitation has 
been introduced on the basis that a review of the literature suggested that the task 
of incorporating the other key elements, particularly the analysis stage, would be 
beyond the limits of a single research thesis, particularly in the light of criticism 
of many other models which is that they have tried to take on too big a task 
making them unwieldy and complex (Rogers, 2004; Schatz, 2007).                           
1.4.2  Limitation of environment scope 
Although  digital  forensic  tools  and  processes  are  employed  across  a 
number  of  environments  the  environment  scope  for  this  research  has  been 
restricted  to  the  three  areas  of  ‘commerce’,  ‘incident  response’  and  ‘law 
enforcement’ digital forensic activity within Australia. The military environment 
has been excluded on the basis that for anyone outside of this area of the armed 
forces it is extremely difficult to obtain data on their processes and procedures 
and  it  has  therefore  been  considered  practical  to  only  identify  essential  key 
elements across the three stated environments.  
The  geographical  restriction  to  Australia  is  imposed  because  of  the 
complexity  of  evaluating  the  model  against  the  needs  of  a  large  number  of 
jurisdictions where digital evidence may be presented, although this could be an 
element of future research. However, this restriction will not prevent the new 
model  from  having relevance  in other environments that have a similar  legal 
basis for assessing digital evidence.  
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1.4.3  Limitation of model detail scope 
The  field  in  which  computer  forensic  practitioners  work  is  constantly 
evolving  through  advances  in  technology  and  tools  (Garfinkel,  2010,  p.  66; 
Mercuri, 2005; Schatz, 2007). Given this rapidly-changing environment, from a 
practical perspective, it would be highly unlikely that every situation could be 
anticipated  and  the  necessary  detail  instructions  provided  as  part  of  the  new 
process model (Garfinkel, 2010, p. 66; McDermott & Fox, 1999). Furthermore, 
from a risk-mitigation perspective, a low-level prescriptive list of actions could 
involve practitioners in complicated legal challenges as they may have to explain 
why  they  didn’t  follow  every  single  item  on  the  list  where  many  will  be 
irrelevant in the particular circumstances (Garfinkel, 2010, p. 67). Limiting the 
level  of  detail  of  the  new  model,  and  thereby  making  it  more  practical  and 
therefore more likely to be adopted, addresses the issue raised with respect to 
some other process models that have been criticised for their large amount of 
detail  which  is  claimed  to  have  made  them  cumbersome  and  too  specific  or 
complex to use (McDermott &  Fox, 1999; Reith, et al., 2002; Schatz, 2007; 
Selamat,  et  al.,  2008).  Schatz  (2007)  refers  to  this  issue  as  the  ‘complexity 
problem’  which  relates  to  the  ever-changing  technical  environment  in  which 
digital  forensic  practitioners  work  that  quickly  makes  lists  that  are  too 
prescriptive become obsolete very quickly. 
In  terms  of  the  ‘target  audience’,  unlike  some  earlier  process  models 
where the practitioner is expected to have very little (if any) computer forensic 
experience the new model is aimed at those operating in the area of computer 
forensics who are professionals and who already have the necessary skills and 
experience for undertaking data acquisition together with existing processes and  
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procedures (Brown, 2006; Bunting & Wei, 2006; Calhoun, 2008; B. D. Carrier, 
2006; Jones, et al., 2006; Kent, et al., 2006). The new model is intended to help 
structure their existing processes in a formal way that can be readily described to 
the court instead of completely replacing them. In addition, existing procedures 
and practices. 
The  need  for  practitioners  to  have  specific  guidance  in  new  areas  of 
technology  is  already  addressed  in  the  form  of  academic  papers  and  other 
publications  (many  of  which  are  available  online)  that  are  constantly  being 
updated and that can assist practitioners with new or unfamiliar technology and 
best practices (Kim, Hong, & Chung, 2008; Sammes & Jenkinson, 2007; Savoldi 
& Gubian, 2008; Sutherland, Evans, Tryfonas, & Blyth, 2008). 
1.4.4  Excluded from scope 
The field of digital forensics is continually changing as new technology is 
developed both as the focus of a digital forensic practitioner’s activities and in 
relation to the tools available to undertake those activities. This has led to the 
difficulties  being  faced  by  the  U.S.  National  Institute  of  Standards  and 
Technology (NIST) who have been unable to keep pace with new digital forensic 
software being released or even updates to existing software. For instance, the 
NIST handbook revised on 1 February 2012 (Lyle, 2012) refers to the testing 
results of EnCase version 6.5, but by 23 February 2012 the production version of 
EnCase was v7.03. This problem comes about because the tools themselves are 
victims  of  the  fast-moving  environment  of  digital  forensics  and  the  need  for 
those “… tools designed solely for forensic purposes to keep abreast of the broad 
range of technology” (Slay & Beckett, 2007, p. 4).  Therefore this research does 
not attempt to address the issue of the reliability of the  vast array of tools or  
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computer systems that a digital forensic practitioner may choose to utilise in the 
course of their work. 
1.5   Research contribution 
This  thesis  adds  to the  body  of  knowledge  by  building  upon  existing 
digital  forensic  research  in  relation  to  process  models  and  synthesises  key 
elements  to  produce  the  first  formal  generic  model  for  the  acquisition  of 
potential  digital  evidence,  the  ADAM.  In  addition,  it  contains  the  most 
comprehensive review to date of existing process models relating to the field of 
digital  forensics. Finally,  by demonstrating the  instantiation of the theoretical 
requirements of a digital forensic acquisition process model through the adoption 
of the Unified Modelling Language (UML)
6 this thesis paves the way for using 
UML to describe the other aspects of the digital forensic environment that could 
lead to a complete formal description encompassing all digital forensic activities. 
1.6   Methodology 
1.6.1  Selection of methodology 
This section presents the methodology used in this research. The methods 
and processes used in this research are discussed in relation to how they address 
the research objectives. 
Design science (A. Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; AR Hevner, March, Park, 
& Ram, 2004; A. R. Hevner, 2007; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008; Lee, 2000; 
                                                 
 
 
6 Controlled by the Object Management Group at http://www.uml.org/  
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McKay & Marshall, 2007; Peffers, et al., 2006; Storey, 2008; Venable, 2006) has 
been selected as the methodology used for this research. The selection of Design 
Science rather than alternatives such as Requirements Engineering (Nuseibeh & 
Easterbrook, 2000) was made on the basis that it is particularly suited to the task 
of  creating a new process model (an artefact). Armstrong & Armstrong (2010) 
point out that with design sciences’ focus on designing solutions it is an ‘ideal 
approach’ in the problem domain of digital forensic evidence. 
The  design  science  paradigm  is  concerned  with  the  creation,  and 
subsequent evaluation, of IT artefacts within an organisational context to solve 
specific problems (A. Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; AR Hevner, March, Park, & 
Ram,  2004).These  artefacts  include  constructs,  models,  methods  and 
instantiations (real-life products such as prototype systems) (AR Hevner, et al., 
2004).  Design  science  has  as  its  goals  the  creation  of  effective  artefacts  and 
utility (Applegate, 1999; AR Hevner, et al., 2004; Simon, 1996).  
Hevner  et  al  (2004)  make  the  distinction  between  routine  design  and 
design  science  research  by  stating  that  routine  design  applies  existing 
knowledge, such as current best practices, to organisational problems whereas 
design  science  research  addresses  either  unsolved  problems  in  new  ways  or 
solved problems more efficiently or more effectively.  
Design  science  researchers  come  to  understand  the  problem  that  is 
addressed by the artefact and its appropriateness for providing a solution through 
the artefact’s  construction and use in the field (Nunamaker, Chen, & Purdin, 
1990). In so doing they are not seeking ‘truth’ but attempting to improve an 
existing situation through the application of the artefact having considered the 
environment in which it is to be deployed and the intended users of the artefact  
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(McKay  &  Marshall,  2005).  McKay  and  Marshall  argue  that  because 
Information  Systems  usage  is  within  an  environment  in  which  some  part  of 
human activity  is aided  by computer technology the context and use of  such 
systems  should  be  considered  when  carrying  out  research  in  this  area.  In 
addition, Applegate (1999) has called for ‘industry-relevant’ research as opposed 
to adopting the more traditional functionalist paradigm that is usually associated 
with the IS discipline.  
The artefact associated with this research is a new model that describes 
the forensic acquisition of digital data, the Advanced Data Acquisition Model 
(ADAM).  The  organisational  context  is  that  of  a  generic  digital  forensic 
practitioner,  i.e.  they  may  be  working  in  law  enforcement  (in  its  broadest 
meaning), commercial practice or incident response. This research addresses an 
unsolved problem: that there is no formal generic model for the acquisition of 
digital  data  that  encompasses  the  activities  of  practitioners  working  in  the 
different environments of law enforcement, commerce and incident response.  
1.6.2  Process model for the research 
A paper produced by Hevner et al. (2004) on the topic of design science 
was intended to present design science as an alternative paradigm for IS research 
and as such it does not provide detail on the actual process for undertaking that 
research  (A.  Hevner  &  Chatterjee,  2010;  Venable,  2006).  Nunamaker  et  al 
(1990)  place  the  building  of  the  artefact  as  the  central  activity  but  Venable 
(2006) argues that research papers in design science have neglected to emphasise 
the importance of theory building as a key aspect of design science research and 
therefore proposes an alternative framework which has theory as the central role.  
15 
While both the Venable and Nunamaker et al frameworks are useful as high-
level guides for this research they lack sufficient detail in their application.  
The  process  model  selected  for  this  research  is  the  Design  Science 
Research  Process  (DSRP)  model  developed  by  Peffers,  Tuunanen,  Gengler, 
Rossi, Hui, Virtanen and Bragge (2006) that has been frequently used within 
information systems research
7. The DSRP is intended to meet three objectives: 
(1) to be consistent with prior literature; (2) to provide a nominal process model 
for doing DS research and  (3) to provide a mental model for presenting and 
appreciating DS research  in IS.   From the synthesis of the common design 
process elements Peffers et al developed the DSRP that consists of six activities 
as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1    Design Science Research Process (DSRP) model  after Peffers et al 
(2006) 
 
                                                 
 
 
7 The model has been cited over 60 times in the ACM Digital Library 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1481768  
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Brief descriptions of the activities in the DSRP are outlined below: 
 
  Activity 1 
The  first  of  the  activities,  ‘Problem  Identification  and  Motivation’, 
involves  establishing  the  problem  to  be  addressed  and  justifying  the 
research based on the perceived benefits of the resulting artefact. 
  Activity 2 
This involves creation of the ‘Objectives of a Solution’ and requires the 
researcher to define the objectives which will be based on the problem to 
be solved. 
  Activity 3 
The  activity  ‘Design  and  Development’  involves  the  creation  of  the 
artefact. 
  Activity 4 
For the ‘Demonstration’ activity the artefact is used in some appropriate 
environment to solve the stated problem.  
  Activity 5 
In the ‘Evaluation’ activity the performance of the artefact is reviewed 
with reference to the stated objective(s) from activity 2. It may be the 
case that at this stage the researcher considers that the artefact requires 
further design and development and therefore resorts to activity 3 as part 
of an iterative process. 
  Activity 6 
The  final  activity  is  ‘Communication’  in  which  the  researcher  puts 
forward their research to add to the body of knowledge in their field. 
Peffers  et  al  (2006)  identify  the  need  for  communication,  initially  
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proposed by  both  Archer  (1984) and Hevner et al  (2004),  in order to 
publicise  the  problem,  its  significance  and  the  resulting  artefact.  This 
communication  should  be  addressed  to  practicing  professionals, 
academics and other relevant parties.  
 
Peffers et al (2006) identify several points in relation to the activities that 
comprise  the  DSRP  at  which  a  researcher  may  start  their  research  process 
(Figure 1). The entry point for this research is now discussed. 
1.6.3  Applying the methodology to the research problem 
This  research  has  as  its  focus  the  problem  that  there  is  currently  no 
generic process model for the digital forensic acquisition process. The research is 
therefore based on a ‘problem centred approach’ and as such the entry point in 
the DSRP is at the first activity. 
The  following  sections  describe  how  the  chosen  methodology  will  be 
followed in the course of this research. In addition, as the DSRP does not include 
the low-level detail of how to carry out the activities within the individual stages; 
this section will also describe the process that will be followed with reference to 
the appropriate methodologies. 
DSRP Activity 1 - Problem Identification and Motivation 
The problem that this thesis addresses is: 
There is no formal generic model for the acquisition of digital data that 
encompasses  the  activities  of  practitioners  working  in  the  different 
environments of law enforcement, commerce and incident response. 
  
18 
Checkland and Poulter (2006) consider a real-world problematic situation 
that requires some form of intervention in order to improve it. This intervention 
requires  the  identification  and  analysis  of  a  given  problem  situation  by  a 
researcher to develop a deep understanding of the problem area in order that an 
appropriate solution can be identified (Rhalibi, England, & Hanneghan, 2005). A 
deep knowledge of the problem area for this research will be satisfied through an 
extensive  review  of  the  associated  literature  with  respect  to  relevant  process 
models added to the thesis author’s own practitioner experience in the domain of 
computer forensics. 
DSRP Activity 2 - Objectives of a Solution 
The objective of this research is to develop a formal model of the process 
for  the  forensic  acquisition  of  digital  data  that  is  generic  in  that  it  can  be 
employed  by  digital  forensic  practitioners  in  the  fields  of  commerce,  law 
enforcement and incident response. 
DSRP Activity 3 - Design and Development 
The  contributions  from  previous  researchers  in  the  literature  review, 
personal experience and interactions with other digital forensic practitioners will 
be used to create the new model. For the design and development stage the top-
level approach taken will be to: 
 
1.  Identify criteria against which existing models will be assessed 
A review of the comments from other researchers on existing models that 
are relevant to this research will  be used to formulate criteria  for the 
overall assessment of the models or to identify existing criteria that may 
be employed in this way. These will constitute the Assessment Criteria.  
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In addition to the identified assessment criteria the models will also be 
considered in the light of the Daubert tests (Supreme Court of the United 
States, 1993) as described on page 2.  The two methods of assessment 
will  be  considered  for  relevance  following  on  from  the  argument 
presented in 1.1 above in which the appropriateness of the Daubert test 
was brought into question with regard to assisting a court of law to assess 
the scientific merit of the process of digital data acquisition. 
2.  Evaluate existing models against criteria 
Each existing model will be reviewed to determine which, if any, of the 
identified  assessment  criteria  have  been  met  by  that  model.  For  each 
model the results of the comparison will be stated and then the overall 
results summarised.  
3.  Identify common requirements across different environments 
The environments for this research are commerce, incident response and 
law  enforcement.  Those  models  most  closely  meeting  the  assessment 
criteria will be considered for their possible contribution to the ADAM. 
A  set  of  model  attributes  will  be  constructed  to obtain  both  the  core 
elements  that  are  common  across  the  three  areas  of  digital  forensic 
practice that form the focus of this research as well as any innovative 
suggestions  made  by  individual  researchers  that  might  enhance  the 
ADAM. 
4.  Propose a new model incorporating the requirements of the 
different environments 
The contributions of previous researchers through their process models 
will  be  used  as  the  basis  for  the  new  model  whilst  paying  particular  
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attention to ‘domain-specific’ attributes (i.e. those associated specifically 
with  either  the  commerce,  incident  response  or  law  enforcement 
environments) to ensure that they are accommodated. Attention will also 
be paid to criticisms of previous  models to gain  insight  into potential 
design or implementation pitfalls whilst ensuring that the model remains 
‘forensically sound’.  
DSRP Activity 4 - Demonstration 
The purpose of the model is to describe the data acquisition activities of 
digital forensic practitioners and therefore the ‘appropriate environment’ for the 
demonstration activity required by the DSRP will be addressed by applying the 
ADAM within a commercial computer forensic service provider. The aim of the 
Demonstration activity (covered in Chapter 5) will be to determine how well the 
model  compares  with  a  sample  of  previous  cases  based  on  documentation 
produced  contemporaneously.  Given  the  confidential  nature  of  the  type  of 
documentation being examined and its restricted access the thesis author will 
take  advantage  of  his  position  within  a  service  provider  of  digital  forensic 
services by undertaking the Demonstration activity in-house. This also has the 
advantage  that  any  obvious  shortcomings  in  the  ADAM  can  be  addressed 
without  impinging  on  the  time  of  external  reviewers.  As  this  activity  only 
constitutes a pilot trial the fact that it is to be performed within the thesis author’s 
own environment will not affect the independent evaluation of the ADAM that 
occurs in the following activity. 
DSRP Activity 5 – Evaluation 
Cleven et al (2009) state that, in order to realise utility when developing 
an artefact based on design science research, attention should be given to two  
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fundamental requirements which are ‘relevance’ and ‘rigour’. Relevance requires 
that  the  artefact  addresses  a  real  business  need  whilst  rigour  requires  the 
researcher to appropriately apply the existing body of knowledge.  
The evaluation activity will be conducted by two independent panels of 
external  reviewers  who  between  them  will  be  able  to  address  the  relevance 
aspect of the development of the ADAM. With regard to the Cleven et al ‘rigour’ 
requirement  the  issue  of  enhancing  the  credibility  of  this  research  through 
triangulation  of  data  (Creswell,  2005)  has  been  balanced  with  the  practical 
aspects of obtaining quality feedback through in-depth reviews by authoritative 
reviewers. Bruce (2007) points out that the trustworthiness of the reporting is a 
more significant factor for credibility than the number of ‘data events’ and so, 
despite  the  relatively  small  number  of  reviewers  planned  to  assist  with  this 
research,  they  are  all  authorities  within  the  field  of  digital  forensics  whose 
feedback should be both insightful and reliable.  
DSRP Activity 6 – Communication 
As the research is presented in the form of a thesis, the Communication 
activity  cannot  be  completed  by  the  time  of  its  submission.  However,  a 
submission  detailing  the  potential  for  ADAM  to  be  deployed  in  a  ‘cloud’ 
environment has been accepted for publication and will appear in a refereed book 
chapter to be published in December 2012 
8. The communication aspect of the 
DSRP will also be covered with respect to academic knowle dge through direct 
communications  with  academic  leaders  in  t his  field  (also  as  part  of  the 
                                                 
 
 
8 IGI Global (Cybercrime and Cloud forensics: Applications for Investigative Processes, Chapter 
5- The Emergence of Cloud Storage and a New Digital Forensic Process Model  
22 
Evaluation  process)  and  publications  in  refereed  journals  together  with  the 
publication of this thesis within the Murdoch University Research Repository
9. 
With  respect  to  communicating  with  practitioners,  this  will  be 
accomplished  through  the  involvement  of  the  High  Technology  Crime 
Investigators  Association  and  by  introducing  the  ADAM  as  part  of  a 
postgraduate  course  in  the  Centre  for  Forensic  Science  at  the  University  of 
Western  Australia  (course  ref.  FNSC8617  –  Forensics  and  Information 
Technology).  
1.7   Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1 (Introduction to the research) provides a brief summary of the 
digital forensic environment and highlights the importance of digital evidence 
acquisition. The challenges faced when presenting digital evidence in court are 
reviewed  and  the  contribution  this  thesis  intends  to  make  to the  field  stated, 
including  the  methodology  that  will  be  employed  and  the  limitations  of  this 
research.  
Chapter 2 (Literature review) will provide a general review of the field of 
digital  evidence  followed  by  detailed  review  of  previous  process  models 
involving the forensic acquisition of digital data.  
Chapter  3  (Requirements)  will  introduce  the  Assessment  Criteria  and 
cover  the  process  for  identifying  the  requirements  for  the  new  model  by 
evaluating each of the models from the literature review against the Assessment 
Criteria. The essential components of the new model will be identified.  
                                                 
 
 
9 http://researchrepository murdoch.edu.au/view/types/thesis.html  
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Chapter 4 (Design and development) will describe the design activity for 
the ADAM together with the rationale behind the requirements for each of the 
model’s stages.  
Chapter 5 (Demonstration) will cover an appraisal of the ADAM through 
the  Demonstration  activity  that  involves  reviewing  the  contemporaneous 
documentation from three previous in-house investigations and comparing the 
activities against the ADAM.  This chapter will also include a walkthrough of 
the  model  using  four  scenarios.  Based  on  the  results  of  the  Demonstration 
process,  amendments  to  the  ADAM  will  be  identified  in  preparation  for  its 
submission to the external reviewers consisting of a Panel of Experts and a Panel 
of Practitioners.  
Chapter 6 (Evaluation) will describe the composition of the Expert and 
Practitioner  Panels,  the  tasks  they  were  set  and  the  results  of  their  feedback 
including detailed changes to the ADAM.  
Chapter  7  (Conclusion)  will  discuss  the  limitations  of  this  research 
together with the potential future research opportunities. The research will be 
summarised in relation to the research objective and its contribution to the field 
of digital forensics stated. Finally, the forums in which this research has been, or 
will be, communicated will be identified. 
1.8   Summary 
In this chapter the  justification  for this research has  been  set out and 
background  information  in  relation  to  the  research  problem  and  the  generic 
environment for digital forensics has been provided. The research problem has 
been  defined  and  the  research  questions  stated.  The  selection  of  the  Design  
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Science research methodology has been covered and the process of applying the 
selected  methodology  to  the  research  question  based  on  the  Design  Science 
Research  Process  of  Peffers,  Tuunanen,  Gengler,  Rossi,  Hui,  Virtanen  and 
Bragge (2006) is described together with the thesis structure and outline.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1  Introduction 
In relation to the DSRP used for this research this chapter will cover the 
‘knowledge of the state of the problem’ and the ‘current solutions’. This chapter 
first presents a literature review on the field of digital evidence. This provides 
the necessary background for the review of previous process models involving 
the forensic acquisition of digital data.  
The  review  of  previous  models  was  undertaken  using  online  data 
resources accessed via the Murdoch University library such as ScienceDirect and 
the  ACM  Digital  Library.  Online  search  engines  were  also  used  to  identify 
conference papers, personal websites and university repositories. The following 
free-text  search  terms  were  used  in  various  combinations  and  forms:  digital, 
computer,  forensics,  process,  models,  cyber,  acquisition,  imaging,  activities, 
capture, standards, guidelines, incident response, crime and evidence.  
Several papers provided summaries of relevant process models and these 
were cross-checked to identify any missing models or references. The review 
suggested three central themes which provide the framework for  this chapter. 
These themes are: 
 
  The use of ‘ad hoc’ design elements 
  Adopting a ‘process flow’ approach 
  Employing some form of ‘scientific’ approach.  
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2.2  Digital evidence 
Prior to the existence of digital data storage devices the Best Evidence 
Rule (in use since the 18
th century) meant that the original writing, recording or 
photograph needed to be produced in court unless these had been destroyed or 
were  unavailable  in  which  case  a  certified  copy  or  duplicate  was  admissible 
(Steel, 2006). This Common Law rule of ‘best evidence’ had been applied in 
many  jurisdictions,  including  Australia,  but  over  the  years  there  have  been 
various challenges, particularly with respect to differences between hard copy 
(paper-based)  and  soft  copy  (digital  data  based)  records  (Argy,  2006).  Some 
examples of these differences are: 
 
  There  may  be  differences  between  hard  copy  and  soft 
copy versions of a document such that some information 
associated with the document may only be visible during 
the examination of the digital version, e.g. comments and 
alterations  
  Hard copy documents need no special tools and can be 
viewed  and  read  by  the  naked  eye,  whereas  soft  copy 
documents require the appropriate hardware and software 
  Soft copy documents can easily be altered  
  Soft  copy  documents  can  be  easily  copied  and 
disseminated.  
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In  addition,  unlike  a  paper  document,  the  act  of  viewing  a  digital 
document or record by  using a computer and a software application or other 
facility can cause changes to be made to the original data contained on the digital 
storage device, i.e. the original evidence is no longer in the form it was in when 
it was obtained. The requirement to produce original documents was abandoned 
in some states through the introduction in Australia of the Evidence Act 1995 
(Cth) (Austl.) that applies to the Federal Court, New South Wales, Australian 
Capital  Territory  and  Tasmanian  proceedings  and  is  in  the  process  of  being 
adopted by other Australian jurisdictions as the Uniform Evidence Acts. Section 
51 of the Uniform Evidence Acts now allows for the copy of a document to have 
the same evidentiary status as the original. 
The  Uniform  Evidence  Acts  defines  a  document  as  any  record  of 
information and includes: 
 
1.  Anything on which there is writing;  
2.  Anything  on  which  there  are  marks,  figures,  symbols  or 
perforations  having  a  meaning  for  persons  qualified  to  interpret 
them;  
3.  Anything from which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced 
with or without the aid of anything else; or  
4.  A map, plan, drawing or photograph.  
 
The  wording  of  the  Uniform  Evidence  Acts  also  means  that  a  digital 
storage  device  is  itself  a  document  and  in  relation  to  computer  records  the 
Evidence Acts in Victoria, Queensland and South Australia specifically state that  
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evidence derived from computer records will be admissible (although subject to 
certain  conditions  of  reliability).  Whilst  the  remaining  jurisdictions  do  not 
provide specific provisions, each of them recognise a copy of a computer record  
(Argy, 2006). 
The  “conditions  of  reliability”  are  generally  the  same  for  most 
jurisdictions  and  Steel  (2006,  p.26)  states  that  electronic  copies  of  data  are 
admissible provided that:  
 
 
1. They were from the indicated source 
2. They were acquired using proven tools and techniques 
3.  They have not been altered since the time of acquisition. 
 
The use of “proven tools and techniques” is consistent with the Daubert 
test mentioned in 1.1. In relation to Steel’s “conditions of reliability” a process 
methodology that ensures that comprehensive notes are maintained from the start 
of the acquisition process will aid in addressing  condition (1) by confirming the 
source of the data; it will aid in addressing the need to show the use of “proven 
tools  and  technique”  required  in  condition  (2)  by  recording  which  tools  and 
techniques were  adopted (assuming the digital  forensic practitioner  has  made 
appropriate choices in this regard), and it will also assist in meeting condition (3) 
by showing that the data has not been altered since it was acquired through the 
recording of  hash values (Schwarz, Newby, & Carroll, 2009; Steel, 2006). 
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A  further  aspect  of  reliability  in  relation  to  the  activities  of  digital 
forensic  practitioners  who  are  handling  digital  evidence  is  the  concept  of 
“forensically sound tasks” as identified by Rogers (2006) who states that they are 
derived from properties of digital forensics and comprise of Authenticity, Chain 
of  Custody,  Integrity,  Minimization  and  Reproducibility.  Rogers  cites 
McKemmish (1999) and Mocas (2004) as sources for these properties. 
2.3  Standards and Guidelines in data acquisition 
There are significant differences between the activities associated with 
law  enforcement  agencies  and  those  practicing  digital  forensics  in  another 
environment. Where there does seem to be a large degree of consistency is in 
acceptance of the basic principles associated with the handling of digital devices, 
although there are still many issues surrounding the precise implementation of 
these principles  in the different environments.  Noblett et al (2000) suggest a 
‘Three-Level  Hierarchical  Model  for  Developing  Guidelines  for  Computer 
Forensic  Evidence’  on  the  basis  that  despite  short-term  changes  within  the 
environment  in  which  digital  forensic  practitioners  work  there  should  be  a 
consistent long-term standardised approach to their activities. In order to achieve 
this, the three stages of the Noblett et al  model  include a  limited  number of 
overarching principles which are then reflected in policies/practices which then 
lead to specific procedures and techniques. This hierarchy moves from industry 
best practice principles through to organisational polices for ensuring quality and 
efficiency and culminates in those activities that are likely to be introduced or 
modified to cater for changes in technology such as the introduction of a new  
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software tool or the release of a different type of storage device. Common areas 
for identifying the details of best practice are published standards and guidelines.  
Standards  Australia  is  the  Australian  non-government  body  given 
responsibility by the Commonwealth Government to meet Australia's need for 
“contemporary,  internationally  aligned  Standards  and  related  services” 
(Standards Australia, 2012a). Standards Australia provides the following wide-
ranging definition for a Standard: 
 
Standards  are  published  documents  setting  out  specifications  and 
procedures designed to ensure products, services and systems are safe, 
reliable and consistently perform the way they were intended to. They 
establish a common language which defines quality and safety criteria  
(Standards Australia, 2012b). 
 
The following sections summarise the various references and guides that 
are associated with digital data and legal processes. The first two references are 
described as Standards with the remainder being ‘guides’ or ‘guidelines’. 
2.3.1  International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
The main international body that is relevant to standards within the field 
of digital forensics is the International Organization for Standardization
10  which 
is a non-government organisation and is an international standard-setting body 
that  is  composed  of  representatives  from  164  countries
11,  one  of  which  is 
                                                 
 
 
10 http://www.iso.org/iso/home htm 
11 As at September 2012  
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Standards Australia
12. ISO is based in Geneva, Switzerland and although it has 
no government-enforced powers the standards that it creates are often adopted as 
law by its member countries. In addition to the standards that it sets, ISO also 
publishes technical reports, guides and other technical literature, normally based 
on the output from  special committees that are established  for a particular 
purpose. One of these committees, JTC1 (the only joint committee of ISO), is the 
specialist  standards-setting  organisation  for  electrical,  electronic  and  related 
technologies. At a meeting held in Kyoto in April 2008 a sub-committee of JTC1 
(JTC1/SC  27  –  IT  Security  Techniques)  proposed  a  Study  in  the  area  of 
Evidence  Acquisition  Procedure  for  Digital  Forensics
13.    The  ongoing 
contribution of the Australian Standards Working Group, of which the author of 
this thesis is a member, is currently being coordinated by Ajoy Gosh who has 
authored previous standards and guidelines in this area  (Gosh, 2004a, 2004b) 
with input from law enforcement, education and commerce. 
2.3.2  British Standards Institute (BSI) 
The  British  Standards  Institute  has  produced  a  standard,  BS  10008, 
whose title, ‘Evidential weight and legal admissibility of electronic information – 
Specification’,  suggests  that  it  may  be  related  to  the  acquisition  of  digital 
evidence.  However,  the  standard  relates  to  the  production  of  electronic 
documents  that  may  be  required  as  evidence  of  business  transactions  and 
provides advice for practices and procedures involving information management 
systems.  
                                                 
 
 
12 http://www.standards.org.au/ 
13 The author is a member of the Australian Standards working group for this document and is 
therefore aware of its contents and structure.  
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In contrast to the limited number of Standards associated with the field of 
digital forensics there are several guidelines with each having a particular focus 
area such as law enforcement, electronic discovery, commercial digital forensics 
and  incident  response.  The  main  references  encountered  during  the  literature 
review are now covered in more detail. 
2.3.3  Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Guide 
The  UK  National  Hi-Tech  Crime  Unit  produces  (on  behalf  of  the 
Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers)  its  Good  Practice  Guide  for  Computer 
Based Electronic Evidence (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2003) which 
contains definitions of the four Principles: 
 
Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents 
should  change  data  held  on  a  computer  or  storage  media  which  may 
subsequently be relied upon in court. 
Principle  2:  In  exceptional  circumstances,  where  a  person  finds  it 
necessary to access original data held on a computer or on storage media, 
that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions. 
Principle  3:  An  audit  trail  or other  record of  all  processes  applied  to 
computer based electronic evidence should be created and preserved. An 
independent third party should be able to examine those processes and 
achieve the same result. 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation (the case officer) 
has overall responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles 
are adhered to.  
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Fundamental  to  the  concept  of  work  undertaken  in  a  forensic 
environment is the ability to use  any  material or information discovered  in  a 
court of law. As quoted above, Principles 1 and 2 require that, if possible, the 
original digital data is not altered by any activities of the investigator or, if data 
has been altered, the person responsible is able to explain what was altered and 
the implications of this on the evidence being presented. 
2.3.4  International Organization on Computer Evidence (IOCE)  
In  general  terms  the  ACPO  rules  are  mirrored  by  the  International 
Organization  on  Computer  Evidence  in  its  draft  guidelines  (I.O.C.E,  2002) 
which themselves are based on the ISO 17025 Standard
14. The IOCEs purpose is 
stated as  being a forum with an international focus in which law enforcement 
agencies can exchange information in relation to computer forensic issues.   The 
IOCE’s guidelines can be summarised as: 
 
  The general rules of evidence should be applied to all digital evidence  
  Upon seizing digital evidence, actions taken should not change that 
evidence 
  When it is necessary for a person to access original digital evidence 
that person should be suitably trained for the purpose 
  All  activity  relating  to  the  seizure,  access,  storage  or  transfer  of 
digital evidence must be fully documented, preserved and available 
for review  
                                                 
 
 
14 This is the main standard used by testing and calibration laboratories and was first published in 
2001. This is a general purpose document concerned with management and quality procedures 
that do not specifically relate to computer forensic labs.   
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  An  individual  is  responsible  for  all  actions  taken  with  respect  to 
digital evidence whilst the digital evidence is in their possession. 
2.3.5  McKemmish’s rules 
McKemmish  (1999)  introduces  four  rules  that  must  be  followed  by 
digital forensic practitioners during the course of their work but although they 
provide the framework under which the digital forensic practitioner should be 
working  they  do  not  provide  detailed  guidance  (although  McKemmish  does 
provide  justification  and  examples  of  their  application  in  context). 
McKemmish’s rules are: 
 
  First Rule: This involves the handling of evidence and requires that 
the original source of the data should be handled as little as possible 
and  only  to the  extent  needed  in  order  to obtain  an  authenticated 
copy.  
  Second  Rule:  While  accommodating  situations  in  which  the 
practitioner has no choice but to undertake some activity that alters 
the  data,  such  as  entering  a  password  to  access  a  computer,  the 
Second  Rule  requires  the  practitioner  to  account  for  changes  they 
may  make  to  any  of  the  data  which  comes  under  their  control. 
Identifying and recording these changes will require the practitioner 
to have a deep technical knowledge of the environment such that they 
are aware of the implications of their actions. 
  Third Rule: This states the need to comply with the rules of evidence 
such that the admissibility of the evidence cannot be  brought  into  
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question.  This  involves  adhering  to  the  other  rules  as  well  as 
maintaining a chain of custody and other documentation in order that 
any challenges relating to admissibility may be defended. 
  Fourth Rule: This states that the digital forensic practitioner should 
not proceed with activities in a situation where they have exceeded 
their  knowledge  of  the  environment  or  situation.  Given  the  ever-
changing environment this requires practitioners to keep their training 
program updated. 
2.3.6  Gosh’s guidelines 
The  focus  of  the  document  ‘Guidelines  for  the  Management  of  IT 
Records’ (Gosh, 2004b) is to assist organisations to manage the data stored on 
their systems in such a way that it may be readily accessed and provided in an 
admissible form in the event that it may be relevant in some form of litigation. 
Although digital forensic methods are referenced the focus of this document is 
with  Electronic  Discovery  rather  than  third-party  investigations  and  does  not 
take into account the wider needs of digital forensic practitioners. 
2.3.7  Brezinski & Killalea’s guidelines 
The  document  ‘Guidelines  for  Evidence  Collection  and 
Archiving’(Brezinski & Killalea, 2002) is a Network Working Group memo that 
is focussed on incident response. It does however provide advice on a range of 
digital forensic activities in the form of actions to be carried out under various 
headings, including ‘chain of custody’ considerations.  
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2.4  The First Digital Forensic Research Workshop 
The First Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) took place in 
2001 and included a session titled “A Framework for Digital Forensic Science” 
whose stated purpose was to “Build a taxonomy to guide and direct research” 
and  “Identify  the  areas  or  categories  that  define  the  ‘universe’  of  Digital 
Forensic Science” (Palmer, 2001, p. 21). Palmer suggested that digital forensic 
practitioners, whose activities are investigative in nature, would benefit from a 
properly categorized process.  
The first attempt at the ‘properly categorized process’ appeared in the 
DFRWS’s final paper (Palmer, 2001) and consisted of elements that had been 
included  on  the  basis  that  they  were  derived  from  processes  used  in  digital 
forensic analysis, although with the recognition that not all of them may come 
under the heading of ‘forensic’. Getting agreement on exactly what constitutes 
the ‘forensic process’ seems to have been problematic with the final summary 
being produced that describes the included tasks as being “…subject to the least 
confusion” amongst practitioners (Palmer, 2001, p. 23). 
The  DFRWS  produced  a  summary  of  the  ‘major  categories’  for  the 
forensic  process  and  ‘candidate  techniques  or  methods’  based  on  what 
“…appears  to  be  used  in  digital  forensic  analysis”  (Palmer,  2001,  p.  17), 
although the term ‘preservation’ appears four times under different categories. 
The DFRWS name is now used to describe the US non-profit organisation that 
supports research in the field of digital forensics.   
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2.5  Review of digital forensic process models 
The models identified through the online search fall into three themes of 
‘ad hoc’ models, ‘process flow’ and ‘scientific’ approaches. The key features of 
these models are now covered in the following sections. 
2.5.1  Ad hoc digital forensic process models 
In this part of the literature review the models have been grouped on the 
basis that they do not conform to a recognised methodological approach. Each of 
the authors has presented their model in their own unique way except for a few 
instances where they have built upon a previous ad hoc model. The models are 
presented in chronological order. 
 
2.5.1.1  The Abstract Digital forensics Model (ADFM) 
Reith et al (2002) built upon the initial framework of the DFRWS and 
claimed  to  have  abstractly  defined  common  steps  from  previous  forensic 
protocols. They comment that the steps reflect the traditional forensics approach 
applied to a digital context. The ADFM is based on 9 components in relation to 
evidence:  Identification,  Preparation,  Approach  strategy,  Preservation, 
Collection,  Examination,  Analysis,  Presentation  and  Returning.  These 
components  are  seen  as  being  a  complete  representation  of  the  process 
undertaken by a digital forensic practitioner.  
Reith et al introduced the concept of ‘digital forensics’ in order to include 
all forms of digital storage rather than what they suggest is the more narrow 
definition of ‘computer forensics’.   
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In relation to digital evidence acquisition the first 5 steps of the Reith et 
al  model  (Identification,  Preparation,  Approach  Strategy,  Preservation  and 
Collection) would seem to be relevant although, based on its description, the first 
step  seems  to  be  associated  with  some  form  of  network/infrastructure  attack 
rather than a generic forensic process. In practice Steps 2 and 3 (Preparation & 
Approach Strategy) could perhaps not be separated but grouped together under 
‘Planning’. This concept is supported by Baryamureeba & Tushabe  (2004) who 
point out that upon receiving notification of an event the techniques to be used in 
the investigation will be part of the response, although they go on to say that in 
general  terms  the  Reith  et  al  model  is  a  good representation  of  the  forensic 
process. 
 
2.5.1.2  Integrated Digital Investigation Process (IDIP) 
The Integrated Digital Investigative Process (IDIP) developed by Carrier 
and Spafford (2003) adopts physical crime scene processes for their digital crime 
scene with the computer being treated as a ‘door to another room’. In order to 
clarify the differences (and  similarities)  between a physical and digital  crime 
scene Carrier and Spafford provide the following definitions (together with their 
emphasis): 
  Physical  Crime  Scene:  The  physical  environment 
where physical evidence of a crime or incident exists. 
The environment where the first criminal act occurred is 
the primary physical crime scene and subsequent scenes 
are secondary physical crime scenes.  
  (Carrier & Spafford, 2003, p. 6)  
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  Digital Crime Scene: The virtual environment created 
by software and hardware where digital evidence of a 
crime  or  incident  exists.  The  environment  where  the 
first criminal act occurred is the primary digital crime 
scene  and  subsequent  scenes  are  called  secondary 
digital crime scenes.  
(Carrier & Spafford, 2003, p. 6) 
 
Carrier and Spafford (2004) produced another paper at the 2004 Digital 
Forensics Research Workshop with modifications to their original model. This 
later model was still based on treating the digital crime scene in the same way as 
a  physical  crime  scene  and  incorporating  both  as  part  of  a  digital  forensic 
process, with the digital investigation phase diagram as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2    Digital Crime Scene Investigation Phases after Carrier and Spafford 
(2004)  
 
To  place  the  Digital  Crime  Scene  phases  in  perspective,  Carrier  and 
Spafford’s (2004) overall model is shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3    The IDIP after Carrier and Spafford (2004) 
2.5.1.3  Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIPM) 
The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIPM) developed 
by Baryamureeba & Tushabe (2004) follows the same basic format and takes the 
same fundamental stance as Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) original version of the 
IDIP in that the digital evidence is treated in the same way as physical evidence, 
i.e. the computer becomes a digital crime scene in its own right. In the EDIPM 
the authors establish five ‘major phases’ (Readiness, Deployment, Trace Back, 
Dynamite and Review). The EDIPM phases are shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4    The EDIPM after Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2004)  
 
The  Carrier and Spafford IDIP (2003) definition of the physical crime 
scene is incorporated in the EDIPM which now has 5 phases instead of the 6  
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phases of Carrier and Spafford caused by dropping the IDIP’s  Reconstruction 
phase  (which  involves  developing  a  theory  for  the  incident  based  on  data 
analysis - although the IDIP is unclear when this analysis takes place). In relation 
to acquiring the digital evidence the Preservation phase of the EDIPM, a sub-
phase of both the physical and digital crime scene investigation phases (which 
are  themselves  sub-phases  of  the  Deployment  phase),  is  described  by 
Baryamureeba & Tushabe (2004) as the process: 
 …which preserves the digital crime scene so that evidence can be later 
synchronized and analysed for further evidence. Duplication of evidence 
(creation of bit-by-bit copies of the seized data) should be performed for 
use in multiple analyses (p. 4). 
 
2.5.1.4  Digital Crime Scene Analysis model (DCSA)  
The  idea  of  building  on  the  similarities  between  digital  and  physical 
investigations  at  a  conceptual  level  was  progressed  by  Rogers  (2006)  in  his 
Digital  Crime  Scene  Analysis  model  (DCSA),  despite  the  fact  that  this 
introduces new challenges, as this enables a common approach to be defined 
with the benefit of bringing digital forensics into the recognised field of forensic 
science as first proposed by Carrier and Spafford (2003) and further supported 
by Baryamureeba & Tushabe (2004). 
Rogers  (2004)  recognises  the  contributions  of  digital  forensic  process 
models proposed by Carrier and Spafford (2003), in addition to other researchers 
such  as  Baryamureeba,  Tushabe  (2004),  Beebe  &  Clark  (2004)  and  Mocas 
(2004).  However,  Rogers  contends  that    “…what  is  still  lacking  is  an 
applied/practical approach to dealing with digital crime scenes and the digital  
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evidence contained therein” (2004, p. 1). Whilst adopting the definition of digital 
evidence used by Carrier and Spafford (2003), Rogers modifies the definition of 
a digital crime scene to be “…the electronic environment where digital evidence 
can potentially exist” (2004, p. 7).  
Rogers (2004) takes issue with previous models that have been biased 
towards incident response on the basis that vital elements of law enforcement 
activity  are  missing,  such  as  ‘chain  of  custody’  and  ‘standard  of  proof’ 
considerations as well as the need to comply with the appropriate rules. In this 
respect, although Reith et al (2002) point out that even though their model does 
not include a chain of custody element this is in fact implied as being part of the 
forensic process, the chain of custody is vitally important on any matter that may 
appear  in  court  (Ashcroft,  2001;  Cummins  &  Lowry,  2003;  Gosh,  2004a; 
Mercuri, 2005) and therefore Rogers makes a valid point as this process should 
be explicit within any process model. 
Further criticism is made by Rogers (2004) of previous models in relation 
to the lack of ‘stratification’ on the basis that non-digital forensic investigations 
would  involve  specialists  in  particular  areas  of  evidence  gathering,  e.g. 
fingerprinting, DNA material, but the digital models envisage one person being 
responsible for the data collection from all digital sources whether they be from a 
network, router or hard disk drive. This point made by Rogers has some merit as 
the technological environment is ever-changing and extensive thus precluding an 
individual from having skills in all areas and ultimately  “The mere fact that the 
scene is digital does not alter the reality that no one can live up to this unrealistic 
expectation of multiple domain expertise” (Rogers, 2004, p. 12).   
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Previous models are also identified by Rogers as having a limitation due 
to their broad approach which Rogers states is understandable on the basis that 
they try and model the whole investigative process which he says is not possible 
(given that this cannot even be undertaken for a physical crime scene). Instead 
Rogers suggests that a more pragmatic approach would be to deal with the most 
important aspects of the investigation on which further work is reliant, the data 
acquisition, and in this respect he points out that “If doubt is cast on the initial 
collection and management of evidence, output from the other phases is moot.” 
(2004, p. 12) 
However, with regard to developing a practical generic approach for the 
high-level phases of a digital investigation Rogers identifies a problem in that the 
phases  are  dependent  on  the  type  of  investigation,  which  Rogers  calls  the 
‘context’ and ‘content’ of the investigation. Rogers defines context to be the type 
of crime that has been ‘committed or assumed’ and gives examples of ‘hacking 
incident’,  ‘internal  fraud’  and  ‘child  porn’.  Content  is  associated  with  the 
operating system(s) and file system(s) on which the data resides and  also the 
volume of potential evidence (Rogers, 2004). 
On the basis that he believes that the high-level phases are impractical to 
model  Rogers  focuses  on  ‘lower  level’  activities.  Referring  to  Carrier  and 
Spafford’s (2003) earlier model consisting of five phases, Rogers introduces in 
the DCSA an additional hierarchy comprised of the ‘lab’  and ‘corpus delicti’ 
layers. Of relevance to data acquisition, the corpus delicti layer comprises the 
three phases of Evidence Identification, Evidence Collection and Transportation.   
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2.5.1.5  A  Hierarchical,  Objectives-Based Framework  for the  Digital  Investigations 
Process (HOFDIP) 
An alternative to the abstract approach for producing a digital forensic 
model is proposed by Beebe and Clark (2004) on the basis that the focus on the 
abstract is at the expense of the fundamental investigative principles. They go on 
to suggest that although previous models are useful in explaining overarching 
concepts they lack the detail required to be of practical use. Beebe and Clark 
propose  a  framework  that  they  suggest  complies  with  the  requirements  of  a 
scientific discipline  and they adopt the definition of Digital  Forensic Science 
from Palmer’s work with the Digital Forensics Research Workshop: 
 
Digital Forensic Science – The use of scientifically derived 
and  proven  methods  toward  the  preservation,  collection, 
validation,  identification,  analysis,  interpretation, 
documentation, and presentation of digital evidence derived 
from  digital  sources  for  the  purpose  of  facilitation  or 
furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, 
or  helping  to  anticipate  unauthorized  actions  shown  to  be 
disruptive to planned operations. 
 (Palmer, 2001, p. 22) 
 
A problem with this definition is that it specifies criminal activity, which 
is not necessarily the case for all digital forensic investigations, whilst for the 
theoretical  aspect  it  focuses  on  predicting  events  which  lends  itself  more 
specifically to network intrusions rather than to the other types of digital forensic 
activity such as law enforcement (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2003;  
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Craiger, 2005). Beebe and Clark’s (2004) proposed  framework comprises the 
following key aspects: 
 
  Phases and sub-phases  - sequential, time-based, distinct, discrete 
steps in the process 
  Principles -  high-level procedures, guidelines and/or approaches that 
apply to one or more phases 
  Objectives – the intended outcomes. 
 
2.5.1.6  Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation (FDFI) 
Kohn et al (2006) conclude that the important factors in a digital forensic 
model are knowledge of the legal environment and that the model should contain 
three stages, namely preparation, investigation and presentation. These stages are 
based  partly  on  the  work  of  other  authors  such  as  the  Extended  Model  of 
Cybercrime  Investigations  (Ciardhuáin,  2004)  (discussed  later),  Computer 
Forensics: Incident Response Essentials (Kruse & Heiser, 2002) and the Reith et 
al Examination of Digital Forensic Models (2002). Instead of the detail provided 
in the Carrier and Spafford (2003) model the FDFI is very simple, as shown in a 
diagram provided to illustrate the order in which the stages need to be carried out 
(Figure 5).  
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Figure 5    The Three Stage Process after Kohn et al (2006)  
In  relation  to  data  acquisition  both  the  Preparation  stage  and  the 
Investigation stages are relevant. Kohn et al (2006) suggest the Preparation stage 
should incorporate the following elements: 
 
  Standards used in the organization 
  Policies and procedures in place to assist in the investigation 
  Training 
  Legal advice 
  Notification to the correct authorities 
  Documentation of previous incidents 
  Planning, also known as an ‘approach strategy’.  
 
The  inclusion of activities that would  happen after an  investigation  is 
under way, ‘Notification to the correct authorities’ and ‘Planning’, suggest that 
the title ‘Preparation’ covers both preparing for a potential investigation that is 
yet to happen and preparing to undertake activities during the early stages of an 
existing investigation. The elements to be included in the investigation stage that 
are relevant to acquiring digital data are identified as: 
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  Searching for and identifying evidence on a computer; 
  Collection of the evidence from the computer (original is duplicated); 
  Transportation of the evidence to a secure environment; 
  Storage of evidence collected at the scene. 
 
2.5.1.7  The Four Step Forensic Process (FSFP) 
Venter  (2006)  suggests  that  there  are  expectations  within  many 
organisations that digital forensics can be carried out by non-technical personnel. 
Consistent with this idea, Kent, Chevalier, Grance and Dang (2006) developed a 
guide whose aim is to provide information that would allow an organisation to 
develop their own digital forensic capability, using IT professionals, for security 
incident response (although they suggest that the information could also be used 
in other environments). Kent et al recognise that different organisations may be 
subject to different laws and regulations and provide a disclaimer to the effect 
that  the  guide  should  only  be  considered  as  a  starting  point  for  developing 
policies  and  procedures  and  that  advice  should  be  sought  from  specialists 
working in this area. Kent et al identify several basic stages in other models with 
the main differentiator being the degree of granularity adopted in describing the 
detail for each stage of the process. While suggesting that an organisation should 
adopt  the  most  appropriate  model  for  their  own  circumstances  Kent  et  al 
recommend that the four step process as detailed in Figure 6 is followed in all 
cases. At first sight this suggestion seems impractical but as the process itself is 
described  at  a  high  level  it  is  unlikely  to  impose  unnecessary  restrictions  in 
practice.  
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Figure 6    The Four Step Forensic Process (FSFP) after Kent et al (2006)  
 
The FSFP proposed by Kent et al (2006) appears relatively simple when 
compared to other models such as the Enhanced Digital Investigation Process 
Model (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004), the Abstract Digital Forensics Model 
(Reith,  et  al.,  2002)  and  the  Extended  Model  of  Cybercrime  Investigations 
(Ciardhuáin, 2004)(discussed later) but the authors go into some detail as they 
describe  various activities associated with each  of the  four phases. However, 
with regard to digital data acquisition only the Collection phase is relevant which 
is  defined  as  “identifying,  labelling,  recording,  and  acquiring  data  from  the 
possible sources of relevant data, while following procedures that preserve the 
integrity of the data” (Kent, et al., 2006, p. 26). This definition is consistent with 
other models (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004; Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Reith, 
et al., 2002).   
The Collection step of the FSFP consists of two activities which are: (1) 
Identifying Possible Sources of Data and (2) Acquiring the Data. For the first 
step Kent et al (2006) offer advice to assist in recognising potential data storage 
devices  such  as  computers,  DVDs,  thumb  drives,  memory  cards  etc.,  whilst 
introducing the idea that the ‘analysts’
15 should be capable of undertaking an 
                                                 
 
 
15 The term used by the authors to describe the person undertaking the computer forensic 
activities  
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onsite survey to identify such data sources. For the second step there are three 
activities: (1) Develop a plan to acquire the data, (2) Acquire the data and (3) 
Verify the integrity of the data. 
 
2.5.1.8  The Common Process Model for Incident Response and Computer Forensics 
(CPMIRCF) 
Supporting the views expressed by Cummins and Lowry (2003), Freiling 
and Schwittay (2007) clearly identify the distinction between incident response 
and digital forensics. They describe the area of incident response as focusing on 
the activities of organisations who suffer security breaches on the networks with 
the prime aims of  “…quick detection, containment and recovery” (Freiling & 
Schwittay,  2007,  p.  2).  Digital  forensics  is  described  as  being  a  “…forensic 
science that deals with obtaining, analysing and presenting digital evidence…” 
(Freiling & Schwittay, 2007, p. 6)  by adopting proven techniques and principles.  
Despite identifying the differences between incident response and digital 
forensics, Freiling and Schwittay  (2007) question whether they should be treated 
separately on the basis that there are many common elements between the two 
types of activity. With this in mind they propose a common process model that 
can be applied in both environments, the Common Process Model for Incident 
Response and Computer Forensics (CPMIRCF). The CPMIRCF consists of three 
main phases: (1) Pre-Analysis, (2) Analysis and (3) Post-Analysis. In relation to 
the data acquisition aspect of the model the relevant phases are the Pre-Analysis 
phase  and  the  Analysis  phase.  The  Pre-Analysis  phase  is  a  ‘catch-all’ 
classification and comprises all the processes that take place prior to analysis of 
the data that has been collected and includes ongoing Incident preparation (that  
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could  be  regarded  in  a  generic  sense  as  developing  policies,  procedures  and 
capability to undertake a forensic data acquisition task). Freiling and Schwittay’s 
Pre-Analysis phase contains three steps: 
 
1. Incident Detection 
Despite  the  stated  intention  of  Freiling  and  Schwittay  to  produce  a 
generic model applicable to both incident response and digital forensic 
processes the description of this step provided by Freiling and Schwittay 
is all about intrusion detection and other aspects of incident response.  
2. Initial Response 
Freiling  and  Schwittay  (2007)  state  that  the  goal  for  this  step  is  to 
confirm  the  incident  has  occurred  and  determine  its  impact  on  the 
organisation.  The  description  is  again  based  on  an  incident  response 
situation and many of the tasks listed do not have a generic equivalent, 
e.g. network  monitoring, removing compromised hosts and  initialising 
packet filtering.  
3. Formulation of Response Strategy 
The emphasis on incident response is again evident in that a decision will 
be made to determine if a  ‘full forensic’ analysis will take place where 
for a generic model of the digital forensic process this question is moot 
(Palmer, 2001; Rogers, 2004). Unlike many other authors who use the 
term ‘analysis’ to describe the process of analysing the data after it has 
been collected (Casey, 2004, 2010; Palmer, 2001;  Reith, et al., 2002) 
Freiling and Schwittay regard this stage as being everything between the 
initial incident and the preparation of a report or presentation.   
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There  are  two  activities  related  to  data  acquisition  in  Freiling  and 
Schwittay’s  Analysis  stage  of  the  CPMIRCF;  Live  Response  and  Forensic 
Duplication: 
 
Live Response - Notwithstanding the incident response terminology this 
step would normally be considered as part of the data acquisition stage as 
it  is  one  of  many  techniques  that  may  be  adopted  dependant  on  the 
requirements of the investigation. 
Forensic Duplication - this step involves copying the contents of storage 
media whilst ensuring that the original data  is  unaltered.  However, as 
McKemmish (1999) points out, this is a desirable state but not always 
possible or practical. 
 
The  ‘chain  of  custody’  is  mentioned  in  the  CPMIRCF  as  is  the 
requirement to keep the original media, i.e. the source of the data, safe together 
with the forensic copies. This may not always be practical, especially in the case 
of  a  server  or  other  critical  system,  and  would  not  usually  apply  to  cases 
involving digital forensic practitioners when providing services to third-parties. 
Freiling and Schwittay (2007) state their intention is to integrate the Incident 
Response and Computer Forensic environments to produce a common model and 
suggest  that  digital  forensic  investigations  would  benefit  from  the  ‘proper 
management’ imposed by incident response procedures.   
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2.5.1.9  Two-Dimensional  Evidence  Reliability  Amplification  Process  Model 
(TDERAPM)  
Agreeing  that  there  are  limitations  with  previous  abstract  models  and 
following the concept of the iteration of phases within an investigation Khatir, 
Hejazi  and  Sneiders  (2008)  adopt  a  ‘management’  approach  to  the  digital 
forensic process in their Two-Dimensional Evidence Reliability Amplification 
Process  Model  (TDERAPM).  They  suggest  that  existing  models  have 
shortcomings such as: 
 
  Lack of flexibility between phases 
  Lack of tools usage/automation 
  Ignoring of management aspects 
  Ignoring organisational structure 
  Ignoring the distribution of responsibilities. 
 
Having identified these problems, Khatir et al (2008) conclude that the 
issue of the reliability of evidence has still not been addressed and thus present 
the TDERAPM which consists of five major phases (of which only the first two 
are relevant to data acquisition) sixteen sub-phases (of which only the first five 
are relevant) and four ‘umbrella activities’ which apply to all phases. 
The two major phases of the TDERAPM relevant to data acquisition are 
Initialization and Evidence Collection whilst the five relevant ‘sub-phases’ are: 
Confirmation,  Case  Assessment,  Authorization,  Physical  Evidence  Collection 
and  Digital  Evidence  Collection. The  umbrella  activities  are:  Documentation,  
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Preservation and Authenticity, Case Management and Team Setup and Computer 
Tools Utilization. The TDERAPM is reproduced in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7    TDERAPM Phases after Khatir et al (2008) 
 
It  would  appear  from  the  text  that  the  horizontal  areas  represent  the 
amount  of  ‘effort’  involved  in  a  particular  umbrella  activity  but  there  is  no 
information  provided  on  how this  has  been  assessed  or  even  the  units  being 
measured.  These  umbrella  activities  are  described  as  being  activities  that 
“…should always  be practiced during phases of the process”  (Khatir, et al., 
2008, p. 28) and they are intended to contain guidelines. The narrative for the 
Documentation  umbrella  activity  says  that  it  is  important  to  maintain 
documentation but does not indicate how.  
The  Preservation/Authenticity  activity  requires  the  forensic  team  to 
follow “…disciplined and fully documented steps” (p. 28) although what this 
means and  how this  is to be achieved  is  not covered. The  narrative  includes 
aspects of integrity relating to the acquired data as well as the physical return of  
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collected items but does not provide any detail, although reference is made again 
to a table that has been omitted. Case Management and Team Setup is an activity 
that Khatir et al (2008) have identified through their research. An overview is 
provided in regard to the requirements of the management role but this high-
level narrative is a statement of a few processes that would normally already be 
in place and that may in certain circumstances be undertaken by the investigator 
who  could  fulfil  both  roles.  The  final  umbrella  activity  is  Computer  Tools 
Utilisation. The narrative does not provide any detail but states that computer 
tools are useful and can be applied to all aspects of the investigation process. 
This would seem to be inappropriate as a separate activity when compared to, for 
instance, the requirement to keep comprehensive documentation. 
 
2.5.1.10   Mapping Process of Digital Forensic Investigation Framework 
Selamat, Yusof and Sahib (2008) consider that some previous  models 
have redundancies in terms of their key steps, such as Kohn’s Framework for 
Digital Forensic Investigation (Kohn, et al., 2006) and the Reith et al Abstract 
Digital Forensics Model (Reith, et al., 2002) , whilst no model provides a single 
framework  for  investigating  all  cases.  Selamat  et  al  (2008)  identify  common 
phases  in  previous  models  and  relate  them  to  a  more  concise  framework  to 
produce a map of the Digital Forensic Investigations Framework (DFIF). Their 
review of thirteen published papers on previous models identified five phases to 
which  the  reviewed  models  could  be  mapped. Of  these  phases  only  Phase  1 
(Preparation)  and  Phase  2  (Collection  and  Preservation)  are  relevant  to  data 
acquisition.  
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Selamat et al  (2008) note that their review showed that  whilst all the 
models contain Phases 2, 3 and 4 (Collection and Preservation, Examination and 
Analysis, Presentation and Reporting) only a few contain Phases 1 (Preparation) 
and 5 (Disseminating the Case) which they consider to be important. From a data 
acquisition viewpoint the case for some form of preparation prior to arriving on 
site seems to be well supported. Despite the framework being an amalgamation 
of previous  models,  it  is  missing details  such as the Pre-incident Preparation 
requirements from the Common Process Model (Freiling & Schwittay, 2007).  
 
2.5.1.11  Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model 
Agarwal,  Gupta,  M.,  Gupta,  S.,  and  Gupta  S.C.  (2011)  propose  the 
Systematic  Digital  Forensic  Investigation  Model  (SDFIM)    to  assist  forensic 
practitioners and organisations to establish their policies and procedures. The 
SDFIM has eleven phases covering all aspects of a forensic practitioner’s work 
but in contrast to many previous models the analysis phase is not the main focus 
of the activities described. Only those phases relevant to digital data acquisition 
are now covered in more detail: 
 
  Phase  1  (Preparation),  covers  the  various  constraints  and 
authorisations as well as collecting together the necessary resources 
to undertake the investigation  
  Phase 2 (Securing the Scene) involves identifying the extent of the 
‘crime scene’ in order to set up a perimeter to prevent unauthorised 
access to potential evidence   
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  Phase 3 (Survey and Recognition) can be summarised as an onsite 
survey 
  Phase  4  (Documenting  the  Scene)  requires  that  all  equipment  and 
connections must be photographed and this includes any data that is 
visible on screens. Other documentation involves a log of all those at 
the scene broken down into various categories such as ‘victim’ and 
‘suspect’ 
  Phase  5  (Communication  Shielding)  involves  preventing 
communications to any devices involved in the incident  
  Phase 6 is where the evidence collection takes place and this is sub-
divided into volatile and non-volatile collection 
  Phase  7  (Preservation)  involves  packaging,  transportation  and 
subsequent storage prior to analysis 
  Phase  11  (Result  &  Review)  is  a  follow-up  assessment  of  the 
activities  undertaken  during  the  case  with  a  view  to  process 
improvement. 
 
2.5.1.12  Ad hoc models reviewed 
This section of the literature review has reviewed the following models under the 
theme ‘ad hoc digital forensic process models’: 
 
  The Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith, et al., 2002) 
  The  Integrated  Digital  Investigative  Process  (Carrier  &  Spafford, 
2003)  
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  The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (Baryamureeba & 
Tushabe, 2004) 
  The Digital Crime Scene Analysis Model (Rogers, 2004) 
  A  Hierarchical,  Objectives-Based  Framework  for  the  Digital 
Investigations  
  Process (Beebe & Clark, 2004) 
  Framework for a Digital Investigation (Kohn, et al., 2006) 
  The Four Step Forensic Process (Kent, et al., 2006)  
  The Common Process Model (Freiling & Schwittay, 2007) 
  The  Two-Dimensional  Evidence  Reliability  Amplification  Process 
Model (Khatir, et al., 2008) 
  The Digital Forensic Investigations Framework (Selamat, et al., 2008) 
  The  Systematic  Digital  Forensic  Investigation  Model  (SRDFIM) 
(Agarwal, et al., 2011). 
 
These process models have displayed a range of approaches from those 
that include a few fundamental stages to those that involve many stages and sub-
divisions. In addition, whereas some authors have attempted to develop a generic 
approach  others  have  focused  on  a  particular  environment,  such  as  law 
enforcement or incident response. 
 
2.5.2  Process flow approaches for digital forensic models 
A different approach to that used in the ‘ad hoc’ models reviewed in 2.5.1 
has been adopted by some researchers such as Ieong (2006),  Ciardhuáin (2004)  
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and  Venter  (2006)  who  have  moved  away  from  the  low-level  detail  of  the 
investigative process and look instead at the issue from a workflow perspective. 
Whilst  this  approach  may  be  of  limited  practical  use  for  an  investigator  the 
concept is worthy of consideration as part of an overall formal description as it 
may capture aspects of the process that have not been included in the ad hoc 
models covered previously.  
 
2.5.2.1  Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigations  
Ciardhuáin (2004) paved the way  for the ‘information  flow’ approach 
when  he  proposed  his  ‘comprehensive’  model  for  conducting  cybercrime 
investigations. His motivation for proposing the model is founded on the belief 
that other models did not cover all aspects of the investigation process and the 
“single largest gap in the existing models is that they do not explicitly identify 
the information flows in investigations” (p. 4). A further criticism of previous 
models is that they concentrated on the ‘middle’ of the investigations process, 
suggested by Ciardhuáin (2004) as being the Collection and Examination stages. 
In order to model the entire information flow associated with a digital forensic 
investigation Ciardhuáin identifies thirteen activities of which only the first eight 
are  relevant  to  evidence  acquisition:  (1)  Awareness,  (2)  Authorisation,  (3) 
Planning,  (4)  Notification,  (5)  Search  &  Identification  of  Evidence,  (6) 
Collection of Evidence, (7) Transport of Evidence and (8) Storage of Evidence. 
These activities are seen as being addressed in a linear fashion although it is 
anticipated that ‘backtracking’ will be necessary with several iterations required, 
particularly  on  some  of  the  later  activities  which  is  a  concept  introduced  by  
Beebe and Clarke (2004).  
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Ciardhuáin (2004) identifies the lack of explicit mention of a chain of 
custody in the Reith et al model (2002) as a ‘major flaw’, even for those working 
in jurisdictions that don’t require a chain of custody, because due to its nature 
digital evidence can often be subject to claims of tampering. Ciardhuáin uses the 
chain of custody as an example of information flow stating that “...the chain of 
custody is formed by the list of those who have handled a piece of evidence and 
must  pass  from  one  stage  to  the  next  with  names  added  at  each  step” 
(Ciardhuáin, 2004, p. 5). Descriptions  for the eight activities relevant to data 
acquisition are: 
 
  Awareness - associated with the investigator being made aware that 
the investigation is needed and notification may come from external 
or  internal  sources.  The  inclusion  of  this  activity  addresses  a 
perceived  weakness  in  earlier  models  in  that  the  source  of  the 
notification would have a bearing on the direction the investigation 
would take and the process methodologies adopted  
  Authorisation - potentially complex depending on the environment 
in which the digital forensic practitioner is working, ranging from a 
simple verbal approval to a formal legal document such as a court 
order or warrant 
  Planning - involves resources both inside and outside of the digital 
forensic practitioners’ organisation and may involve regulations and 
legislation considerations 
  Notification  -  involves  informing  all  parties  involved  in  the 
investigation although this is recognised as not being applicable in all  
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cases, e.g. when the subject of the investigation must be unaware that 
it is to take place 
  Search and Identification of Evidence - ranges from confirming the 
suspect’s computer to tracing network packets 
  Collection - the activity in which the digital image is acquired 
  Transport  -  involves  transferring  either  the  original  evidence 
devices, such as seized computers, or forensic images to a suitable 
location whilst ensuring that the integrity of the potential evidence is 
not affected 
  Storage  -  allows  for the  fact  that the  devices  containing  potential 
evidence  will  need  to  be  properly  safeguarded  whilst  not  being 
analysed. 
 
2.5.2.2  FORensics ZAchman framework (FORZA) 
Ieong (2006) adopted a different focus for his information flow model, 
(FORZA), by seeking to accommodate the involvement of legal practitioners in 
the process of a digital forensic investigation by assigning them specific roles 
within the framework and using high-level business model descriptions for the 
various stages rather than technical terms. The FORZA model is based on the 
Zachman  Framework  (Zachman,  1987)  for  producing  a  high-level  way  of 
viewing an enterprise, hence the name given to the model: FORensics ZAchman 
Framework.  The  essential  idea  behind  the  Zachman  framework  is  that  any 
(usually complex) object, entity or process can be described in different ways for 
different audiences. The framework allows for six varying levels of detail and six 
viewpoints or perspectives.  
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Following on from work by Losavio, Adams and Rogers (2006) (who 
identify  a  gap  in  understanding  between  the  technical  digital  forensic 
practitioners and their legal colleagues/clients) Ieong (2006) states that in the IT 
security environment there are a simple, fundamental set of principles on which 
all aspects of this field rely, namely Integrity, Confidentiality and Availability. 
The  concept  of  the  linked  fundamental  principles  of  the  IT  Security  field  is 
applied by Ieong to digital forensics and  he goes on to suggest that a digital 
forensics  investigation  has  an  equivalent  three-part  set  of  principles  that  are 
Reconnaissance, Reliability and Relevancy (as shown in Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8    Digital Forensic Principles after Ieong (2006)  
 
Ieong (2006) places the digital investigation process in perspective with 
an  emphasis  on  the  ‘forensic  aspect’  by  stating  that  it  is  a  “…  process  to 
determine  and  relate  extracted  information  and  digital  evidence  to  establish 
factual information for judicial review” (p. 2). Ieong defines Reconnaissance as 
collecting,  recovering  and  analysing  the  digital  data.  The  term  Reliability  is 
considered  to  be  the  process  of  maintaining  chain  of  custody  and  the  term 
Relevancy is used to describe where the legal practitioner may be involved in 
determining what is collected.   
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Ieong uses a Zachman-like framework in which he identifies eight roles 
for a ‘typical’ forensic investigation (although they could be carried out by the 
same person). These roles are: (1) Case leader, (2) System/business owner, (3) 
Legal  advisor,  (4)  Security/system  architect/auditor,  (5)  Digital  forensics 
specialist,  (6)  Digital  forensics  investigator/system  administrator/operator,  (7) 
Digital forensics analyst and (8) Legal prosecutor. A process flow between the 
various roles is briefly described and produced in a diagram shown as Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9    Process Flow Between Roles in a Forensic Investigation after Ieong 
(2006)  
 
From  Figure  9  the  data  acquisition  aspect  is  identified  in  the  ‘Data 
Acquisition  Layer’  associated  with  the  ‘Forensics  Investigator/System 
Administrator/Operator’. No information is provided in relation to the skills that 
are required for this activity but in a case example provided by Ieong (2006) the 
relevant person would need to consider six categories of questions, namely: 
 
  What (the data attributes)   
  Why (the motivation)   
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  How (the procedures)   
  Who (the people)   
  Where (the location) 
  When (the time). 
 
Ieong  attributes  these  questions  to the  Systems  and  Business  Security 
Architecture  (SABSA)  framework  but  they  are  also  a  fundamental  aspect  of 
police  investigative  training  and  recognised  as  the  5WH  approach  (National 
Centre for Policing Excellence, 2005, p. 68) . 
 
2.5.2.3  Process Flows for Cyber Forensics Training and Operations 
Venter  (2006)  uses  the  process  flow  approach  to  describe  a  series  of 
activities with the primarily aim being to assist with the training of people with 
limited technical background knowledge in the role of Cyber First Responder. 
This is in contrast to Ciardhuáin (2004) who used the same approach but targeted 
at  digital  forensic  practitioners.  The  concept  of  non-technical  personnel 
undertaking what can be a complex and technically demanding task such that the 
output of their efforts (potential digital evidence) may be admitted by a court 
seems to be at odds with digital forensic practice. It is unlikely that courts will 
lower their standards for admissibility on the basis that there was no other person 
available to collect the evidence in a manner that would have been undertaken by 
a digital forensic professional. Furthermore, if such evidence were to be admitted 
then  the  opposing  side  would  potentially  have  grounds  for  contesting  that 
evidence. However, as well as providing training for non-IT personnel, Venter  
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suggests  that  by  adopting  the  process  flow  model  described  in  his  paper 
experienced investigators would be able to speed up their investigations.  
Unlike the guide produced for non-IT personnel by the National Institute 
of Justice (Ashcroft, 2001) that identifies high-level principles and then provides 
detail  around  the  possible  location  of  potential  digital  evidence,  the  Venter 
(2006)  process  description  includes  detailed  instructions  in  a  step-by-step 
approach.  Whilst  being  attractive  to  the  principal  audience  of  non-technical 
personnel, criticism of this step-by-step approach comes from Beebe and Clark 
(2004) and Carrier and Spafford (2003) who suggest that practitioners are better 
able to deal in practice with ‘objectives-based steps’ given the varied nature of 
the environment (although Beebe and Clark themselves provide an example of a 
detailed  list  of  activities  as  an  example  in  their  own  model).  Venter  (2006) 
counters  that  this  ‘unstructured’  approach  proposed  by  the  other  authors  is 
flawed  as  they  require  a  practitioner  to  possess  “…a  certain  amount  of 
understanding of the technical field…” (Venter, 2006, p. 3). Several authors have 
argued that anyone working in the field of digital forensics would require a good 
technical understanding (C. Brown, 2006; Bunting & Wei, 2006; Calhoun, 2008; 
B. D. Carrier, 2006; Jones, et al., 2006; Kent, et al., 2006) and if the necessary 
skills are not available in-house then they can be brought in (even at short notice) 
from  an  external  provider,  of  which  there  are  many  (such  as  the  ‘Big  Four’ 
professional services firms and numerous specialist companies).  
Suggesting that the benefit of the process flow approach is that it will 
potentially reduce errors whilst enhancing the standard of documentation, Venter 
(2006) describes four design principles for the development of a process flow 
model:  
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  Ease of use for non-IT professionals 
  Applicable in most cases 
  Assist with expert testimony or at least not interfere with it 
  Can be utilised during operations and not only during training. 
 
In addition to his Design Principles, Venter (2006) incorporates several 
‘layout characteristics’ into his process flow model that can be summarised as: 
  Each process flow must fit on a single A4 sheet of paper 
  Important information is recorded during the process steps 
  Standard naming conventions are adopted. 
 
An  overall  Process  Flow  that  governs  the  behaviour  common  to  all 
situations  is  presented  by  Venter  starting  with  Inspect  and  Prepare  Scene, 
followed by Collect Evidence & Evidence Information and ends with Debrief 
Scene & Record Seized Information. This generic process flow is complemented 
by process flows that are specific to a particular type of device: 
 
  Desktop computer hard disks 
  PDAs and Cell phones 
  CD/DVD/STIFFY/FLASH/OTHER 
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2.5.2.4  Process flow models reviewed 
The models reviewed in this section of the literature review under the theme of 
Process Flow are: 
 
  An Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigations (Ciardhuáin, 2004) 
  FORZA - Digital forensics investigation framework (Ieong, 2006) 
  Process Flows for Cyber Forensics Training and Operations (Venter, 
2006). 
 
The three Process Flow models provide a different perspective than the 
earlier Ad Hoc models in that they associate the activities of the digital forensic 
practitioner with the information they generate and place this in context with the 
purpose of the investigation. 
 
2.5.3  Scientific approaches for digital forensic models 
The authors of the modelling approaches described earlier created their 
own terminology and definitions to describe their models. Whilst this may have 
made it easier to create the narrative around ideas and concepts this has meant 
that these models have not been described or defined in such a way as to make 
them readily part of a scientific discipline through  the  lack of an established 
formal specification. An alternative approach is to adopt a formal method for 
describing the  model.  A  formal specification  is  an abstract expression of the 
properties of a system that are expressed in a formal language  (Lamsweerde, 
2000) which contains three components: 
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1.  Rules for determining the grammatical well-formedness of sentences 
(the syntax) 
2.  Rules for interpreting sentences in a precise, meaningful way within 
the domain considered (the semantics);  
3.  Rules  for  inferring  useful  information  from  the  specification  (the 
proof theory).  
(Lamsweerde, 2000, p. 2) 
 
Several ‘scientific’ approaches are now described in chronological order 
in accordance with their appearance in the literature. 
 
2.5.3.1  End-to-End Digital Investigation (EEDI) process  
Stephenson  (2003a)  introduces  the  Digital  Investigation  Process 
Language (DIPL) as a formal process language, loosely based on LISP
16, “…that 
allows the characterization of an investigation in formal terms” (p. 12). Although 
his initial paper does not provide much detail on DIPL Stephenson (2003b) made 
available a PowerPoint presentation on the Eastern Michigan University website 
that gives a more in-depth coverage. The PowerPoint presentation summarises 
the key attributes of Stephenson’s DIPL as being: 
 
  Involves a process language like LISP 
  Follows the End-to-End Digital Investigation (EEDI) process and the 
DFRWS framework 
                                                 
 
 
16 LISP is derived from "LISt Processing" and refers to one of the oldest high-level languages. 
LISP source code is itself made up of lists.  
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  Gives a detailed and explicit description of the investigation and its 
findings 
  May be used to translate the investigation into a formal model.  
(Stephenson, 2003b, p. 2) 
 
Further information is provided in relation to the ways in which the DIPL 
could be used which are (1) as a structured framework for an investigation, (2) as 
an analysis of completeness of a completed investigation and (3) as the basis for 
a formal model of an investigation and event. As well as the proposal for a new 
language Stephenson also proposed the End to End Digital Investigation (EEDI) 
model,  although  he  states  that  the  model  is  not  suitable  for  ‘simple  digital 
forensic investigations’ but does not expand on this further and no definition of 
‘complex investigations’ is provided beyond the statement that it would typically 
employ “…sophisticated tools such as link analysers…” (Stephenson, 2003a, p. 
2). The reference to ‘link analysers’ and an example of a digital forensic task 
involving  the  investigation  of  ‘worm’  attacks  suggests  that  in  this  instance 
Stephenson’s focus is on the specific area of Incident Response involving the 
internet or large corporate networks rather than a generic area of digital forensics 
activity. 
Stephenson  (Stephenson,  2003a)  builds  upon  the  Digital  Forensics 
Research Workshop model (DFRWS) to provide definitions for eight concepts 
that are used in the EEDI model, only three of which are relevant to acquisition 
of digital data: 
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1.   Primary evidence - evidence that is corroborated and may in turn 
corroborate other primary evidence. The corroboration may come 
from other primary evidence or a significant amount of secondary 
evidence. 
2.   Secondary evidence - evidence that in itself is not corroborated but 
that can assist in corroborating another piece of evidence. 
3.   Forensic digital evidence collection - the use of tools  by trained 
digital forensic practitioners that have been accepted by the digital 
forensic discipline in order to obtain digital evidence.  
 
Based on the definitions of primary and secondary evidence Stephenson 
introduces his First Rule of End-to-End forensic digital analysis: 
Primary evidence should be corroborated by at least one other 
piece of relevant primary evidence to be considered a valid 
part of  the  evidence  chain.  Evidence  that  does  not  fit  this 
description, but does serve to corroborate some other piece of 
evidence without itself being corroborated, is considered to 
be secondary evidence. 
(2003a, p. 8) 
 
 
This rule does not have an equivalent in other process models involved 
with acquiring digital evidence. 
The EEDI process itself is characterised by a set of general steps that 
must  be  taken  by  an  investigator  in  order  to  preserve,  collect,  examine  and 
analyse digital evidence that follow the framework set by the DFRWS (which is  
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considered to contain the ‘critical elements’ of a digital investigation). Of the 
nine  general  steps  used  in  the  EEDI  process  only  one  is  relevant  to  the 
acquisition of digital data and that is called Collecting Evidence. The overall 
concept of using DIPL is provided in Figure 10: 
 
Figure 10  EEDI stages after Stephenson (2003)  
Figure 10 shows that the process must first be described in narrative form 
by,  presumably,  a  skilled  investigator  who  is  able  to  clearly  identify  all  the 
necessary steps. This is then followed by someone with a degree of software-
writing skills understanding the narrative and transforming it into the syntax of 
DIPL. The inclusion of the Petri Net stage in the EEDI is not explained. 
Stephenson  (2003a)  expands  on  the  potential  benefits  of  adopting  a 
formal language by suggesting that it could be used: 
 
  To discredit an opposing investigator’s testimony by showing that 
their investigative process was flawed 
  To  persuade  the  finder  of  fact  that  the  investigation  had  been 
conducted “properly and completely” by showing a DIPL listing in 
court. 
 
How  these  additional  benefits  are  to  be  achieved  in  practice  remains 
unclear and there seems to have been little further work undertaken on the DIPL.   
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2.5.3.2  Cyber Tools On-line Search for Evidence (CTOSE) 
A European Union project called the Cyber Tools On-line Search  for 
Evidence (CTOSE) went a stage further than Stephenson (2003b) in that rather 
than just creating a framework and language it implemented a new methodology 
in a web-based tool. The intention was to “…provide a consistent approach for 
identifying,  preserving,  analysing  and  presenting  digital  evidence”  (Hannan, 
Frings, Broucek, & Turner, 2003, p. 5). The motivation behind the project was a 
recognition that in most companies the IT security function was largely focussed 
on  finding  technical  solutions  to the  problem  of  intruders  with  little,  if  any, 
regard to the requirements of the legal system should offenders be identified or 
evidence  located that  might  help  to  identify  them.  To  address this  and  other 
issues,  such  as  concern  for  disruption  caused  to  the  organisation  during  an 
investigation, the CTOSE project developed a model to provide a framework that 
would enable digital evidence to be collected in such a way that it would be 
admissible in court. Because of the complexity of the model the CTOSE project 
team  decided  to  produce  the  CTOSE  Demonstrator  which  is  a  software 
simulation application whose purpose was to demonstrate how the model could 
be used in practice (Hannan, et al., 2003).  
The  user  interface  of  the  full  prototype  application,  Cyber  Crime 
Advisory Tool (C*CAT), is web-based (written in Java) and it connects via an 
Apache Web Server to an SQL database which contains the data for the process 
model  (Hannan,  et  al.,  2003).  As  well  as  the  C*CAT  utility  that  assists  the 
‘management’  aspect  of  the  investigation  another  ‘expert  system’  has  been 
designed that covers the legal aspects (Mann, 2004).  
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The  C*CAT  process  model  itself  contains  five  phases;  Preparation, 
Running,  Assessment,  Investigation  and  Learning.  These  phases  are  now 
covered in more detail: 
 
  Preparation – This involves the organization ensuring that it has 
the resources, infrastructure and security aspects in place prior to 
the need to investigate a security incident, described as ‘forensic 
readiness’ 
  Running – This phase is where the system is running ‘normally’, 
i.e. there is no indication of an incident at this point 
  Assessment  – This is the point at which there is some suspicion 
that  a  security  incident  has  taken  place  which  may  or  may  not 
involve the organisation’s systems running normally. A decision is 
made  on  what  actions  to  take  that  may  involve  undertaking  an 
investigation or implementing specific monitoring processes 
  Investigation  –  If  an  investigation  is  determined  to  be  the 
appropriate course of action a senior management decision will be 
made  on  whether  this  is  to  be  performed  in-house  using  the 
organisation’s  own  staff  or  whether  to  engage  the  services  of  a 
third-party  provider.  The  outcome  of  the  investigation  is  to 
determine the details of the  incident and establish  how a similar 
incident can be prevented in the future 
  Learning  –  This  is  where  the  knowledge  gained  from  the 
investigation is translated into plans and procedures to mitigate the 
effect of further incidents of the same type.  
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The  digital  forensic  practitioner  is  required  to  define  the  situation  by 
selecting from options presented by the process model, which then provides the 
flow of actions and decisions that have to be considered or executed. Information 
in the form of advice or hints is stored within the system and this is available at 
all times (Mann, 2004). Finally, the practitioner is required to enter feedback as 
part of a knowledge-building process to assist with any future incidents (Mann, 
2004). 
 
2.5.3.3  The Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
Several authors of digital forensic models have introduced the idea of 
adopting a formal modelling language used by software developers (Bogan & 
Dampier, 2005; Kohn, Eloff, & Olivier, 2008; Ruan & Huebner, 2009; Wang & 
Yu, 2007). This forms a framework for formally describing the digital forensic 
process without having to ‘re-invent the wheel’ and where there is a large body 
of knowledge that can be applied to the task (Bell, 2003). Bogan and Dampier 
(2005) suggest that the lack of formalism in other models is due to the fact that 
many of those working in the field of digital forensics have come from non-IT 
specialist roles, such as law enforcement, and therefore they have not followed 
the structured approach that software engineers would have adopted in relation to 
developing their plans, procedures and tools. Bogen and Dampier (2005) propose 
the  use  of  case  domain  modelling  as  it  affords  a  structured  approach  for 
analysing  and  documenting  the  investigation,  which  addresses  the  lack  of 
planning and analysis tools that often hinders the digital forensic investigator 
when it comes to investigating large or complex cases.  
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Bogan and Dampier (2005) also suggest that the field of digital forensics 
research will follow the advances in formalism and modelling in methodologies 
that has been seen in the field of software development. Justification for this 
view is based on commonalities the authors have identified between software 
development  and  digital  forensics  such  as  “…quality  focus,  application  of 
repeatable  processes,  the  use  scientific  methods,  and  the  support of  software 
tools” (2005, p. 1). Bogan and Dampier propose employing domain analysis as a 
tool for identifying relevant information within an investigation, and their aim is 
to develop a methodology that combines both UML notation and that of previous 
models in order to provide support for: 
 
  Planning  the  collection  and  examination  activities  of  a  digital 
investigative process 
  Building digital forensics expertise 
  Reusing digital forensics knowledge 
  Documenting forensics tasks. 
 
The acquisition of  digital data would seem to come under  Bogan and 
Dampier’s description “…general investigative processes that may be applied to 
several cases” (2005, p. 2) as well as the “…sequence of activities that occur in 
an investigation” (2005, p. 2). The issue of acquiring the potential evidence is 
not  described,  suggesting  that  the  proposed  unification  of  forensic  model 
approaches  does  not  cover  all  activities  undertaken  during  a  forensic 
investigation and is only applicable to the analysis stage.    
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Kohn,  Eloff  and  Olivier  (2008)  also  argue  that  the  field  of  computer 
forensics would benefit from formal modelling approaches, such as UML, and 
comment that most of the process models they have reviewed have adopted an 
informal or ‘intuitive’ approach. They model what are described as two existing 
Digital Forensic Process Models
17 by utilising Use Case and Activity diagrams 
from UML in order to compare them.  However, the ‘model’ that Kohn et al 
attribute to Kruse and Heiser (2002)  is simply the headings for three steps for 
investigating a computer incident provided by Kruse and Heiser contained within 
their book
18. The resulting Activity diagram is very simple, as shown in Figure 
11. 
 
Figure 11  Kruse & Heiser Activity diagram after Kohn et al (2008) 
The resulting Use Case diagram for the Kruse and Heiser model does not 
come directly for the narrative but seems to be an interpretation by Kohn et al 
based on the environment of Incident Response as shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12  Kruse & Heiser Use Case diagram after Kohn et al (2008) 
 
                                                 
 
 
17 (Kruse & Heiser, 2002) and (Ashcroft, 2001) 
18 Described by Kruse and Heiser as the “three A’s”  
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In relation to the second ‘model’, that of the United States Department of 
Justice  (US  DoJ)  (Ashcroft,  2001),  the  narrative  contained  in  the  US  DoJ 
guideline  is used as the basis  for the Activity diagram (although the  original 
guideline actually concentrates on the Collection phase). The resulting high-level 
Activity diagram is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13  US DoJ Activity diagram after Kohn et al (2008) 
The corresponding Use Case diagram is similar to that for the Kruse and 
Heiser model with the addition of an extra phase as shown in Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14  US DoJ Use Case diagram after Kohn et al (2008) 
 
 
Ruan  and  Huebner  (2009)  use  UML  diagrams  to  describe  the  ‘well-
accepted’ components of a computer forensic investigation but seem to disagree 
with Kohn et al (2008) in relation to the involvement of the legal ‘actors’  in 
different stages of the investigation as shown in the UML Use Case diagram of 
Figure 15.  
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Figure 15  Forensic Process Use Case after Ruan and Huebner (2009) 
 
Ruan and Huebner provide an Activity diagram for each of the processes 
shown  in  Figure  15.  Shown  in  Figure  16  is  the  Activity  diagram  for  the 
Collection process. 
 
Figure 16  Forensic Process Activity Diagram after Ruan and Huebner (2009) 
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2.5.3.4  Modeling Computer Forensic Process from a Workflow Perspective  
Wang  &  Yu  (2007)  identify  similarities  between  the  software 
development  process  and  the  digital  forensic  process.  However,  whilst 
acknowledging similarities they also point out that a notable key differentiator 
between the two is that whilst the particular order of the steps in the software 
development process is not critical (and some may be skipped entirely) this is not 
the case in the digital forensic process where certain steps are mandatory and 
need to be performed in the appropriate order. 
Wang  and  Yu  see  the  benefits  of  a  formal  methodology  as  being  of 
practical use to the forensic practitioner rather than simply adding credibility to 
the forensic process and describe previous models as being “…very abstract and 
cursory”  (2007,  p.  55).  They  propose  enhancing  the  digital  forensic  process 
described by Bogen and Dampier (2005) through the use of  a Petri net
19. Wang 
and Yu  (2007)  demonstrate their approach to modelling part of the fore nsic 
process using a Petri net together with a narrative that provides a useful summary 
of  some  of  the  actions  that  would  be  recognised  from  other  models  as  a 
preliminary  ‘onsite’  stage  or  ‘site  review’  in  relation  to  acquiring  digital 
evidence (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004; Carrier & Spafford, 2004). For their 
model  Wang  and  Yu  introduce  the  term  ‘action’  (which  they  project  to  T-
elements
20) and the term ‘condition’ (which they project to P-elements
21).  
                                                 
 
 
19 A Petri net is a mathematical tool that can be used for describing the dynamic activities of a 
system (Trickovic, 2000) 
20 ‘T’ elements are active entities of the real world such as events, transitions and actions. 
21 ‘P’ elements are
 passive entities of the real world such as conditions, places and resources.   
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Wang and Yu (2007) provide two lists identifying the particular elements 
that they  state are relevant  in describing the  sub-process ‘Protect Locale  and 
Perambulation’: 
 
‘Actions’ used for the Petri Net 
t1: The investigator sends ready sign;  
t2: The investigator starts perambulate;  
t3: The supervisor gives start sign;  
t4: The investigator sends finish sign;  
t5: The supervisor sends finish sign.  
‘Conditions’ used for the Petri Net 
p1: The investigator prepares for starting;  
p2: The investigator waits for starting;  
p3: Ready sign of the investigator;  
p4: The supervisor starts sign given;  
p5: The supervisor waits for ready sign;  
p6: The investigator perambulates;  
p7: The supervisor supervises the procedure;  
p8: Finish sign of the investigator;   
p9: The end of perambulation procedure.  
 
Wang and Yu provide a diagram, as shown in Figure 17, based on the 
actions and conditions contained in the previous lists:  
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Figure 17  The Perambulation Procedure after Wang and Yu (2007) 
 
The detail shown in Figure 17 can be summarised as:  
 
An investigator tells his supervisor that he is ready; the supervisor gives 
authority to start a process, the investigator undertakes the process and 
informs  the  supervisor  that  it  is  complete  and  then  the  supervisor 
confirms the process is complete.  
 
2.5.3.5  Scientific approaches reviewed 
This  section  of  the  literature  review  focussed  more  on  the  modelling 
approaches rather than the models themselves and comprised of the contributions 
from the following researchers: 
 
  Stephenson (2003b) 
  Hannan, Frings, Broucek and Turner (2003) 
  Bogen and Dampier (2005) 
  Kohn, Eloff and Olivier (2008) 
  Ruan and Heibner (2009) 
  Wang and Yu (2007).  
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Although  Stephenson  (2003b),  Wang  and  Yu  (2007)  support  the 
introduction of a  formal  language to describe digital  forensic process  models 
their particular approaches have not been as popular as that of utilising Activity 
and other diagrams from UML. 
2.6    Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the existing body of knowledge in relation to the 
environment  of  digital  forensics  and  the  existing  process  models  for  the 
acquisition  of  digital  data.  Although  there  has  been  little  agreement  on  a 
definition of the digital forensic process, more recently there has been a call to 
adopt a formal methodology, with UML seeming to have the most support. 
Chapter  3  now  builds  upon  the  information  obtained  in  the  literature 
review of Chapter 2 and includes an assessment of the models and approaches 
that were discussed therein.  
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Chapter 3: Model Requirements 
3.1  Introduction 
In their description of the DSRP (the design science model adopted for 
this research) Peffers et al (2006) state that the resources required to define the 
objectives of a solution include a “…knowledge of the state of the problems and 
current solutions and their efficacy, if any” (p. 90). The ‘knowledge of the state 
of the problem’ and the ‘current solutions’ for this research have been covered in 
Chapter 1 and the literature review of Chapter 2. This chapter now describes the 
process for assessing the current models and approaches discussed in Chapter 2 
in order to identify the essential components of the new model that will form the 
basis of the new model’s design and development stage that will be covered in 
Chapter 4. 
3.2  Assessment criteria for previous models 
Following on from the Research Objective the overarching requirements of 
a process model for the acquisition of digital evidence are that:  
 
  There must be a formal representation of the model  
  The  model  must  be  relevant  to  the  fields  of  commerce,  law 
enforcement and incident response. 
 
In addition to considering the Research Objective when reviewing each 
model, in order to determine if there are any attributes of existing models that  
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could aid in the development of a new model a framework based on the work of 
Carrier  and  Spafford  (2003)  has  been  utilised  which  provides  a  list  of  the 
essential requirements  for a digital  forensic process  model
22. The Carrier and  
Spafford requirements form a common yardstick for helping to determine which 
of the reviewed models contains attributes suitable for inclusion in  the ADAM. 
The five requirements of a digital forensic process model as proposed by Carrier 
and Spafford (2003) are: 
 
1.  It must have a  basis in existing physical crime scene investigation 
theory; 
2.  It must be practical—matching steps taken in actual investigations; 
3.  It must be technology neutral to ensure the process isn’t constrained 
by current products and procedures; 
4.  It must have specificity in relation to the classifications or categories 
used in order to facilitate technology requirement development; and 
5.  It must be applicable to all possible user communities. 
 
Each model will be given a score out of five based on how many of the 
Carrier and Spafford requirements have been met.  In addition to this, a score 
based on the Daubert test (Supreme Court of the United States, 1993) will also 
be applied on the basis that it is a commonly-referenced process used to assess 
the reliability of scientific evidence by many courts. The Daubert test seeks to 
determine:  
                                                 
 
 
22 These requirements have also been used by Beebe and Clark (2004) as the basis for the 
assessment of their own process model.  
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  Whether  the  theory  or technique  in  question  can  be  and  has  been 
tested 
  Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication 
  Its  known  potential  rate  of  error  along  with  the  existence  and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation 
  The degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific community.  
 
Although  the  original  court  transcript  includes  the  ‘error  rate’  and 
‘standards’  as  a  single  factor  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find  the  test  quoted  as 
consisting of  five criteria with  ‘error rate’ and ‘standards’  separated  (Pace & 
Sheehan,  2002;  Richards,  2009).  Other  interpretations  are  that  sometimes 
‘standards’  within  the  four  tests  isn’t  mentioned  (Kenneally,  2005)  while 
Marsico  groups  ‘standards’  with  ‘general  acceptance’  rather  than  with  ‘error 
rates’ (2005). For this research the approach adopted is that in order to establish 
an error rate there have to be standards associated with the particular process or 
methodology  such  that  they  form  a  single  factor  (Cheng,  2007).  This 
consideration of ‘standards’ is separate and independent of the various guidelines 
and standards covered in 2.3. Each model will be assessed and given a score out 
of four based on how many of the individual Daubert tests are met. 
The application of the Daubert test to existing models may provide an 
indication  of  how  appropriate,  or  otherwise,  the  Daubert  test  criteria  are  for 
aiding the courts in the assessment of the reliability of digital evidence produced 
using  acquisition  process  models  (Cheng,  2007).  Although  ultimately  it  is  a 
matter for a court to come to its own conclusion with respect to how a particular  
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model ‘scores’ under the Daubert test the fact that the criteria are known allows a 
prima  facie  examination  to  be  undertaken.  Given  that  there  is  little  or  no 
information relating to the outcome of any court assessments in relation to many 
of  the  models  this  prima  facie  examination  will  be  the  first  time  that  this 
information  will  have  been  produced,  albeit  based  on  a  single  researcher’s 
interpretation. 
3.3  Assessment of previous models 
There are no comprehensive studies from which to draw assessment data 
for earlier process  models and this  section of the chapter describes  how this 
research has assessed these models. The assessment process is not presented as a 
definitive assessment but rather the scores assigned to the various models are 
later used to provide a rough indication of how many of the attributes stated in 
the selection criteria have been met by a particular model. 
The  earlier  process  models  included  in  the  literature  review  will  be 
assessed individually and scored based on the Carrier and Spafford criteria and 
the Daubert test (except where the models are examples of the application of a 
particular approach). 
3.3.1  The Abstract Digital Forensics Model (ADFM)  
There are shortcomings in this model that have been identified to some 
extent by the authors themselves as they note several disadvantages of applying 
their own framework, namely:  
  
86 
1.  The current high-level approach to categories may be too general to 
be applied in practice  
2.  There does not seem to be a way of testing the model  
3.  As  the  model  is  developed  to  increase  its  detail  it  becomes  more 
complex and more cumbersome to use. (Reith, et al., 2002, pp. 8-9) 
 
Another shortcoming of the Abstract Digital Forensics Model in relation 
to the ‘essential components’ of the research question is that despite being an 
‘important  facet’,  the  chain  of  custody  is  assumed  to  be  automatically 
incorporated without explicit reference to it in the model. This important aspect 
of  forensic  work  should  be  specifically  covered  in  a  digital  forensics  model 
(Boddington, Hobbs, & Mann, 2008; Peisert, et al., 2008; Selamat, Yusof, & 
Sahib, 2008). Whilst suggesting that the Abstract Digital Forensics Model meets 
the requirement of a general framework the authors of a later paper (Carrier & 
Spafford,  2003)  comment  that  in  reality  some  of  the  phases  would  be  in  a 
different order and the names of some of the phases have the potential to cause 
confusion.  
Based  on  the  Carrier  and  Spafford  criteria  the  ADFM  meets  the  first 
requirement in that it is based on ‘the traditional approach’ and is also specific 
enough to allow for technology to be developed to assist the investigator whilst 
not  being  restrictive  to  a  particular  product,  procedure  or  environment 
(Requirements 1, 3, 4 & 5). However, it has significant shortcomings in terms of 
practicality  and  its  ability  to  accommodate  changes  without  becoming  overly 
complex (Requirement 2). The Carrier and Spafford score for the ADFM is 4/5 
as it meets four out of the five criteria stated in section 3.2.  
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In relation to the selected Daubert test the authors admit that there does 
not seem to be a way to test the model and although it has been published and 
peer reviewed comments from the authors and Beebe & Clark suggest the model 
is incomplete and not practical (Beebe & Clark, 2004, p. 1). There do not appear 
to be any standards referenced by the ADFM and there seems to have been little 
or none of the necessary development since the model was proposed. Although 
there has been some support for the approach, there is also significant criticism 
as well and it has not achieved general acceptance. The Daubert test score for the 
ADFM is 1/4 as it meets only one out of the four test conditions - this process 
will be used for all the following models where a score can be assessed. 
3.3.2  Integrated Digital Investigation Process (IDIP)  
Baryamureeba & Tushabe (2004) identified various weaknesses (centred 
around a lack of practicality)  in the  IDIP developed by Carrier and Spafford 
(2003)  and  offered  a  modified  version,  the  Enhanced  Digital  Investigation 
Process  Model  (EDIPM),  that  sought  to  address  these  shortcomings  and  is 
covered later in section 0. Further criticism of the IDIP comes from Shin (2008) 
who suggests that Carrier and Spafford have  missed out important categories 
such as: ‘classification of the cybercrime’, ‘deciding investigation priority’ and 
‘psychological profiling’, although these views do not seem to be shared by other 
researchers and these categories seem to add unnecessary complications to the 
process. 
Rogers et al (2006) point out that while the IDIP may be suitable for 
investigations  in  which  the  whole  process  is  likely  to  be  followed  the  time 
constraints  of  certain  investigations,  such  as  those  involving  child  abduction, 
make the model impractical. This criticism seems a little harsh in that the IDIP  
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does not tie the practitioner to a particular time scale and many of the stages may 
be ‘ticked off’ relatively quickly in practice. Furthermore, the requirement that 
the court needs to be able to see a structured process which it can assess for 
reliability means that the concept of a ‘fast track’ approach implied by Rogers et 
al is in itself a risk that data obtained in such a fashion may be challenged in 
court.  
Whilst Carrier and Spafford’s (2003) approach is open to criticism, for 
instance Baryamureeba & Tushabe (2004) are critical of a lack of specificity in 
relation to the physical location of particular crime scenes, other authors such as 
Sommer (1998), Reith (2002) and Mercuri (2005) agree that the approach for 
obtaining digital evidence is not fundamentally any different from that adopted 
in  relation  to  obtaining  ‘conventional’  evidence.  Other  researchers,  such  as 
Saferstein (2010) and Boddington, Hobbs & Mann (2008) go further in support 
of  Carrier  and  Spafford’s  approach  by  identifying  a  fundamental  similarity 
between the physical and digital crime scene domains. Despite criticism of the 
IDIP many of the ideas that it introduced were adopted by other researchers, 
particularly  the  concept  of  a  digital  crime  scene  (Baryamureeba  &  Tushabe, 
2004; Beebe & Clark, 2004; Kohn, Eloff, & Olivier, 2006). 
Based on their own criteria the IDIP meets the requirements that it needs 
to be based on the existing theory for physical investigations, is not technology-
specific but allows for technology to be used to assist the investigator and can be 
applied  generally  amongst  practitioners  working  in  different  areas  of  digital 
forensics. Where the IDIP is weaker is in the area of practicality and it has been 
criticised in this respect by several researchers in this area (Beebe & Clark, 2004; 
Rogers, 2004). The IDIP is given a Carrier and Spafford score of 4/5.  
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In relation to the Daubert tests, although Carrier and Spafford provide 
two case studies in which they map activities to the IDIP there does not seem to 
have been any independent testing of the model. With respect to peer review of 
the IDIP, the feedback has not always been positive (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 
2004; Peisert, et al., 2008; Rogers, et al., 2006), although other researchers have 
used some of the concepts of a ‘digital crime scene’ as an element in their own 
models (Beebe & Clark, 2004; Kohn, et al., 2006). A further weakness of the 
IDIP from the perspective of the Daubert tests is that there do not appear to be 
any standards associated with the model so the Daubert Score for the model is 
1/4. 
Although Carrier and Spafford contribute many useful elements for the 
digital forensic process, particularly the idea of the ‘Digital Crime Scene’, the 
key failing of their model is an overall lack of practicality. 
3.3.3  Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIPM)  
The  most  significant  contribution  of  the  EDIPM  is  the  idea  that  the 
phases are  iterative rather than  linear, however  Baryamureeba and Tushabe’s 
(2004)  descriptions  of  phases  lean  heavily  towards  incident  response,  unlike 
Carrier  and  Spafford’s  IDIP  (2003)  whose  phase  descriptions  can  be  read  in 
generic terms. An example of this focus is in the scenario used to describe how 
the  model  could  be  used  with  the  introduction  of  ‘primary’  and  ‘secondary’ 
crime scenes and the  ‘Traceback’ phase that  involve a computer system (the 
secondary crime scene) being accessed from another location (the primary crime 
scene)  necessitating  the  employment  of  various  Internet-related  tools  to 
‘Traceback’ the origin of the ‘attack’.   
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The descriptive narrative is sometimes unclear, such as the use of the 
terms ‘multiple analysis’ and ‘synchronized’ that are not explained and that do 
not have an obvious meaning in the context of analysis. Perumal (2009) criticises 
the EDIPM for missing essential elements such as the ‘chain of custody’ while 
Wang and Yu (2007) criticise the practicality of this model (and the earlier IDIP) 
on the basis that they are both “abstract and cursory” (p. 1).  
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the EDIPM does meet the 
requirement to reflect a physical crime scene process and is not dependent on 
any particular technology. However, the description and structure of the model 
indicates a heavy focus on incident response thereby reducing its practicality in 
other areas. Furthermore, a lack of guidance in the EDIPM’s application, such as 
how the iterative steps feature in the process flow, and unclear narrative make it 
difficult to apply even within the incident response field. This would hinder the 
design of technological tools to assist the practitioner. The EDIPM is given a 
Carrier and Spafford score of 2/5. 
In relation to the Daubert tests there does not seem to have been any 
testing of the EIDIP but it has been published and peer reviewed, although as per 
the  Carrier  and  Spafford  model  it  has  been  criticized  for  lack  of  practicality 
(Kohn, et al., 2006). Whilst other researchers acknowledge the EDIPM there are 
no other models based on it, there are no standards associated with the model and 
there is no evidence that the EDIPM has been generally accepted. The Daubert 
score for this model is given as 1/4.   
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3.3.4  Digital Crime Scene Analysis model (DCSA)  
Rogers (2004) states that the ‘overriding principal’ for the DCSA model 
is that it should be independent of tools as per Carrier and Spafford (2003) and 
McKemmish (1999) whilst adhering to the “…criminalistic principles of being 
methodical,  accurate,  ensuring  authenticity  and  reproducibility  of  evidence, 
maintaining  the  chain  of  custody  and  minimizing  the  contamination  of  the 
original  scene…” (p. 14). Rogers also identifies the need, when applying the 
DCSA model, to keep within the limits of the practitioner’s skills and knowledge 
together with the need to maintain ‘proper documentation’.  
A further useful contribution from Rogers is the concept of ‘forensically 
sound tasks’. These tasks are derived from ‘properties’ of digital forensics and 
comprise  of  Authenticity,  Chain  of  Custody,  Integrity,  Minimization  and 
Reproducibility.  Rogers  cites  McKemmish  (1999)  and  Mocas  (2004)  as 
inspiration  for  these  properties.  However,  on  reviewing  the  tasks  in  detail  it 
appears that Rogers has created separate tasks for what could realistically be one 
task  in  practice.  This  is  evident  in  the  tasks  ‘control  the  scene’,  ‘survey  the 
scene’ and ‘document the scene’. In practice these could all be covered by the 
requirement to ‘process the scene as per local guidelines’ as one is unlikely to 
carry  out  any  of  these  tasks  in  isolation  (Baryamureeba  &  Tushabe,  2004; 
I.O.C.E, 2002). Similarly, the tasks ‘Identify potential evidence and containers of 
evidence’  and  ‘Determine  the  evidence  modality’  could  be  undertaken  at the 
same time or as part of the same task ‘Identify the source and nature of potential 
evidence’  (Baryamureeba  &  Tushabe,  2004;  Ciardhuáin,  2004).  The  task 
‘package  for transport’ which  is  identified  as  being  important as  it  is  “…the 
second most crucial event in crime scene analysis” (Rogers, 2004, p. 24) due to  
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the potential for evidence to be lost or destroyed, could include the following 
task ‘turn over to lab or appropriate offsite facility’ which seems to be the final 
outcome of the previous task. Rogers identifies the risk of transporting evidence 
which comes about because the evidence leaves the controlled environment of 
the crime scene and enters a ‘no man’s land’ before reaching the ‘lab’. However 
the task ‘package and deliver to secure  facility’ would  be a  more reasonable 
description for the final task involved in acquiring digital evidence. 
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford  (2003) criteria, Rogers’ DCSA 
model  meets  all  five  requirements  being;  1)  based  on  existing  crime  scene 
investigations, 2) following the steps of an actual investigation (notwithstanding 
earlier comments in relation to additional steps), 3) unconstrained to a particular 
tool or technology, 4) detailed enough to allow for the development of technical 
aids and 5) capable of being applied in a variety of environments. The DCSA 
model is given a Carrier and Spafford score of 5/5. 
However,  in  relation  to the  Daubert  test, there is  no  evidence  of  any 
testing having been carried out on the DCSA model and there do not appear to be 
any standards associated with the model. There seems to have been little adverse 
comment  since  the  DCSA  model  was  proposed  and  it  has  appeared  in  a 
handbook  (Tipton  &  Krause,  2006)  but  there  is  no  indication  of  its  general 
acceptance or widespread adoption. The Daubert score for the DCSA model is 
given as 1/4. This is an interesting example of the disparity between what experts 
in the field, such as Carrier and Spafford, consider makes a good process model 
for  acquiring  digital  evidence  and  how  the  courts  might  assess  the  process 
described by that model.  
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Despite some of the issues highlighted in relation to a few of the concepts 
introduced in the DCSA model the overall approach is a valuable contribution to 
the  field  of  digital  forensics,  especially  the  emphasis  on  the  data  acquisition 
element which seems to be lacking in other models . The DCSA model is let 
down by a lack of testing or associated standards and does not appear to have 
been widely adopted. In addition, the stance taken by Rogers (2004) that the type 
of investigation should determine the high-level process can be criticised as the 
type of investigation can potentially change, e.g. if child pornography is located 
during a fraud investigation, and this approach has not been adopted elsewhere.  
3.3.5  A  Hierarchical,  Objectives-Based  Framework  for  the 
Digital Investigations Process (HOFDIP)  
The description provided by Beebe and Clark (2004) of the Preparation 
phase of the HOFDIP suggests it is based on the perspective of a digital forensic 
practitioner working within their own organization, i.e. incident response. This 
emphasis is apparent through the author’s reference to an organization’s decision 
regarding  its  ‘forensic  readiness’  (an  incident  response  concept)  as  well  as 
further references to ‘deterrence’ and  ‘computer security  incidents’  (Beebe  & 
Clark,  2004).  The  inclusion  of  an  ‘incident  response’  phase  is  also  further 
evidence of the HOFDIP’s focus although a useful aspect of the model is the 
introduction of ‘principles’ that are then applied throughout the investigations 
process, these being ‘evidence preservation’ and ‘documentation’. 
In  relation  to  ‘evidence  preservation’  two  goals  are  stated  which  are 
firstly to maximize evidence availability and quality and secondly to maintain 
the integrity of the evidence during the digital investigation process. The goal of  
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‘documentation’ is to record all information relevant to (or generated by) the 
investigation.  Both  of  these  principles  are  reflected  in  other  models  (Brown, 
2006; Ciardhuáin, 2004; Rogers, et al., 2006). Despite Beebe and Clark’s (2004) 
stated  intention  to  create  a  model  that  incorporates  the  activities  of  all  the 
previous models they have defined their own principles rather than adopt those 
defined by the Association of Chief Police Officers (2003) or the IOCE (2002). 
This seems counter-productive and it would be better to add (if necessary) to 
existing  definitions  which  are  already  widely  recognised  and  relatively  well-
established. 
Notwithstanding  the  introduction  of  their  own  principles  Beebe  and 
Clarke’s main argument for adopting their model centres around the fact that it is 
‘multi-tiered’  (in  contrast  to  the  ‘single  tier’  approach  they  identify  in  other 
models)  which  they  contend  is  more  appropriate  for  the  complex  digital 
investigation  process.  Where  detail  has  been  provided  for  the  ‘second-tier’ 
activities (as part of the Data Analysis phase) the prescriptive nature of the tasks 
for particular objectives would  be  more appropriate as an  appendix that  lists 
possible activities rather than being part of the model to address Schatz’s (2007) 
‘complexity problem’.  
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria, the HOFDIP meets the 
requirements  to  be  based  on  existing  physical  crime  scene  theory  and  to  be 
‘technology independent’. However, the model in its current state is not practical 
and is missing the detail in some of the stages necessary to provide a design for 
technological aids. In addition, it is focused towards the area of incident response 
rather than being generic. The HOFDIP is given a Carrier and Spafford score of 
2/5.  
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Beebe and Clark (2004) themselves give their framework a high rating 
based on the Carrier and Spafford criteria suggesting it can be applied generally 
(despite its incident response phase and focus) and when further developed they 
believe it will provide sufficient detail to meet the requirements of specificity 
and practicality. However, Beebe and Clarke admit that as the framework stands 
in its current form it is “incomplete” (2004, p. 15).  
In relation to the Daubert tests there is no evidence that any testing has 
been undertaken on the HOFDIP as described by Beebe and Clark and there do 
not  appear  to  be  any  standards  associated  with  the  framework  nor  is  there 
evidence  of  the  necessary  development  undertaken  since  the  HOFDIP  was 
proposed.  Although  the  HOFDIP  has  been  published  and  peer  reviewed,  the 
comments from Beebe and Clark suggesting that the framework is incomplete 
and not yet practical (Beebe & Clark, 2004, pp. 15-16) reduce its usefulness. The 
Daubert score for the HOFDIP is given as 1/4.  
Beebe and Clark’s key contribution is the concept of a ‘multi-tiered’ as 
opposed to the ‘single tier’ approach adopted in other models; however several 
of the key phases and principals are not structured in such a way that they are 
relevant in their current form to all digital forensic practitioners due to their bias 
towards incident response. Although their proposed framework is claimed to be 
another summary of ‘best practice’, references by Beebe and Clark, such as the 
installation of ‘activity monitoring’ devices, have been introduced by the authors 
as this does not feature in other ‘generic’ digital forensic models and would be 
relevant mainly to network intrusion investigations.  
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3.3.6  Framework for a Digital Forensic Investigation (FDFI)  
Kohn et al (2006) combine phases in the FDFI that they have identified in 
earlier  models  and  highlight  legal  knowledge  of  the  environment  and  the 
‘documentation of all steps taken’ as being key elements of any digital forensic 
model.  These  are  key  contributions  as  identified  by  Selamat  et  al  (2008), 
although they propose expanding the process model to five phases (see section 
3.3.8 ).  
In  relation  to  the  Carrier  and  Spafford  criteria  the  FDFI  meets  the 
requirements to be based on existing physical crime scene theory in as much as 
the high-level description could be applied in this context and is practical in the 
sense  that  its  high-level  approach  does  not  introduce  any  hindrance  to  the 
practitioner nor does it make it ‘technology dependent’. However the lack of 
detail  prevents  the  adoption  of  technology  to  assist  with  the  framework’s 
implementation and the leaning towards the area of incident response means that 
it  is  not generic enough to be applied across all areas of the digital  forensic 
environment. The FDFI is given a Carrier and Spafford score of 3/5. 
In relation to the Daubert tests there is no evidence provided by Kohn et 
al (2006) that any testing has been undertaken on the FDFI, there do not appear 
to be any standards associated or referenced by the framework and there seems 
to have been no development since the framework was proposed. The FDFI has 
been published and peer reviewed but does not seem to have been developed 
further.  The Daubert score for the FDFI is given as 1/4.   
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3.3.7  Two-Dimensional  Evidence  Reliability  Amplification 
Process Model (TDERAPM)  
Within  the  TDERAPM  the  step  for  Initialisation  covers  two  roles, 
Inspector and Manager with the Inspector being the technical ‘hands on’ person. 
Khatir, Hejazi and Sneiders (2008) suggest that at the outset of the investigation 
the manager should refer to similar previous cases (also suggested by Beebe and 
Clark (2004) ) in order to estimate costs/time/resources and obtain an idea of the 
likely outcome. Whilst this may seem worthwhile in theory it does not seem to 
be very practical. The first issue is that the process assumes all previous cases 
have  been  adequately  recorded  and  classified  although  no  system  for  this  is 
suggested in the paper which only refers to some form of purpose-built database. 
Secondly, the details of a case are likely to differ from one case to the next and to 
suggest that the costs or the potential conviction rate can be estimated based on 
previous cases is unrealistic, certainly without a large body of research to draw 
upon and there is currently no evidence that this exists. 
Other aspects of the initialization phase such as determining legal issues, 
developing  a  plan,  receiving  authorisation  and  setting  up  a  team  would  be 
recognisable from the contributions of other authors such as Brown (2006) in his 
book ‘Computer Evidence: Collection and Preservation’, Freiling & Schwittay 
(2007)  with  their  ‘Common  Process  Model  for  Incident  Response’  and 
Stephenson  (2003a)  with  his  ‘Comprehensive  Approach  to  Digital  Incident 
Investigation’. However, the Khatir et al (2008) focus on ‘incident response’ as 
opposed to a generic digital forensic investigation are apparent in their comment 
“Besides hardening the security of the compromised organization, the ultimate 
goal of a digital forensic investigation is to support the prosecution”(Khatir, et  
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al.,  2008,  p.  3).  Notwithstanding  the  previous  comment,  with  its  incident 
response  focus, the reference  “to support the prosecution”  does  not take  into 
account the fact that there may not be a prosecution element to the matter nor 
does  it  consider  circumstances  in  which  the  digital  forensic  practitioner  is 
working for the defence. 
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria the TDERAPM meets the 
test for being based on the existing theory for physical crime scenes and not 
being  ‘technology  dependent’.  However,  although  the  key  factors  of  an 
investigation are identified in a unique format the high-level approach is not of 
great benefit to the investigator as a lot of detail is missing thus limiting the 
practical aspect of this model as well as the ability to design technology to assist 
the  practitioner.  The  high-level  abstract  model  (discussed  in  section  2.5.1.9) 
would seem to be generic as there are no environment-specific aspects. However, 
some of the  narrative used to describe particular aspects of the  model  is  not 
generic, for example the reference to “supporting the prosecution”. There are 
also  suggestions  of  an  incident  response  focus  to  the  TDERAPM  through 
comments such as “…hardening the security of the compromised organization” 
(Khatir, et al., 2008, p. 3). These aspects will require modification in order to 
remove this bias from the TDERAPM. The model has been given a Carrier and 
Spafford score of 2/5. 
In relation to the Daubert tests there is no evidence that any testing has 
been  undertaken,  there  do  not  appear  to  be  any  standards  referenced  or 
associated  with  the  TDERAPM  model  and  there  seems  to  have  been  no 
development  since  it  was  proposed.  The  model  has  been  published  and  peer  
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reviewed but does not seem to have been developed further. The Daubert score 
for the TDERAPM is given as 1/4.  
Where many authors adopt over-riding principles (Beebe & Clark, 2004; 
Selamat,  et  al.,  2008;  Wang  &  Yu,  2007)  Khatir  et  al  have  used  the  term 
‘umbrella  activities’  and  the  main  contribution  provided  by  this  paper  is  the 
consideration  of  management  issues  rather  than  purely  practical/technical 
process issues. However, the TDERAPM would be difficult to apply in practice 
given the lack of information regarding its implementation. 
3.3.8  Mapping  Process  of  Digital  Forensic  Investigation 
Framework  
At  a  high  level  the  classification  system  used  by  Selamat,  Yusof  and 
Sahib (2008) provides a useful summary of the phases that make up the digital 
forensic process. However, the detail provided in relation to each phase is less 
clear. For instance, the meaning of “provide a mechanism for the incident to be 
detected and confirmed” (Selamat, et al., 2008, p. 167) in Phase 1 is vague and 
does  not  appear  to  be  generic  but  rather  leaning  towards  incident  response. 
Similarly vague is an activity in Phase 2 “translated [sic] the media into data” 
(Selamat, et al., 2008, p. 167). Although proposing a guide based on previous 
work, the Selamat et al paper is almost entirely a summary of earlier models and 
as it provides only brief Results and Conclusion sections it has not been assessed 
against either the Carrier and Spafford or Daubert criteria. 
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3.3.9  Four Step Forensic Process model 
A significant criticism of the Four Step Forensic Process model is that it 
seems  to  begin  with  the  Collection  stage  without  the  necessary  preliminary 
activities such as confirming that you are authorised to carry out the activity and 
undertaking  an  initial  planning  stage,  followed  by  an  onsite  survey  (Brown, 
2006; Casey, 2004; Sammes & Jenkinson, 2007). Unlike other researchers who 
incorporate a planning stage (Brown, 2006; Casey, 2004; Sammes & Jenkinson, 
2007) Kent, Chevalier, Grance and Dang (2006) limit the requirements of the 
plan for acquiring the data to prioritizing the data based on three factors, namely; 
‘likely value’, ‘volatility’ and ‘amount of effort required’. These factors reflect 
the model’s focus on incident response. Whilst Kent et al (2006) provide a lot of 
background detail to assist an organisation to develop a general capability  in 
terms of training, procedures and resources, the lack of a separate planning stage 
prior to the physical collection of data is a serious shortcoming, particularly for 
other environments such as law enforcement and commercial practice (Bogen & 
Dampier,  2005;  Ciardhuáin,  2004;  Kohn,  et  al.,  2006).  In  several  places 
throughout  the  model’s  description  Kent  et  al  (2006)  refer  to  ‘policies  and 
procedures’, ‘decisions’, ‘concerns’ and ‘considerations’ prior to the collection 
of data which indicates an awareness of the need for processes to occur prior to 
the physical collection of data but this awareness is not translated into a separate 
planning aspect of the model. Overall, the process described by Kent et al (2006) 
covers  the  standard  forensic  procedures  and  provides  some  detail  that  would 
assist an organization in preparing its ‘incident response’ capabilities. The lack 
of clear structure and emphasis of important activities detracts from the model’s 
general usefulness in other environments.   
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Although Kent et al (2006) include within their guide a high-level and 
simplistic model of the forensic process (with the whole data acquisition process 
combined under the ‘collection’ stage) many of the detailed elements described 
in the narrative need to be selected or adjusted for an organisations’ particular 
purpose and given the intended incident response focus the Kent et al model has 
not been evaluated against the Carrier and Spafford or Daubert criteria.  
3.3.10    Common  Process  Model  for  Incident  Response  and 
Computer Forensics (CPMIRCF)  
Although the title of their  model  suggests that Freiling and Schwittay 
(2007)  have  prepared  a  significant  amount  of  the  groundwork  for  a  generic 
model,  in reality their aim was to  incorporate some techniques and practices 
from the field they see as ‘computer forensics’ into the ‘incident response’ field. 
In addition, they do see that the ‘good management’ of incident response practice 
could be a benefit in ‘pure’ computer forensic cases. In relation to the Carrier 
and  Spafford  criteria,  the  CPMIRFC  is  not  based  on  a  physical  crime  scene 
scenario and with its heavy focus on incident response it is not applicable as a 
generic  model  and  misses  many  steps  that  would  be  part  of  an  actual 
investigation. It is however not ‘technology dependent’ and a level of specificity 
has been achieved in relation to classifications and categories. The Carrier and 
Spafford score is given as 2/5. 
With regard to the Daubert test, there is no evidence of any testing or 
peer-review,  and  there  are  no  standards  associated  with  it.  There  is  also  no 
evidence of acceptance within the communities for which it was designed. The 
Daubert score is given as 0/4.  
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3.3.11   Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (SDFIM) 
  The activities associated with the various phases of the SDFIM are valid 
but the criteria for the classification of an activity (or collection of activities) as a 
phase does not appear to have been applied consistently. For instance, the whole 
of the preparation activities are covered in one phase whereas the initial onsite 
activities are spread across six phases. Many phases could be incorporated into a 
single  phase  such  as  Phase  2  (Secure  the  Scene),  Phase  3  (Survey  and 
Recognition) and Phase 5 (Communication Shielding) which would be consistent 
with the approach taken by many other researchers such as  Beebe and Clark 
(2004), Rogers (2006), Selamat (2008) and Carrier and Spafford (2003).  
Another issue with the model is that there are no overriding activities, 
with ‘documentation of the scene’ being a specific phase in its own right. Most 
importantly, the creation and maintenance of a chain of custody is mentioned but 
not associated with items of potential evidence and it is unclear how it is to be 
applied in the model.  
Agarwal, Gupta, M., Gupta, S. and Gupta, S. C. (Agarwal, et al., 2011) 
make the statement that the “Majority of the evidence involving mobile devices 
will be of a volatile nature, being present in ROM” (p. 126). There are technical 
errors with this statement: 
  The majority of evidence contained in mobile devices is non-volatile 
as most of the data is stored in flash memory and is not lost when 
power is removed  
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  The  volatile  data  in  a  mobile  device  mostly  relates  to  current 
communications which Phase 5 of the SDFIM eliminates through the 
requirement to isolate the device from its carrier  
  Data  cannot  be  lost  (or  altered)  from  ROM  (Read  Only  Memory) 
through user activity and mobile devices typically don’t use this type 
of memory. 
 
Based  on  the  Carrier  and  Spafford  criteria  the  SDFIM  is  based  on 
physical crime scene theory and is technology neutral as well as being applicable 
to  all  environments.  There  are  however  significant  weaknesses  in  terms  of 
practicality, as key steps such as chain of evidence are not well documented, and 
specificity  due  to  inconsistencies  in  the  data  flow.  The  Carrier  and  Spafford 
score is given as 3/5. 
In relation to the Daubert test there is no evidence of testing having been 
carried out although the SDFIM has been published in a peer-reviewed journal. 
There are no standards associated with the model and there is no indication of 
acceptance within the relevant community. The Daubert score is given as 1/4. 
3.3.12 Extended  Model  of  Cybercrime  Investigations  (EMCI) 
  The EMCI was produced based in the belief that other models did not 
cover all aspects of the investigation process. Ciardhuáin’s (2004) inclusion of 
an ‘authorisation’ activity is something normally lacking in other models which 
may describe the need to obtain warrants etc. but only as part of a ‘preparation’ 
or ‘readiness’ phase. For instance Reith et al (2002) recognise an ‘identification 
component’  whilst  Carrier  and  Spafford  (2003)  have  a  ‘Confirmation  and  
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Authorization Phase’ as one of their Deployment phases. Ciardhuáin suggests 
that there may be both internal and external authorities involved. This concept is 
one that has been selected as a useful contribution to a new generic model. With 
regard to the ‘Planning’ activity Ciardhuáin identifies several specific sources of 
influence such as regulations, legislation, internal strategies and internal policies 
whilst  recognising  that  there  is  a  potential  need  to  re-address  the  issue  of 
authorisation  should  the  investigation  scope  be  found  to  be  greater than  that 
anticipated in the authorisation activity. The inclusion of a planning stage of an 
investigation is supported by the initial work of McKemmish (1999) and is in 
keeping  with  other  contemporary  models  (Baryamureeba  &  Tushabe,  2004; 
Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Reith, et al., 2002). More recently researchers and 
practitioners give a high weighting to this type of activity (Brown, 2006; Casey, 
2004; Sammes & Jenkinson, 2007) 
Ciardhuáin’s (2004) ‘notification’ activity  involves, where appropriate, 
notifying  the  subject  or  relevant  person/authority  that  the  investigation  has 
commenced. It could be argued that whilst this could be identified as an instance 
of information flow it could just as easily be incorporated into a more detailed 
planning stage rather than stand alone as a specific activity. Ciardhuáin (2004) 
describes  his  ‘search  and  identification  of  evidence’  activity  as  dealing  with 
locating and identifying the evidence for the next activity and goes on to give an 
example that this could be considered to be “...finding the computer used by a 
suspect and confirming that it is the one of interest to the investigators” (p. 6). In 
this respect Ciardhuáin’s statement is too simplistic as finding the computer used 
by a suspect is not in itself locating evidence but is locating a potential source of 
evidence as the physical computer is unlikely to be an item of evidence in its  
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own right but merely ‘seized property’ (Hutton & Johnston, 2000, p. 151). It is 
also quite possible for the computer to contain nothing of evidentiary value and 
therefore no evidence will have been seized at all. Steel (2006) provides a better 
description  of  this  process  “Identify  the  scene  -  Determine  the  location  or 
locations where digital evidence of the crime may be resident” (p. 12). 
The  remaining  activities  in  the  EMCI  relating  to  digital  evidence 
acquisition (Collection, Transport and Storage) are roughly similar to those of 
other models but of particular interest, especially in relation to the Daubert test, 
is the fact that Ciardhuáin (2004) attempted to test his model. However, unlike 
Venter  (2006)  (who  later  used  training  sessions  for  his  testing)  Ciardhuáin 
(2004)  adopted  a  ‘focus  group’  format  for  questioning  a  group  of  police 
computer  crime  investigators
23  and  also  questioned  an  ‘experienced 
investigator’. The results of the focus group where that the EMCI was seen as a 
good generic description of a police  investigation (not just a computer crime 
investigation)  and  the  ‘backtracking’  was  seen  as  an  important  feature 
(Ciardhuáin, 2004). However, although there were no major elements omitted 
from the EMCI the respondents felt there were activities included that were not 
normally seen as being separate from other investigative processes and some of 
these were regarded as irrelevant for their work, namely: Awareness, Transport, 
Storage  and  Dissemination  (Ciardhuáin,  2004).  From  a  law  enforcement 
perspective the respondents felt that there needed to be tighter controls on the 
flow of information and were concerned with information ‘leakage’ because of 
the  requirements  for  confidentiality  imposed  on  them  by  “external  policies, 
                                                 
 
 
23 Size of group not stated  
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regulation  and  legislation”  (p.  13).  There  is  no  comment  attributed  to  the 
‘experienced  investigator’  and  under  the  section  ‘future  work’  Ciardhuáin 
suggests that the EMCI should be tested in other environments and identifies 
those areas of interest as being auditing, civil litigation, investigations by system 
administrators and judicial inquiries. 
In  relation  to the  Carrier  and  Spafford  criteria  the  EMCI  is  based  on 
physical crime scene investigations; from the feedback of the focus group the 
model  follows  the  main  steps  of  an  investigation  it  seems  to  be  practical  to 
implement whilst being generic and not tied to a particular technology. The only 
test it fails is that of providing sufficient detail to develop technological aids to 
the investigator. The EMCI is given a Carrier and Spafford score of 4/5.  
In  relation  to  the  selected  Daubert  tests,  testing  has  been  undertaken 
(although this was through a focus group session rather than field-based trials 
and  Ciardhuáin  identifies  the  need  for  testing  in  fields  other  than  law 
enforcement). The EMCI has been published and peer reviewed but it does not 
seem to have been developed further to gain general acceptance and there do not 
appear to be any standards associated with the model. The overall Daubert score 
for the EMCI is given as 2/4.  
The  EMCI  introduced  a  new  approach  to  describing  the  activities 
undertaken  in  a  digital  forensic  investigation  by  focussing  on  the  flow  of 
information  although  accepting  that  “  Some  additional  emphasis  needs  to  be 
placed  on  the  control  of  the  information  flows  in  the  law  enforcement 
environment” (Ciardhuáin, 2004, p. 14).   
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3.3.13    FORensics ZAchman framework (FORZA)  
There are aspects of the FORZA model that are unclear, such as the lack 
of identification of a ‘terminating process’, missing data flow between the ‘legal 
advisor’ and the ‘legal prosecutor’  plus the discrepancies between the narrative 
and  diagram  in  relation  to  data  flow  direction.  Although  the  concept  of 
modelling the process flows is a key contribution to the research environment 
there are various questions raised around how the process would work in the 
field and many aspects of the narrative appear to be theoretical rather than based 
on practice.  
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria the FORZA model is based 
on  an  internal  incident  response  scenario  rather  than  existing  theory  for  a 
physical  crime  investigation  (although  reference  to  the  5WH  approach  is 
generic). From the information supplied it is also not clear that the framework is 
practical and follows the steps of an actual investigation as the worked example 
is too theoretical to confirm practical applicability. Examination of the example 
of process flows raises several questions. For instance, the process flow for most 
tasks is only one way from the Case Leader whilst the narrative suggests a two-
way interaction. Furthermore, there is no ‘flow’ from the ‘Conceptual Security 
Layer’  even  though  this  is  not  identified  as  the  terminating  process  in  the 
narrative and in practice there is likely to be some process flow between the 
‘legal  advisor’  and  the  ‘legal  prosecutor’  (assuming  they  are  not  the  same 
person). Whilst the model is not dependent on a particular technology the overall 
lack  of  detail  would  prevent  the  development  of  general  technology 
requirements. In addition the model is focused towards incident response and  
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therefore would need development to become a candidate for a generic model. 
Because of these issues the Carrier and Spafford score is 1/5. 
In relation to the Daubert tests, although the model description has been 
published there is no evidence that any testing has been undertaken, there do not 
appear to be any standards associated with the model and there is no evidence of 
general acceptance. The overall Daubert Score is 1/4. 
3.3.14   Process Flow Model  
While  the  basic  concept  of  providing  flowcharts  to  assist  with  the 
collection of potential evidence, albeit restricted to physical devices, seems to be 
sound, the intended target audience and the implementation of the concept has 
been strongly criticised. Fundamentally, the aim to provide adequate training for 
those with limited technical background seems ambitious given the nature of the 
digital forensic field (Calhoun, 2008; Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Steel, 2006). 
Even when the American National Institute of Justice (NIJ) produced a guideline 
for  ‘first  responders’  they  stated  that  the  assumption  was  that  these  were 
personnel tasked with collecting digital evidence who were already technically 
trained (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 17).  
Venter (2006) accepts that the process flow approach could come under 
criticism as being a type of checklist and is critical of the ‘lists based approach’ 
based on observations made during training sessions using the US Department of 
Justices’ Guide for First Responders (Ashcroft, 2001) in which the candidates 
where described as being anxious and making mistakes with the conclusion that 
the  “… lists based approach did therefore not provide sufficient support to the 
candidates” (Venter, 2006, p. 3). The distinction being made between the term 
‘list’ and ‘checklist’ is not clear although the process flow approach  “…adds  
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sequence  to  actions  in  a  manner  that  is  easier  to  understand  than  the  list 
approach”  (Venter,  2006,  p.  6).  Venter  suggests  that  his  process  flow  model 
provides a “…rigorous approach that will deal adequately with most situations” 
(p. 6) as required by the intended audience and indicates support for his approach 
from  Brezinski  (2002)  on  the  basis  that  the  “…amount  of  decision  making 
needed to be made during the collection process must be minimized” (p. 6). 
Whilst it would seem that the process flow approach suggested by Venter  
is  relatively  easy  to  use,  given  the  technical  nature  of  digital  forensic 
investigations the first design principle’s target audience would seem to conflict 
with  the  nature  of  forensic  work  that  requires  a  technical  expert  to  provide 
evidence, i.e. a person a judge determines is an expert in the relevant field by 
virtue of their  experience and/or training  (Mason, 2007, p. 124). The second 
design principle, that of making the process applicable in ‘most cases’, would 
also  seem  to  be  ambitious  given  the  author’s  own  recognition  of  Beebe  and 
Clark’s argument against a ‘checklist’ approach on the basis that each situation 
can be different (Beebe & Clark, 2004, p. 2). Situations can be identified that are 
not covered by the ‘process flows’, such as encountering a file server or laptop, 
as well as inadequate instructions, e.g. not stating that the hard disk must be 
placed in an electrostatic bag for protection (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 42; SWGDE, 
2006, p. 4). 
There is some merit in the third principle that has the concept of assisting 
with expert testimony through reference to a ‘standard’ procedure of some form 
that is easy to follow. However, on the basis that the model is for people with 
limited technical  background they would not qualify as  ‘expert witnesses’  in 
their own right nor would they be able to express opinions (a key feature of  
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expert witness testimony; (Mason, 2007, p. 124). It is therefore unclear how this 
principle would apply in practice. The final principle seems sensible on the basis 
that for the model to be of any practical use it should be able applicable in the 
‘real’ world rather than be confined to a training environment. 
The  restriction  on  the  size  of  the  document  containing  a  particular 
process flow may seem like a reasonable proposition but this may be restrictive 
in practice, especially when trying to cater for all eventualities (for example, as 
the forms stand you are limited to recording only three hard disks per computer 
when it is relatively common to have 5-disk RAID arrays in business situations). 
The benefit of having a standard A4-sized form is also likely to be negated by 
having to compress information into this format. Furthermore, with the move 
towards documentation being presented in court in electronic format and police 
forces  producing  their  reports  in  electronic  format  (such  as  the  Western 
Australian  Police  Force  Computer  Crime  Unit)  the  dimensions  of  documents 
when printed is less relevant than the information they contain. Even with regard 
to the output of Internet access log files and databases, neither of these  lends 
itself to a convenient printed format However, Venter (2006) justifies the use of 
an A4 format by suggesting that this will enable all the documentation to be kept 
together, for instance in relation to a particular computer although he doesn’t 
discuss why this is better than having one sheet per item of evidence to create a 
bundle of documents in the case of a computer with multiple hard disk drives. 
Another point is that other documentation, such as photos, scene sketches and 
notes  associated  with  a  particular  item  of  potential  evidence  will  be  stored 
separately so there will be multiple forms/documents for each computer in any 
case (Quality Assurance Institute, 2007).  
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Examining the detail of how the process flow model should be applied 
through  reference  to  a  specific  example  (Process  to  follow  at  an  Electronic 
Evidence Scene)  has as the  first task ‘verifying the search warrant’ which  is 
relevant to law  enforcement activities, but a  better label would perhaps  have 
been ‘verify authority to undertake evidence collection’ thus enabling the form to 
be used by all digital forensic practitioners. This would also identify whether in 
fact the  various  hard  disk  drives  or other  devices  could  be  removed  in  their 
entirety and whether initial analysis was required prior to removing a device (i.e. 
requirements beyond the ability of the ‘Cyber First Responder’). The next step is 
to  answer  the  question  ‘suspects  around?’  which  is  very  specific  and  could 
perhaps have been covered by an instruction to ‘secure and document the scene’ 
that would also encompass the next step ‘Photograph general scene and details’. 
The  process  flow  then  moves  to  the  stage  where  iterations  of  the  collection 
process relating to each of the three identified device types begin before finishing 
with evidence processing tasks and leaving the scene. The evidence collection 
stage  only  considers  physical  evidence  so  the  creation  of  forensic  images  or 
copies of relevant data are not considered and the actual process of how you 
would go about identifying which items may contain relevant information is not 
described in the text. 
Although the intention seems to be to provide as much detailed advice as 
possible for the less-experienced responder there are fundamental problems with 
some of the detailed advice contained within the process flow. For instance, with 
regard to shutting down the computer or ‘pulling the plug’ Venter (2006) argues: 
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In the absence of support, the power plug is removed from 
the machine. It is argued that preserving the integrity of the 
potential evidence on the hard disk is much more important 
than  any  evidence  that  may  be  lost  due  to  an  immediate 
shutdown (p. 13). 
 
However, the advice to remove the power plug from a running machine if 
no technically competent person is available has the potential to cause major 
disruption to the computer’s file system and  “…can result in loss of evidence 
and  potential  severe  civil  liability”  (Ashcroft,  2001,  p.  35).  Even  in  a  law 
enforcement situation the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence warns 
“…pulling  the  plug  could  severely  damage  the  system;  disrupt  legitimate 
business; and/or create officer and department liability” (SWGDE, 2006, p. 4). 
Of particular concern regarding the preceding advice is the fact that court orders 
will  often  require  commercial  digital  forensic  practitioners  to  provide  an 
undertaking to ensure the items that they deal with are unharmed. This is an 
example of the type of problem that arises when non-IT personnel undertake this 
type of exercise. 
A further issue in the detail is that despite allowing for the processing of 
laptops (and assuming the concept of pulling the plug on a running machine is 
acceptable) a laptop “…requires removal of the battery in addition to stand-alone 
power-down procedure” (Ashcroft, 2001, p. 43). No provision is made within the 
process flow for this situation. Removing a disk from a laptop that is still running 
(although if the lid is closed this may not be apparent) could potentially damage 
both the disk and laptop itself.  
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Although there are areas in which the Process Flow Model is  open to 
criticism, in contrast to many other models Venter (2006) attempted to test his 
process  flow    by  staging a trial that consisted of  four courses  involving  law 
enforcement  personnel  with  Venter  setting  the  test  and  undertaking  the 
assessment. However, Venter (2006) admits that based on the pass rates for the 
course  “…  it  cannot  conclusively  be  deduced  that  the  process  flows  had  a 
significant impact.” (p. 17)  
In relation to the Carrier and Spafford criteria the Venter Process Flow 
Model  does  not  appear  to  be  based  on  existing  theory  for  a  physical  crime 
investigation and questions are raised with regard to the practicability of this 
framework  given  the  restrictive  nature  of  the  forms  and  some  contentious 
guidelines. However, the model is not dependent on a particular technology and 
there is sufficient detail to enable the development of technology requirements. 
In addition, despite the fact that in its present form it is more suited to incident 
response the process flow model is  mostly generic. The Carrier and Spafford 
score is given as 3/5. 
In  relation  to  the  selected  Daubert  tests,  there  is  evidence  of  testing 
undertaken by Venter and the process flow model has been published and peer 
reviewed but does not seem to have been adopted or developed further, nor do 
there do not appear to be any standards associated with the model. The Daubert 
score is given as 1/4.  
3.3.15    End-to-End Digital Investigation (EEDI)  
In  relation  to  the  Carrier  and  Spafford  criteria  the  EEDI  model  by 
Stephenson (2003b) is based on the DFRWS process for an investigation and 
follows the same practical steps. Although it is not dependent on a particular  
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technology its implementation in DIPL is reliant on an understanding of LISP-
like language. While the high-level abstract framework would seem to allow for 
the EEDI’s use across different aspects of digital forensics the model’s emphasis 
on a limited sub-set of investigations, despite being based on the DFRWS, makes 
it unsuited for general use. The Carrier and Spafford score is given as 3/5. 
In relation to the selected Daubert tests, the model has been published 
and  peer  reviewed  but  does  not  seem  to  have  been  generally  accepted  or 
developed further. There is also no evidence that any testing has been undertaken 
and  there  do  not  appear to  be  any  standards  associated  with  the  model.  The 
Daubert score is given as 1/4. 
Despite  the  use  of  a  formal  language  the  fact  that  this  language  is 
minimally defined and is not widely used reduces its usefulness for helping to 
enhance the scientific standing of digital forensics through a formal definition of 
the acquisition process. 
3.3.16    Cyber Tools On-line Search for Evidence (CTOSE)  
A  review  of  an  example  of  the  CTOSE  model  in  practice  contains 
decisions/actions that could be criticised. Firstly, the starting point is formally 
deciding which legal forum is appropriate. This is a flawed initial requirement as 
such a decision cannot always be determined at the outset of an investigation, 
especially if you don’t know who was involved and therefore cannot determine 
the jurisdiction. Furthermore, there may be evidence that comes to light during 
the  investigation  that  constitutes  a  more  serious  offence  than  that  being 
investigated and therefore requires the case to be referred to a higher court. 
A further criticism is that, although the intention of the model is to collect 
evidence in a way admissible to court, an example of its usage shows that a  
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decision on whether or not to prosecute is made even before the facts of the case 
are known. Not only does this seem be inappropriate given the intentions of the 
process model but in practice this decision is often made much later, especially 
as the person or persons involved have to be identified before a prosecution can 
even be considered and this doesn’t always happen in an investigation. 
Criticism can also be made of the decision for the appropriate standard of 
proof  coming  at  the  start  of  the  investigation  –  again  the  placement  of  this 
process  is  not  logical.  If  a  ‘low  standard  of  proof’  is  selected  and  the 
investigation uncovers a serious criminal act it is probably too late to go back 
and re-acquire the evidence to a higher standard. 
Given that the model works by presenting options based on the answers 
to earlier questions it can be seen that an error in the logic at the start of the 
process can direct the user down a path that may not be appropriate or that fails 
to present information that would be useful and relevant for a particular situation. 
In  relation  to  the  Carrier  and  Spafford  criteria  the  CTOSE  model  is 
designed for an internal incident response environment and does not incorporate 
the  standard  physical  crime  scene  theory.  Although  the  key  factors  of  an 
investigation are identified the need to run the tool in a particular environment 
with an SQL database limits its practicality and ties it to this technology. The 
model  does  not  seem  to  come  with  the  complete  decision  tree  data  and  the 
authors refer to the process model’s complexity requiring implementation in the 
form of a computer application. Although some level of detail is provided for 
certain  aspects  of  the  model  the  overall  lack  of  detail  would  prevent  the 
development  of  further  general  technology  requirements  and  as  the  model  is  
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designed  for  incident  response  it  is  not  suitable  as  a  candidate  for  a  generic 
model. The overall Carrier and Spafford score is given as 0/5 
In relation to the selected Daubert tests, the model has been published 
and  peer  reviewed  but  does  not  seem  to  have  been  generally  accepted  or 
developed further.  There is no evidence that any testing has been undertaken and 
there do not appear to be any standards associated with the model. The overall 
Daubert score is given as 1/4. 
The concept of having a framework for acquiring digital data as part of a 
forensic  process  that  has  an  associated  database  of 
advice/recommendations/information  and  which  can  be  accessed  through  a 
relatively simple front-end application has merit, as digital forensic practitioners 
are  constantly  having  to  deal  with  new  environments  and  situations  as 
individuals and so a repository of lessons learnt/information found would be an 
invaluable asset. Unfortunately, the CTOSE project and the C*CAT application 
do not appear to have been developed further and an Internet search reveals a 
relatively  small  number  of  links  –  mostly  references  to  the  project  from 
contemporary papers from the same field. This suggests that despite the backing 
of the European Union there was little support from practitioners in the field of 
digital forensics. 
3.3.17    UML Domain Modelling  
Bogen and Dampier (2005) recommend that domain modelling using the 
domain and ontology modelling language  UML is appropriate for modelling 
digital forensic investigations but suggest that the syntax used for the model is 
less  important  than  the  knowledge  gained  by  building  the  model.  This  last 
statement would appear to be at odds with the concept behind the UML in that  
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the intention with this language is to create a description (model) of a particular 
system in such a way that all those involved in its design, implementation and 
use are able to understand the  information contained therein,  normally  in the 
context of software projects (Bell, 2003). Normally this requires the language 
used  in  the  model  to  be  precise  and  that  suggests  that  the  syntax  must  be 
important. However, in the context of using the language to simply model the 
digital  forensic  process  (rather  than  being  the  specification  for  a  software 
application) this requirement can be ignored.  
As Bogen and Dampier (2005) develop their model it becomes apparent 
that  whilst  there  are  several  references  to  digital  storage  devices  and  their 
relationships to other objects (such as people and workstations) there is no aspect 
of the model that shows how the information that is to be analysed gets into the 
‘system’, although there is a stated need for ‘preparation’ and ‘identifying items 
for analysis’.  
The issue of acquiring the potential evidence is not described in Bogan 
and Dampier’s ‘case domain’ model suggesting that the proposed unification of 
forensic  model  approaches  does  not  cover  all  activities  undertaken  during  a 
forensic  investigation  and  is  only  applicable  to  the  analysis  stage.    As  the 
acquisition  stage  is  not described the  Bogan  &  Dampier  model  has  not been 
assessed against the Carrier and Spafford criteria or Daubert tests but is included 
in this review because of  its use of a  formal  modelling  language to describe 
aspects of the digital forensic process.  
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3.3.18    Modelling  Computer  Forensic  Process  from  Workflow    
Perspective  
Although Wang and Yu’s (2007) argument for using a Petri net to model 
the digital forensic process would seem to have merit there are aspects of the 
narrative  where  the  authors  provide  comments  that  conflict  with  other 
practitioners.  An  example  is  the  practice  of  creating  an  image  on  site  and 
undertaking analysis on a copy of the data (thus preserving the ‘original’ as a 
backup)  which  Wang  and  Yu  contend  is  not  practical.  Whilst  it  is  true  that 
creating the forensic image on site is not always ideal, Wang and Yu’s comment 
is in contrast to the views of many practitioners working in this field (Arthur E. 
Hutt,  1995;  Ashcroft,  2001;  Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers,  2003; 
Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004; Beebe & Clark, 2004; Brezinski & Killalea, 
2002;  Brown,  2006;  Carrier  &  Spafford,  2003;  Casey,  2004;  Craiger,  2005; 
Gosh, 2004; McKemmish, 1999).  
Wang  &  Yu’s  paper  is  included  because  it  describes  a  modelling 
approach (rather than the digital acquisition process), it has therefore not been 
assessed against the Carrier and Spafford criteria or Daubert tests. 
3.4  Summary of model analysis 
The  review  of  relevant  literature  shows  that  since  the  First  Digital 
Forensic Research Workshop was held in 2001 there has been little real progress 
in refining the process for the acquisition of digital data to the point where there 
is  a  formal  definition  that  encompasses  the  activities  of  law  enforcement, 
commercial  and  incident  response  practitioners.  Fundamentally  there  even 
appears to be little agreement on the number of processes or stages involved. As  
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of January 2012 the US-CERT organisation still included in its online ‘reading 
room’ a paper (US-CERT, 2012) which suggests that we are no further forward 
with  regard to  digital  forensics  becoming  a  ‘mainstream’  scientific  discipline 
than we were at the time of the 2001 DFRWS: 
 
Because  computer  forensics  is  a  new  discipline,  there  is  little 
standardization  and  consistency  across  the  courts  and  industry.  As  a 
result, it is not yet recognized as a formal “scientific” discipline.  
(US-CERT, 2012, p. 1) 
  
A summary of comments from the literature review indicate the lack of 
consensus amongst practitioners and researchers: 
 
  Other models are too specific (Reith, et al., 2002) 
  Other models are too abstract (Beebe & Clark, 2004) 
  Other models are too narrow (Ciardhuáin, 2004) 
  Other models are too broad (Rogers, 2004) 
  Other models are too complex (Selamat, et al., 2008) 
  Other models do not provide sufficient detail ( Rogers, 2004) 
  Other models are not practical (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004) 
  Other models lack flexibility (Khatir, et al., 2008) 
  Other models are too technical (Venter, 2006). 
 
Comparing  the  models  that  have  been  developed  using  ad  hoc 
methodologies against the Carrier and Spafford criteria shows that there are four 
models  meeting  at  least  four  of  the  five  criteria  whose  elements  could  be 
incorporated into a generic model, the DCSA, ADFM, EMCI and IDIP.  Four  
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other models meet three out of the five criteria and the remaining models meet 
only two or less. The result of the assessment of previous models is summarised 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 Summary of model scores 
  Scores 
Model/Approach 
Carrier  and 
Spafford  Daubert 
     
Ad Hoc     
The Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Reith, et al., 2002)  4  1 
The Integrated Digital Investigative Process (Carrier & Spafford, 
2003)  4  1 
The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (Baryamureeba 
& Tushabe, 2004)  2  1 
The Digital Crime Scene Analysis Model (Rogers, 2004)  5  1 
A  Hierarchical,  Objectives-Based  Framework  for  the  Digital 
Investigations Process (Beebe & Clark, 2004)  2  1 
Framework for a Digital Investigation (Kohn, et al., 2006)  3  1 
The Two-Dimensional Evidence Reliability Amplification Process 
Model (Khatir, et al., 2008)  2  1 
The  Digital  Forensic  Investigations  Framework  (Selamat, et  al., 
2008)  n/a  n/a 
The Four Step Forensic Process (Kent, et al., 2006)  n/a  n/a 
The Common Process Model (Freiling & Schwittay, 2007)  2  0 
The Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (SRDFIM) 
(Agarwal, et al., 2011b)   3  1 
     
Process flows     
An  Extended  Model  of  Cybercrime  Investigations  (Ciardhuáin, 
2004)  4  2 
FORZA - Digital forensics investigation framework (Ieong, 2006)  1  1 
Process  Flows  for  Cyber  Forensics  Training  and  Operations 
(Venter, 2006)  3  1 
     
Scientific Approaches     
Stephenson (2003b)  3  1 
Hannan, Frings, Broucek, & Turner (2003)  0  1 
Bogen and Dampier (2005)  n/a  n/a 
Wang & Yu (2007)  n/a  n/a 
 
In relation to the Daubert test only one model (the EMCI) met two out of 
the four tests with the majority of the remaining models only meeting one of the 
requirements (and one model meeting none of the requirements). The authors of 
many of the models can claim that they have been peer reviewed whilst only a 
small  number  have undergone any  form of testing and  none of them  include  
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standards against which an error rate can be calculated or have been ‘generally 
accepted’. This situation suggests that the Daubert test may be ineffective as a 
standard for determining the reliability of the process employed for acquiring 
digital evidence. 
In relation to guidelines available for digital forensic practitioners, these 
are focused on law enforcement, electronic discovery or incident response and do 
not cover all the specific requirements of practitioners working in other areas. 
The  International  Standards  Organisation  (ISO)  is  currently  working  on  a 
guideline for digital evidence collection with contributions from the Australian 
Committee IT-012-04 (of which the author of this thesis is a member). This ISO 
document  is  intended  to  cater  for  the  needs  of  digital  forensic  practitioners 
working  in  a  number  of  different  areas,  including  law  enforcement  and 
commercial  practice.  However,  while  the  document  itself  contains  ‘baseline 
steps’ for certain low-level activities involving the collection and acquisition of 
digital  data,  there  is  no  overall  process  model  nor  is  there  a  formal 
representation.  
3.5  Summarising the requirements for a new model 
3.5.1  Identifying the essential components of the new model 
Reviewing the results of the Carrier and Spafford criteria applied to each 
of  the  models  has  identified  those  which  incorporate  many  of  the  attributes 
Carrier and Spafford suggest are essential  for a  model of  the digital  forensic 
process. These models have been selected to provide some of the elements or 
structure for the new model (ADAM). In addition, and in accordance with the  
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comments of Turnball (2008), there is the need to ensure that the ADAM will be 
able to accommodate new and emerging technology. 
The following section presents the specific contributions that have been 
selected  to  influence  the  development  of  ADAM  and  each  of  them  will  be 
directly addressed within the model. 
3.5.2  Key contributions 
The key contributions that relate to the acquisition of digital evidence 
have been identified for each of the models selected via the Carrier and Spafford 
criteria and these are summarised below: 
 
Rogers (2004) - The Digital Crime Scene Analysis Model (DCSA)  
  Emphasising chain of custody considerations 
  Considering all areas of digital forensics rather than bias the model 
towards a particular group 
  Promoting a pragmatic approach concentrating on the important areas 
on which other aspects of the work depend with an emphasis on data 
acquisition 
  Emphasising that a model should be tool and technology independent. 
 
Carrier and Spafford (2003) - The Integrated Digital Investigative 
Process (IDIP) 
  Identifying the important attributes for a model of the digital forensic 
process 
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Ciardhuáin  (2004)  -  An  Extended  Model  of  Cybercrime 
Investigations (EMCI) 
 
  Introducing the concept of ‘information flow’ 
  Identifying ‘awareness’, ‘authorisation’ and ‘planning’ stages 
  Identifying that there may be both internal and external authorities  
involved. 
 
Reith,  Carr  and  Gunsch  (2002)  -  The  Abstract  Digital  Forensic 
Model (ADFM) 
  The  concept  of  abstractly  defined  common  steps  from  previous 
forensic protocols  
  Introducing the concept of ‘digital forensics’ as more encompassing 
than ‘computer forensics’. 
 
Khatir, Hejazi and Sneiders (2008) - The Two-Dimensional Evidence 
Reliability Amplification Process Model 
 
  The concept of an ‘umbrella activity’ for documentation. 
3.5.3  Essential elements identified for the ADAM 
By combining the key contributions and considering the reviewed models 
collectively the essential elements for data acquisition are now summarised and 
grouped into three stages: 
 
  An initial preparation stage that incorporates activities that take place 
once  the  practitioner  is  notified  or  becomes  aware  of  a  potential  
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requirement to undertake some work but prior to them gaining access 
to the ‘incident scene
24’ (the detail of training, lab preparation and 
other  activities  prior  to  the  notification/awareness  point  is  not  the 
subject of this model) 
  Actions that the practitioner undertakes to prepare for the acquisition 
of digital data once they have access to the ‘incident scene’ including, 
but not limited to, safety considerations, documentation, securing the 
scene and identifying potential locations for relevant digital data 
  The actual process of acquiring digital data that may be of evidentiary 
value and its subsequent handling 
  The ADAM will be described through a formal definition using the 
UML as first proposed by Bogan and Dampier (2005) and supported 
by Kohn et al (2008) and Ruan and Huebner (2009). 
3.6  Summary  
This  chapter  has  described  how  the  process  for  identifying  the 
requirements for the new model was undertaken. This involved evaluating each 
of the models from the literature review against assessment criteria based on the 
work of Carrier and Spafford and the Daubert test. The evaluation process is the 
most  comprehensive  evaluation  so  far  undertaken  of  digital  forensic  process 
models and is also the first to assess each model against specific criteria.  
 
                                                 
 
 
24 The environment in which the evidence is thought to reside  
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Chapter 4: Design and development 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter covers the Design and Development stage of the Peffers et al 
DSRP method that has been adopted for this research. The chapter continues 
from the review of models in Chapter 2 and their assessment in Chapter 3 that 
were  undertaken  to  obtain  information  that  would  help  to  address  the  three 
research questions:  
 
  “What are the essential components necessary in a model that describes 
a generic and forensically sound digital data acquisition process?”   
  “What is a suitable way for describing, presenting and using model for 
acquiring digital data?”  
  “How can the identified components for a generic and forensically sound 
digital data acquisition process be combined into an effective working 
model?” 
4.2  Model design elements 
4.2.1   Overview of the model 
Carrier and Spafford (2003) state that digital forensic practitioners find 
the flexibility of objectives-based steps  makes them  more useful than a task-
based  ‘tick-list’  given  that  each  ‘crime  scene’  is  unique.  In  addition,  the 
principles  under  which  the  practitioner  should  be  working  are  clearly  stated  
126 
(Association of Chief Police Officers, 2003) and these form the framework under 
which all the activities  in the various stages are undertaken  (Beebe & Clark, 
2004). From the literature review of Chapter 2 several shortcomings of previous 
models were identified:  
 
1.  Some  models tried to encompass all  aspects of  digital  forensic 
activity  in  one  model  which  became  too  unwieldy  and 
complicated 
2.  Some  models  confused  the  different  activities  of  incident 
response and digital forensics leading to inappropriate activities 
(such  as  network-biased  requirements)  with  a  heavy  emphasis 
towards  an  environment  that  does  not  represent  a  generic 
workspace for digital forensic practitioners 
3.  Some models are either very high-level descriptions providing no 
useful guidance or too low-level in which case they become too 
complicated to employ in practice.  
 
These    shortcomings  will  be  addressed  in  the  ADAM  as  well  as  the 
failing  of  previous  models  to  accommodate  new  and  emerging  technology. 
(Turnbull, 2008) 
4.2.2   Fundamentals  of  the  Advanced  Data  Acquisition  Model 
(ADAM) 
In accordance with the concepts of the three-stage hierarchical model of 
Noblett et al (2000) introduced in section 2.3, while making allowance for the  
127 
fact that the ADAM is to be a generic model and therefore cannot be prescriptive 
in relation to organisational guidelines, ADAM needs to: 
1.  Incorporate  overriding  principles  based  on  the  guidelines  from 
Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers,  the  International  Standards 
Organisation and elsewhere 
2.  Accommodate organizational policy and practice such as guidelines, 
signing authorities and other requirements 
3.  Accommodate procedures and techniques that can be modified and 
expanded upon as new data becomes available 
4.  Incorporate the key contributions from previous researchers. 
 
4.2.2.1  ADAM Principles 
In relation to the requirement for overriding principles listed as (1) above, 
these are defined for the ADAM as being 
1.  The activities of the digital forensic practitioner should not alter the 
original data. If the requirements of the work mean that this is not 
possible then the effect of the practitioner’s actions on the original 
data  should  be  clearly  identified  and  the  process  that  caused  any 
changes justified 
2.  A complete record of all activities associated with the acquisition and 
handling of the original data and any copies of the original data must 
be maintained. This includes compliance with the appropriate rules of 
evidence,  such  as  maintaining  a  chain  of  custody  record,  and 
verification processes such as hashing  
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3.  The  digital  forensic  practitioner  must  not  undertake  any  activities 
which are beyond their ability or knowledge 
4.  The  digital  forensic  practitioner  must  take  into  consideration  all 
aspects of personal safety whilst undertaking their work. 
 
4.2.2.2  ADAM Stages 
The ADAM itself consists of three stages associated specifically with the 
acquisition of digital data. These stages were identified following the literature 
review and are described as: 
 
STAGE 1 - The initial planning stage 
This is where high-level considerations that relate to the documentation 
associated  with  the  investigation,  the  investigation  logistics  etc.  are 
determined. This may involve a covert survey (sometimes carried out by 
private detectives) depending on the type and nature of the investigation 
being  undertaken.  In  some  instances,  such  as  where  law  enforcement 
officers have already seized devices and present them for examination to 
the  digital  forensic  practitioners,  so  this  stage  may  be  very  brief  and 
simply consist of checking paperwork. 
 
STAGE 2 - The onsite survey 
All the gaps in knowledge relating to the location, size and format of the 
devices holding the digital data are filled in and the main acquisition plan 
is created. There may be instances in which this stage may be irrelevant 
as in the case for previously obtained devices mentioned above. 
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STAGE 3 - The acquisition of digital data  
This will include both replication and storage of the acquired data. 
 
The  common  factor  associated  with  all  the  stages  is  documentation. 
Documentation is vital to ensure that a record is kept of all activity associated 
with the acquisition of the digital data and subsequent transportation and storage 
as there is the potential for the whole process to come under close scrutiny in 
court (Brown, 2006; Casey, 2004; Jones, et al., 2006; Kruse & Heiser, 2002). A 
practitioner  following  the  ADAM  is  required  to  ensure  that  appropriate 
documentation be maintained at all times. 
The end result of using the ADAM will be that a clear process description 
is  available  that  can  be  explained  in  court  together  with  associated 
documentation that will support the description of the activities undertaken by a 
digital forensic practitioner who has acquired digital data. As the ADAM allows 
for  the  use  of  existing  forms  and  processes  (where  relevant)  these  can  be 
incorporated into the supporting documentation. 
4.2.3   Assumptions 
The new model incorporates two key assumptions (in accordance with 
the current draft ISO/IEC document (ISO/IEC, 2011)): 
 
1.  The digital forensic practitioner is authorised, trained and qualified 
with  specialized  knowledge,  skills  and  abilities  for  performing 
digital evidence acquisition, handling and collection tasks 
2.  The digital forensic practitioner observes the requirements that their 
actions  should  be  auditable  (through  maintenance  of  appropriate  
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documentation), repeatable where possible (in that using the same 
tools on the same item under the same conditions would produce 
the  same  results),  reproducible  where  possible  (in  that  using 
different tools on the same item would produce substantially similar 
results) and justified. 
 
Having identified the three stages and the assumptions for the new model 
the next section draws upon the contributions of previous researchers to develop 
the elements that go to make up each stage. 
4.3    Stage 1: Initial Planning 
McKemmish (1999) emphasises the  importance  of the  initial planning 
stage in a document written for the Australian Institute of Criminology in which 
he  says  that  the  forensic  process  begins  with  the  identification  of  digital 
evidence. McKemmish goes on to say that until the location and storage format 
of potential digital evidence are identified it is not possible to determine the most 
appropriate  process  for  its  acquisition.  Casey  (2004)  identifies  three  topics 
related  to  the  acquisition  of  digital  data,  the  first  of  which  he  describes  as 
Authorisation and Preparation. Under this topic, Casey describes the processes 
that should be undertaken in preparing for a warrant and although he doesn’t 
give a name to a plan he says that   planning is especially important in cases that 
involve computers. (Casey, 2004) 
In the ideal world it would be possible to obtain perfect knowledge of the 
environment containing the digital data to be acquired thus enabling a detailed 
plan to be created that would simply have to be followed on site, indeed Sammes  
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and Jenkinson (2007) state that: “It is vital that the number of computers, their 
types, operating systems and connections are all known before entry” (p. 177). 
However, in practice the digital forensic examiner often has insufficient detail 
about the computer systems, quantity and location of data, types of hard disk or 
the  operating  system  involved  to  enable  them  to  produce  anything  beyond  a 
rough outline of a plan.  
Brown (2006) argues that due to the fact that initial information relating 
to  the  specific  onsite  environment  may  be  scarce,  incomplete  or  simply 
inaccurate the planning stage should concentrate on preparing for as many likely 
scenarios as possible, allowing for the fact that: 
 
…each computer forensics collection operation can vary so 
greatly, investigators need to have a playbook from which to 
operate, similar to what a sports team coach  would use to 
contain all the plays he intends to use (Brown, 2006, p. 187). 
 
Even if information is obtained that relates to the computer systems that 
are  likely  to  be  encountered,  allowance  always  has  to  be  made  for  errors or 
inaccuracies  in  this  information.  The  thesis  author  has  experienced  several 
occasions  in  which  intelligence  gathered  by  a  third  party  (often  a  private 
investigator) has proved to be wildly inaccurate in terms of the number and type 
of  computers  involved.  The  planning  stage  is  fundamental  to  the  process  of 
acquiring digital  evidence  and  in one  form or another  is common  across the 
different environments in which digital forensic personnel are employed.   
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The ADAM is designed to provide more guidance than previous models 
in this regard as it uniquely incorporates consideration of a number of constraints 
during  the  planning  stage,  which  are;  authorisation  constraints,  physical 
constraints, timing constraints and data constraints. The concepts behind each of 
these constraints is covered in more detail in the following sections and will lead 
to the concluding activity for this first stage of the new model, the formulation of 
the Outline Plan. 
4.3.1  Authorisation constraints 
The primary consideration, before addressing the process detail, must be 
one  of  ensuring  that  the  digital  forensic  practitioner  has  the  authority  to 
undertake the work. This authority can be made up of several discrete elements: 
authority from the organisation providing the services (internal authorisation), 
authority in law and authority from the owner of the resources containing the 
material to be acquired (external authorisation).  
Marcella and Menedez (2008) provide a list of the basic steps for a ‘cyber 
investigation’ that begins with ‘Obtain proper authorization’ which they cover in 
some detail on the basis that this is a ‘critical’ step. 
4.3.1.1  Internal authorization 
Internal  authorisation  will  take  different  forms  depending  on  the 
particular  organisation  involved.  For  a  small  specialist  provider  of  digital 
forensic  services,  the  process  of  internal  authorisation  is  relatively 
straightforward and should consist of a signed agreement detailing the services to 
be delivered. For a firm that provides digital forensic services as part of a larger 
service offering, for instance a global accounting firm, the procedure may be far  
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more complicated in that various conflict checks and risk assessments will need 
to be undertaken. These seek to mitigate potential conflicts of interest and form 
part of the due diligence procedures for many large organisations. The conflicts 
of interest may be focussed on legislative rules  and guidelines or commercial 
considerations, such as working on a matter for which an existing client is an 
opposing party. 
Literature relating to corporate digital forensic investigations is primarily 
based on the digital forensic practitioner being employed within the organisation 
that owns the resources to be investigated and assumes that internal authorisation 
has been granted, although this process is not referenced in the text (Steel, 2006; 
Wiles, 2007). The case of digital  forensic services  being provided  by a third 
party has not been covered in literature relating to process models. 
4.3.1.2  Authority in law 
For commercial practitioners, in cases such as assisting with the serving 
of Anton Piller
25 orders or matters  where government bodies have ‘search and 
seize’ powers, the investigator needs to ensure that they have the legal authority 
to provide the services in the manner in which they have been requested and this 
may involve being named on court orders or other documents. Law enforcement 
practitioners will need to confirm the details of the appropriate warrant and any 
limitations imposed but generally any court orders permitting access to a third-
                                                 
 
 
25 Ex-parte court injunction that requires a defendant to allow the plaintiff to (1) enter defendant's 
premises, (2) search for and take away any material evidence and, (3) force the defendant to 
answer some questions. Employed usually in cases of possible copyright violation, its primary 
objective is to prevent destruction or removal of evidence. This order is not a search warrant, but 
the defendant is in contempt of court if he or she refuses to comply. Named after the 1976 UK 
case of 'Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes.' More recently referred to as a ‘search 
order’.  
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party’s property should be closely scrutinized as the investigator may become the 
subject of litigation if they perform any actions not permitted by law. 
Consideration should be given to the possibility of processing material 
that is covered by criminal law, for instance where there was a suspicion that 
child pornography may have been contained on one or more of the computer 
systems  to  be  analysed.  Being  aware  that  you  are  in  possession  of  child 
pornography, as well as certain other material, is commonly a criminal offence 
and if there is a strong chance that this type of material could exist then the 
investigator needs to review the situation with the client in relation to discussing 
the matter and obtaining advice from the relevant law enforcement contact.  
4.3.1.3  External authority 
When engaged to undertake work for an organisation that requires ‘their’ 
systems to be accessed the investigator needs to confirm that the entity giving the 
instructions has a right of access to the resources involved. For instance, there 
may be occasions in which data from more than one legal entity has been stored 
on a single computer system – this is often the case if the resources are held at a 
third-party IT provider, e.g. a provider of disaster recovery services holding a 
‘live’  copy  of  several  organisations’  data,  a  cloud  service  provider  or  if  the 
computers are used by an accountant or lawyer to store information from many 
clients. 
4.3.2  Physical constraints 
Physical  access to the systems containing digital data  is generally  not 
considered in any great depth  by other models and is often approached from the 
perspective  of  a  commercial  digital  forensic  practitioner  simply  needing  to  
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determine if data may be located at more than one site (Brown, 2006; Jones, et 
al.,  2006;  Marcella  &  Menendez,  2008;  Steel,  2006;  Wiles,  2007).  The  only 
other aspect of physical constraints that tends to be considered is dealing with 
external ‘attacks’ on systems involving the Internet which leads to a discussion 
of  the attack’s technical characteristics. With regard to physical constraints the 
new  model  involves  two  considerations  that  need  to  be  addressed  prior  to 
undertaking the data acquisition.  
4.3.2.1  Access 
The first aspect of physical constraints to consider is that physical access 
to the resources containing the data to be acquired is needed in the majority of 
cases, the obvious exceptions being cases where data can be accessed via the 
internet or internal/external  networks (although  in the  latter case there would 
need  to  be  a  good  reason  for  obtaining  the  data  remotely  rather  than  using 
someone onsite). Commercial premises may be located on a site that is security 
controlled and require the appropriate keys or cards to enter or there may be door 
access codes. Commercial premises may also be shared with other legal entities 
that may restrict access. Private premises may have limited access or restricted 
parking,  such  as  private  premises  that  have  security  gates  thus  requiring  the 
lawyers to negotiate entry with the occupants in order to serve orders and begin 
the data acquisition process. 
4.3.2.2  Layout 
The second aspect of physical constraints to consider is whether the data 
is  held  on  resources  at  more  than  one  location,  either  on  separate  sites  or 
scattered  between  different  offices  or  floors  within  the  same  building.  This 
aspect may determine how many team members are required and how many sets  
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of equipment are needed. In some cases the physical ‘scene’ may not exist given 
the advent of wireless technology and roaming devices. 
4.3.3  Timing constraints 
An  important  aspect  of  the  planning  stage  is  determining  constraints 
based  on  time.  Several  authors  refer  to  choosing  appropriate  techniques  or 
methods based on ‘practical’ considerations but do not include timing as part of 
their  initial preparation (Casey, 2004;  Wiles, 2007). Some authors, especially 
those basing their discussions on  in-house digital  forensic practitioners, don’t 
consider the timing aspects at all (Marcella & Menendez, 2008; Steel, 2006). The 
ADAM requires consideration of three aspects of timing constraints which are 
now considered individually. 
4.3.3.1  Court orders and warrants 
It is often the case with court orders that there are strict time limits placed 
on when the acquisition activities can take place and at what point they must be 
terminated  regardless  of  whether  the  processing  has  been  completed  or  not. 
Similar restrictions may also be contained within warrants. 
4.3.3.2  Private premises 
Engagements  involving  private  premises  may  require  getting  to  the 
premises before the subject of the court order leaves for work (or some other 
activity) but preferably after partners and /or children have left the building. 
4.3.3.3  Commercial premises 
Engagements involving commercial premises often require a key holder 
to arrive and provide access to the offices following their review of the court  
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order. Often there is a requirement to gain access to commercial premises after 
normal working hours and have the acquisition completed prior to employees 
turning up the following day. This may be to avoid business disruption or to 
ensure  that  employees  suspected  of  some  activity  are  not  alerted  to  the 
investigation  nor  have  the  potential  to  destroy  or remove  data.  The  business 
disruption  aspect  is  considered  by  Sammes  and  Jenkinson  (2007)  who  also 
suggest a ‘search briefing’ that not only covers the allocation of tasks and the 
key objectives but identifies the provisions of the warrant or court order. If the 
data is held at multiple sites, a suitable time frame needs to be allowed such that 
all forensic teams are able to co-ordinate their arrival to ensure that no one is 
alerted to the investigation before a team arrives. 
4.3.4  Data constraints 
The data is the digital information that is the target of the acquisition 
process and can take many forms. As for other aspects of the planning stage it is 
not always clear at the outset whether there is in fact any data that is relevant to 
the investigation or where this data might be located. 
It is common practice for authors of digital forensic books to list types of 
digital data (such as text files, images, etc.) and to suggest possible locations for 
this data (Arthur E. Hutt, 1995; Brown, 2006; Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 
2005; Jones, et al., 2006; Marcella & Menendez, 2008).  The ADAM will not 
incorporate this level of detail but requires consideration of the potential quantity 
of data that may be acquired. Therefore there are three new constraints covered 
in the following paragraphs.  
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4.3.4.1  Identification of data 
The type of data to be acquired can vary greatly. For example, it could be 
simple  text  files,  images,  design  drawings,  accounting  packages  or  even 
fragments of deleted material. If data needs to be previewed prior to acquisition 
then the means of identifying any relevant data must be addressed. For instance, 
if relevant data is likely to be in the form of graphics images, i.e. pictures, then a 
keyword search will not be appropriate. There may be the need to have specialist 
software installed on a forensic workstation (such as a CAD application) if this is 
being used to preview the data in native format ‘offline’ via a write-blocking 
device.  The  processes  undertaken  in  relation  to  this  constraint  may  have  a 
significant impact on the time required to carry out the work. 
4.3.4.2  Amount of data 
The  amount  of  data  to  be  acquired  will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the 
amount of storage space required for the acquisition disks and also the amount of 
time that will be involved in the acquisition process itself. Today, disk storage 
capacity  is  relatively  cheap  (for  both  the  owner  of  the  data  and  the  digital 
forensic practitioner) but there can be problems in relation to physically handling 
a  large  number  of  disks  and  the  form  in  which  they  are  combined,  such  as 
portable  storage  devices,  e.g.  Network  Attached  Storage  or  Direct  Attached 
Storage technologies. If a ‘live’ acquisition is being performed and there is likely 
to be an effect on network performance this needs to be communicated to the 
client/lawyers  so  that  the  impact  on  the  business  holding  the  data  can  be 
considered, which may lead to negotiations on when and how the operation takes 
place.   
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4.3.4.3  Location of data 
If the data to be reviewed and acquired is stored on backup tapes, i.e. the 
time period of interest is such that the data is not likely to be currently residing 
on any ‘live’ systems, access to a means of restoring the relevant backup tapes 
will need to be considered or a plan put in place to remove and duplicate the 
tapes offsite. It is becoming increasingly common for data to be held by a third-
party as part of a cloud solution
26 that is accessed via the internet. This presents 
many potential difficulties, particularly in relation to authorisation, but from a 
location perspective it may not be possible to physically access the place in 
which the data is stored.  
4.3.5  The Outline Plan 
The output of the Initial Planning stage should be the Outline Plan. Based 
on the outcome of the previous considerations the logistics of the acquisition 
exercise  can  now  be  considered.  Without  a  survey  of  the  site(s),  which  is 
normally not practical due to the urgency of the work, only a reasonable estimate 
can be made at this stage with certain contingency measures put in place, e.g. 
somebody placed on ‘standby’ to collect and deliver additional storage media, 
application  software  or  other  resources.  A  key  part  of  the  Outline  Plan 
implementation  is  a  briefing.  Although  Sammes  and  Jenkinson  (2007)  are 
writing  from  a  law  enforcement  perspective  when  describing  their  ‘Search 
Briefing’, this activity is no less relevant in the commercial field as it ensures 
                                                 
 
 
26 There is an example of applying the ADAM in a cloud environment in Chapter 5 as part of 
Scenario 4.  
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 that  all  those  involved  are  aware  of  the  information  available  at  the  time 
including any constraints imposed by court orders or other authorities. Sammes 
and Jenkinson (2007) state that answers to the following questions need to be 
addressed: 
 
1.  How many trained personnel are required? 
2.  How many teams are required, where do they need to be and at 
what date/time? (this may be influenced by how many lawyers are 
available) 
3.  How many sets of equipment are required and what should be in 
those kits? 
4.  Are any particular specialist skills required, if so how are they to 
be  made  available?  (e.g.  someone  with  mainframe  server 
knowledge may need to be at a specific location) 
5.  How much storage media is required at each location and how can 
this be supplemented if necessary? 
6.  Will  the  services  of  another  employee/contractor  be  required? 
(e.g.  a  system  IT  administrator  to  assist  with  shutting  down 
servers or locating backup tapes). 
 
The Outline Plan must therefore detail: 
 
1.  Personnel  required  (with  site  allocations  if  applicable)  and  team 
composition 
2.  Equipment required at each site (including software, dongles, write-
blockers and image storage media)  
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3.  Start time at each site 
4.  Estimate of duration of acquisition stage 
5.  Details of other personnel involved 
6.  Contact numbers of team leaders/lawyers/client liaison distributed (if 
applicable) 
7.  Acquisition plan detailing target storage locations, protocol and key 
words (if applicable) 
8.  Applicable constraints – authorisation, physical, timing and data. 
 
Some authors provide great detail in relation to the equipment that should 
be taken on site (e.g. Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007) whilst others (e.g. Brown , 
2006;  Jones et al, 2006) include specific write-blockers of various types at the 
top of their recommendations for an ‘onsite kit’ as well as software tools for 
acquiring digital data. The ACPO Guide (2003) makes no recommendations for 
the equipment to be taken on site.  
There is no consensus or standard set of guidelines for what equipment 
should be considered for inclusion in the onsite kit and as the composition of the 
kit contents should be determined by the appropriate digital forensic professional 
the ADAM is not intended to provide this level of detail. 
4.4    Stage 2: The Onsite plan 
Having  gained  access  to  the  site(s)  in  which  relevant  digital  data  is 
thought to be stored, steps  must be taken to ensure that the risk of potential 
evidentiary data being destroyed or removed  is  reduced as  much as possible. 
Many writers of digital forensic guides, particularly those with a bias towards the  
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work  of  law  enforcement  agencies,  suggest  that  the  whole  ‘crime  scene’  is 
immediately  ‘locked  down’  with  the  intention  to  obtain  what  Casey  calls  a 
‘pristine  environment’  (Casey,  2004;  Craiger,  2005;  Sammes  &  Jenkinson, 
2007). Whilst this may often be achievable for law enforcement investigations it 
is seldom practical in the commercial environment, a view supported by Kruse 
and Heiser (2002) who state: 
 
The ideal way to examine a system and maintain the most 
defensible evidence is to freeze it and examine a copy of 
the  original  data.  However,  this  method  is  not  always 
practical and may be politically unacceptable (p. 6). 
 
 Brown (2006) suggests that one of the first actions upon arrival on site 
is to ensure the safety of the digital forensic practitioner(s) whilst some authors 
incorporate safety and security as one process (Sammes & Jenkinson, 2007). 
The ACPO Guide (2003) incorporates a section on safety and welfare but this is 
in relation to the potential for disturbing material being accessed during the 
course of the investigation. Guidelines for those involved in digital forensics 
within an organisation, normally involving incident response, tend to ignore the 
safety aspects. This may be because they have a more intimate knowledge of 
the  environment,  and  tend  to  start  with  processing  the  digital  data.  This 
approach  has  also  been  adopted  in  other  circumstances  such  as  the  broader 
commercial environment (Casey, 2004; Farmer & Venema, 2005; Jones, et al., 
2006).   
143 
In  order  to  provide  a  consistent  and  generic  approach  the  ADAM 
contains basic procedures to be followed when attending the site as a pre-cursor 
to reviewing the Outline Plan. Rather than being too prescriptive and reducing 
the  necessary  flexibility  required  of  a  digital  forensic  practitioner  the  basic 
procedures  are  general  in  nature  which  ensures  that they  can  be  applied  in 
different environments. 
4.4.1   Updating the Outline Plan 
Once the digital forensic practitioner is on site the Outline Plan needs to 
be reviewed and updated now that its various assumptions can be tested. There 
will  often  be  areas  of  the  plan  that  could  not  be  completed  at  all  prior  to 
attending the site(s) containing the digital data. If more than one site is involved 
there  will  be  the  need  to  have  separate  Onsite  Plans  to  take  account  of  the 
specific local circumstances. The overall goals will likely remain the same but 
the steps to be taken in order to achieve them may have to be altered. This is 
where  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  the  digital  forensic  practitioner 
responsible for the particular site is critical. Few authors on forensic practice 
spare much time, if any, in describing a process for producing an onsite plan. 
Instead many simply state that the equipment likely to contain potential evidence 
should be identified (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004; Casey, 2004; M. Pollitt, 
2009). A more thorough approach is supported by Newman (2007) who suggests 
taking photographs of the scene, in line with most authors, but then goes on to 
list various activities that should be included in his ‘Preliminary Survey’: 
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  Determine all the locations that might need to be searched 
  Look for any specifics that must be addressed relating to 
hardware and software 
  Identify possible personnel and equipment needs for the 
investigation 
  Determine which devices can be physically removed from 
the site 
  Identify all individuals who had access to the computer or 
digital resources.  
 
The ADAM Operation Guide for Stage 2 covers these requirements. 
4.5  Stage 3: Acquisition of Digital Data 
Some authors imply that the acquisition process is always undertaken in 
some ‘ideal’ environment where storage devices can be write-blocked (Jones, 
Bejtlich, & Rose, 2006). McKemmish adopts a more practical view where he 
states that in certain circumstances changes to data are unavoidable.  His solution 
is to clearly  identify and record the consequences of any actions undertaken. 
With a trend towards ‘live’  acquisition and given the technical  nature of the 
devices (such as mobile phones and solid state drives), important computer data 
being stored in volatile memory (Sutherland, Evans, Tryfonas, & Blyth, 2008), 
full disk encryption (Casey & Stellatos, 2008) and time/storage constraints for 
large drive capacities (Gosh, 2004a) the concept of the ‘ideal’ environment is 
becoming even further removed from practice (Adelstein, 2006; Carrier, 2006;  
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Casey  &  Stellatos,  2008;  Leong  &  Leung,  2007).  Given  the  many  different 
potential scenarios it would not be practical or appropriate to develop detailed 
guidelines that could  be generally applied. Each organisation undertaking the 
acquisition of digital evidence should have developed their own procedures to 
supplement those of the ACPO and ISO Guidelines but inevitably it is down to 
the practitioner to decide how these guidelines are to be applied in a particular 
set of circumstances. 
The ADAM is based on the belief that it is the role of the digital forensic 
practitioner to determine the  most appropriate technique to be employed and 
maintain documentation of all activities associated with data acquisition. This 
will include starting the ‘chain of evidence’ and other documentation such that 
they will be able to describe their actions and reasons to a court. 
4.6  Model creation 
So far this chapter has described and justified the elements that make up 
the  Advanced  Data  Acquisition  Model  building  on  the  work  of  previous 
researchers reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. The remainder of the chapter shows 
how these elements have been incorporated in the ADAM, using both a formal 
representation and an Operational (or field) format. 
4.6.1  The ADAM representation 
Kohn et al (2008) suggest that because existing digital forensic process 
models  are  presented  in  an  informal  way  they  would  benefit  from  the 
introduction of a formal modelling approach and so too would the whole area of 
digital  forensic  investigation.  The  formal  approach  proposed  by  Kohn  et  al  
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employs  the  Unified  Modelling  Language  (UML)
27.  The use of the UML is 
supported by Bogan and Dampier  (2005) as well as  Ruan and Huebner (2009) 
who conclude that the UML is appropriate to describe the high -level processes 
involved in digital forensics on the basis th at the UML is a de facto standard 
modelling language. As discussed in the literature review (section 3.4.1.17) t he 
use  of  the  UML  for  modelling  digital  forensic  processes  has  so  far  been 
restricted to high-level activities without providing much detail.  
This  research  will  develop  the  use  of  UML  in  digital  forensics  by 
employing UML Activity Diagrams within the ADAM to define process flows. 
The UML Use Case diagrams will not be adopted based on earlier examples of 
their use (Kohn, et al., 2008; Ruan & Huebner, 2009)  as they seem to add little 
value to the description of the process model and would have to be tailored for 
each  environment  (as  the  ‘players’  would  not  be  the  same  across  all 
environments) thereby making the overall model less generic.  
Notwithstanding  the  benefit  of  adopting  a  formal  approach  from  a 
technical  perspective,  the  use  of  UML  Activity  Diagrams,  being  a  form  of 
flowchart, is supported in a court environment (Dattu, 1998; Kelly, 2010) and in 
some instances flowcharts have been prepared by judges in Australian and New 
Zealand  to  assist  jurors  (Ogloff,  Clough,  &  Goodman-Delahunty,  2006).  As 
Ruan and Huebner (2009) point out, “A graph based model has the advantage of 
visualizing  the  process  requirements,  thus  making  the  model  more 
understandable to various parties involved”  (p. 185). 
                                                 
 
 
27 Defined and maintained by the Object Management Group. Further information available at 
http://www.uml.org/  
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In  addition  to  the  formal  notation,  an  ‘Operational’  format  is  also 
required that provides the necessary level of detail for applying the model in 
practice. This is covered in section 4.6.1.2. 
4.6.1.1  The ADAM Formal representation 
The UML Activity diagrams produced for each of the three stages are 
shown in Figures 18, 19 and 20. These diagrams represent the first instance of 
the  formal  representation  of  the  ADAM  prior  to  the  Initial  Assessment 
(described  in  Section  4.6.2)  which  will  be  followed  by  the  in-house 
demonstration activity as described in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 18  The ADAM Stage 1 – Initial Planning (version 1)  
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Figure 19  The ADAM Stage 2 – The Onsite Plan (version 1) 
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Figure 20  The ADAM Stage 3 – Acquisition of Digital Data (version 1) 
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4.6.1.2  The ADAM operational representation 
To complement the formal notation of the ADAM (described using UML 
Activity diagrams) a series of guides (one for each stage of the ADAM) as well 
as a statement of the ADAM Principles (that apply across all activities relating to 
the use of the ADAM) complete the model. In the later part of this chapter the 
key  words  "REQUIRED",  "MUST",  "MUST  NOT",  "SHOULD",  "SHOULD 
NOT", and "MAY" are used in the Operational Guides and defined as described 
in the document "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" 
[RFC2119] (Brezinski & Killalea, 2002). 
This section presents the ADAM in the form in which it will be used and 
referenced  by  digital  forensic  practitioners.  Firstly  the  overarching  Principles 
underlying  the  model  (introduced  in  section  4.2.2.1)  are  stated  and  this  is 
followed  by  the  process  model  narrative  in  the  form  of  specific  tasks  to  be 
undertaken by the forensic practitioner for each of the model’s three stages. The 
version of the Operational representation (the text of the ADAM Principles and 
Guides for each of the three Stages) shown in this section is prior to it being 
passed to external reviewers for feedback discussed in Chapter 6.  
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ADAM PRINCIPLES 
 
The following overriding principles must be followed by the digital forensic 
practitioner: 
 
1.  The activities of the digital forensic practitioner should 
not alter the original data. If the requirements of the work 
mean that this is not possible then the effect of the 
practitioner’s actions on the original data should be 
clearly identified and the process that caused any 
changes justified 
2.  A complete record of all activities associated with the acquisition and 
handling of the original data and any copies of the original data must be 
maintained. This includes compliance with the appropriate rules of 
evidence, such as maintaining a chain of custody record, and verification 
processes such as hashing 
3.  The digital forensic practitioner must not undertake any activities which 
are beyond their ability or knowledge 
4.  The digital forensic practitioner must take into consideration all aspects 
of personal and equipment safety whilst undertaking their work 
5.  At all times the legal rights of anyone affected by your actions should be 
considered 
6.  The practitioner must be aware of all organisational policies and 
procedures relating to their activities 
7.  Communication must be maintained as appropriate with the client, legal 
practitioners, supervisors and other team members. 
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ADAM OPERATION GUIDE 
 
Stage 1 – Initial Planning 
 
The digital forensic practitioner: 
  MUST understand the requirements of the task, document the 
work to be performed and have this confirmed by the client or 
person providing the instructions to undertake the acquisition task 
 
  MUST consider if the work can be undertaken by confirming that 
you have the appropriate: 
1.  internal authorisation and/or 
2.  external authorisation and/or 
3.  authority in law 
 
  MUST consider 
1.  time constraints – is the task achievable within the 
time allowed? 
2.  physical constraints – access to the data and 
physical/logical locations 
3.  data constraints – how will the potential evidence 
be identified, how much is there likely to be? 
 
  MUST consider safety issues 
 
  SHOULD create the Outline Plan (an exception being in-house 
acquisition from devices already obtained, e.g. at law enforcement 
computer crime laboratories). 
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ADAM OPERATION GUIDE 
 
 Stage 2 – Creating the Onsite Plan 
 
The digital forensic practitioner: 
  MUST identify and address any security or safety issues 
 
  MUST secure access to all potential sources of evidence, either 
directly or remotely 
 
  MUST undertake a preliminary survey and document changes to the 
Outline Plan 
 
  MUST consider 
1.  all the locations that might need to 
be searched 
2.  any issues that must be addressed 
relating to hardware and software 
3.  personnel and equipment needs for 
the investigation 
4.  whether onsite acquisition, offsite 
acquisition or a mixture of both is 
appropriate and possible. 
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ADAM OPERATION GUIDE 
 
Stage 3 - Acquisition of Digital Data (per device) 
 
The digital forensic practitioner MUST identify the most appropriate way of 
acquiring potential evidence given the constraints of time, resources, potential 
evidentiary value and technical limitations. 
In order to do this the digital forensic practitioner: 
  MUST consider 
1.  The most appropriate method of shutting down system(s) if 
applicable 
2.  Write-protection method including interface, e.g. via 
USB/FireWire/eSATA 
3.  Addressing encryption issues 
4.  The appropriateness of undertaking live acquisition  
5.  Acquisition software to be used 
6.  Source device interface(s) – e.g. boot device on host, storage 
device removed and attached to acquisition system, network 
acquisition, operating system (live acquisition) 
7.  Potential volume of data 
8.  Target storage capacity 
9.  Target interface (speed-related) 
10. Prioritising acquisition if more than one source 
  MUST maintain comprehensive notes 
  SHOULD consider photographing  and/or sketching the equipment and 
storage device locations 
  MUST consider the requirements or benefits of an initial review of 
potential evidence devices and decide if it is appropriate for this to be 
carried out ‘live’ or write-blocked 
  SHOULD create a ‘working copy’ of acquired data as quickly as 
possible and concurrent with the creation of the master copy if possible 
  MUST keep all copies of acquired data secure 
  MUST be able to verify the integrity of acquired data. 
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4.6.2  Initial assessment 
As part of the development stage of the Design Science Research Process 
the  head  of  a  Police  Computer  Crime  Unit,  the  National  Director of  Digital 
Forensics from another commercial provider and a forensic practitioner with an 
‘incident response’ background were asked to answer a single question which 
was:  
“How  accurately  do  the  activities  described  in  the  ADAM  Activity 
diagrams relate to your environment”?  
 
The assessment was carried out through a series of informal discussions 
with each person with reference to the UML Activity diagrams on which they 
made various annotations and the author is grateful for their critical feedback.  
Several comments and suggestions were made by the initial assessors to 
help finalise the first iteration of the development stage. These comments are 
summarised as follows: 
 
1.  There is a need to expand on the text relating to the activities in order 
to provide clarity around the activity 
2.  The UML Stage 3 diagram does  not allow  for the device to have 
already been seized / provided 
3.  The process flow for ‘onsite’ and ‘onsite or lab’ is unclear. 
 
A note was made of these comments for consideration with the results of 
the Demonstration activity which together would produce the requirements for  
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the version of the ADAM that would subsequently be provided to the external 
reviewers as the DSRP Evaluation activity in Chapter 6.  
4.7  Summary 
This chapter has covered the Design and Development stage for the new 
model and has provided the rationale behind the requirements for each of the 
three  stages.  The  ADAM  has  also  been  presented  in  both  its  ‘formal’  and 
‘operational’ forms. An initial assessment has been carried out prior to moving 
on to the formal Demonstration and Evaluation stages discussed in the following 
chapter to ensure that there are no major shortcomings from the first iteration of 
the development stage.  
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Chapter 5: Demonstration 
5.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  discusses  the  methods  used  for  evaluating  the  ADAM, 
firstly  by  in-house demonstration and subsequently  by expert evaluation. The 
makeup  of  the  review  panels  and  the  feedback  and  comments  received  are 
presented,  and  how  the  ADAM  was  amended  following  a  review  of  the 
feedback. 
The  DSRP  followed  in  this  research  requires  that  the  Demonstration 
activity involves the artefact to be used in some appropriate environment to solve 
the  stated  problem.  In  order  to  assess  how  the  ADAM  addressed  the  stated 
research problem a ‘desk check’ approach was adopted in which the activities 
from three previous in-house investigations were mapped to the activities in the 
ADAM and any discrepancies recorded. In addition, four scenarios were created 
in order to perform a ‘walkthrough’ of the ADAM. The approach is identified as 
being  appropriate  for  evaluating  ‘simulations  and  models’  (Balci,  2003; 
Brykczynski, 1999; Hayardeny, Fienblit, & Farchi, 2007).  
The  Demonstration  activity  was  undertaken  in  order  to  identify  any 
obvious  errors/omissions  prior  to  submitting  the  ADAM  for  independent 
subjective review by researchers and practitioners working in the field of digital 
forensics (the Evaluation activity). The Demonstration activity was undertaken 
in two parts. The first part identified those activities in the ADAM which were 
not evident in the data acquisition documentation for the selected investigations. 
Being a convenience sample rather than a statistically representative sample of  
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previous investigations (and thus not considered as being  ideal) there was no 
expectation that this activity would identify all potential discrepancies. Rather, it 
would  highlight  at  an  early  stage  aspects  of  the  ADAM  that  seemed  to  be 
unrepresentative  of  plausibly  real  activities.  As  expected,  there  were 
discrepancies  between  activities  in  the  ADAM  and  those  recorded  in  the 
acquisition  documentation  from  the  selection  of  historical  investigations.  The 
second  part  of  the  Demonstration  activity  was  undertaken  to  identify  any 
activities that were recorded in the acquisition documentation for the selected 
investigations but were missing from the ADAM. The identified discrepancies 
from  both  parts  of  the  Demonstration  activity  were  summarised  and  their 
significance considered with a view to determining if changes needed to be made 
to the ADAM. Once the necessary changes had been made, the involvement of 
external reviewers was sought. 
5.2  Case documentation comparison 
The  contemporaneous  documentation  from  three  existing  historical 
investigations  within  the  thesis  author’s  organisation  that took  place  between 
2009 and 2011 were examined and the recorded activities compared against the 
three  stages  of  the  ADAM.  The  investigations  chosen  for  this  demonstration 
activity were selected such that they involved a range of different circumstances 
for the data acquisition process as follows: 
 
  Investigation 1 
Assisting with a government agency in obtaining forensic 
images  of  data  stored on  the  hard  drives  of  computers  
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owned by a large corporation as part of an investigation. 
The  investigation  took  place  under  the  authority  of  a 
warrant  and  approximately  twenty  computers  were 
identified as being ‘of interest’. Over the course of two 
days the hard drives from these computers were imaged 
on site by a team of three digital forensic practitioners. 
 
  Investigation 2 
Acquiring forensic images of several laptop hard drives as 
part of an internal investigation for a large company. The 
laptops  were  used  by  employees  of  the  company  who 
were on suspension on suspicion of being involved in a 
serious breach of company policy. The laptop computers 
were handed over to the digital forensic practitioners by 
an officer of the company to have their hard disks imaged 
off  site.  There  was  a  tight  deadline  for  completing  the 
imaging process and subsequent investigation due to the 
disciplinary policy of the client. 
 
  Investigation 3 
Assisting a client with the execution of an Anton Pillar28 
order whereby forensic images of several computers’ hard 
drives  were  obtained.  An  individual  digital  forensic 
                                                 
 
 
28 Discussed in 4.3.1.2  
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practitioner  accompanied  an  independent  lawyer 
appointed by the court to a residential address in order to 
identify  and  take  a  copy  of  computer  data  that  could 
potentially  contain  evidence  relating  to  a  commercial 
litigation matter. 
 
These investigations are not intended to be a representative cross-section 
of work undertaken by digital forensic practitioners because they only relate to 
the  services  of  a  commercial  service  provider  associated  with  a  single 
organisation (given the sensitivity of this type of information it was not possible 
to  access  similar  documentation  from  other  organisations).  However,  this 
exercise does provide a practical starting point.  
5.2.1  Results of the case documentation comparison 
The results of the comparison between previous investigations, based on 
contemporaneous notes, and the ADAM process are summarised in three tables, 
one for each stage of the ADAM (Appendix 1). Any discrepancies between the 
activities undertaken and the ADAM are highlighted. 
Two aspects of the comparison between ADAM and the documentation 
were considered; firstly where activities that have been included in the ADAM 
are  not  reflected  within  the  contemporaneous  documentation  for  each  of  the 
investigations being reviewed and secondly where activities had taken place in 
the sample investigations that are not catered for in the ADAM.  
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5.2.1.1  Aspect 1 - ADAM activities not recorded in the example case documentation 
The comparison between the ADAM activities and those recorded in the 
case documentation for the three example investigations revealed that there were 
several instances in which the case documentation did not record a particular 
activity that was present in the ADAM. This may have been due to the activities 
not being recorded, not being seen as an activity in their own right or not having 
been  undertaken  at  all. None  of  the  activity  narrative  missing  from  the  case 
documentation (with reference to the ADAM ) are considered to be trivial based 
on  relevant  guidelines  (Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers,  2003;  ISO/IEC, 
2011; Kent, et al., 2006). Had the ADAM been used as a guideline the activities 
would have been undertaken and documented whereas the situation is currently 
unverified. In this instance reference to the ADAM has highlighted shortcomings 
in  the  organisation’s  case  documentation  leading  to  a  review  of  internal 
procedures. 
The following summarises the comparison between ADAM’s overriding 
principles  and  the  case  documentation  from  previous  investigations  with 
comments from the author: 
 
1.  The activities of the digital forensic practitioner should not alter the 
original data. If the requirements of the work mean that this is not 
possible then the effect of the practitioner’s actions on the original 
data  should  be  clearly  identified  and  the  process  that  caused  any 
changes justified. 
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Comment:  In  the  documentation  associated  with  all  three  of  the 
investigations the use and type of a write-blocking tool was recorded and 
there were no instances in which any action was identified that would 
have caused the original data to have been altered. 
 
2.  A complete record of all activities associated with the acquisition and 
handling of the original data and any copies of the original data must 
be maintained. This includes compliance with the appropriate rules of 
evidence,  such  as  maintaining  a  chain  of  custody  record,  and 
verification processes such as hashing. 
Comment: In all cases: 
  The  details  of  the  source  devices  and  forensic 
copies were recorded  
  MD5 hash values were recorded and verified 
  A complete chain of custody was maintained. 
 
3.  The  digital  forensic  practitioner  must  not  undertake  any  activities 
which are beyond their ability or knowledge. 
Comment: In none of the investigations was there any indication that the 
practitioners had undertaken activities beyond their ability or knowledge 
but this is not explicit in the documentation. Whilst it is unlikely that this 
type of information would be recorded by a practitioner had they acted in 
an unprofessional way, the expectation is that practitioners will always 
act in a professional manner and should they be put in a position where  
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circumstances  dictate  that  they  have  to  acquire  additional  knowledge 
from, for instance, a third-party specialist, then this will be documented. 
 
4.  The  digital  forensic  practitioner  must  take  into  consideration  all 
aspects of personal safety whilst undertaking their work. 
Comment: In none of the  investigations was there any record of this 
consideration having been made. 
 
Of the four principles contained within the ADAM both the confirmation 
that  the  practitioner  was  competent  to  undertake  the  tasks  (Principle  3)  and 
consideration  of  the  safety  issues  (Principle  4)  were  lacking  in  all  cases. 
Concerning the shortcomings with respect to  Principle 3, a practitioner could 
make a ‘statement of competence’ to confirm that their skills and knowledge are 
not exceeded. Such a statement would take just a moment to record and should 
not  be  an  onerous  task  to  implement  in  standard  procedures,  regardless  of 
whether  the  practitioner  is  operating  within  the  field  of  law  enforcement, 
commercial  practice  or  incident  response.  Concerning  the  shortcomings  with 
respect  to  Principle  4  with  regard  to  the  safety  issues,  the  fact  that  the 
Demonstration activity took place within a commercial environment and not law 
enforcement  may  explain  why  safety  was  not  considered  automatically  and 
recorded.  Again  it  would  be  a  simple  matter  for  commercial  and  incident 
response  practitioners  to  include  a  comment  that  safety  issues  had  been 
considered  and  record  the  outcome  and,  if  relevant,  how  issues  had  been 
addressed.  
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It can be concluded from the above that the discrepancies between the 
activities contained in the three stages of the ADAM and the activities recorded 
in the case documentation are due to failings in the case documentation and do 
not require modifications to the ADAM at this point. 
5.2.1.2  Aspect  2  -  Activities  recorded  in  the  example  case  documentation  but  not 
catered for in the ADAM. 
The  results  of  this  aspect  of  the  Demonstration  activity  highlighted 
shortcomings  in the process  flow and activities  associated with the  ADAM’s 
Stage 3 which covers the acquisition process itself. The shortcomings were: 
 
1.  The ADAM Stage 3 activity diagram does not account for situations 
in  which  some  activities  may  be  undertaken  on  site  that  would 
normally be carried out in the forensic lab if the target equipment was 
removed  to  there,  such  as  duplicating  the  acquired  image  files  to 
create a working copy  
2.  The ADAM Stage 3 activity diagram does not have an activity for 
returning any equipment that had been seized  
3.  The  ADAM  Stage  3  activity  diagram  does  not  show  the  need  to 
document the process explicitly for each activity.  
 
All three shortcomings were considered and the UML activity diagram for 
the ADAM Stage 3 was amended to produce the version shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21  The ADAM Stage 3 – Acquisition of Digital Data (version 2) 
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5.3  Scenario ‘walkthroughs’ 
For  this  part  of  the  Demonstration  activity,  four  scenarios  have  been 
created and considered from the perspective of deployment of the ADAM. Each 
of  the  scenarios  demonstrates  how  the  ADAM  could  be  related  to  specific 
aspects of an investigation being undertaken in differing circumstances covered 
by the environment scope of this research. For Scenario 1 the Digital Forensic 
Investigator (DFP) is working  for a professional service provider; Scenario 2 
describes a law enforcement computer crime unit where the DFP is not involved 
in  the  seizure  of  the  hardware;  Scenario  3  describes  an  incident  response 
situation in which the DFP is working ‘in-house’ and Scenario 4 describes an 
investigation  in  which  the  DFP  is  working  for  a  government  regulator  with 
‘search and seize’ powers. 
All the scenarios are based on actual situations in which the thesis author 
has either been directly involved or has observed first-hand. They are intended to 
demonstrate  the  potential  deployment  of  the  ADAM  but  are  not  offered  as 
evidence that the ADAM can be successfully deployed into the environments 
being described. 
 
SCENARIO 1 
A client, Company X, contacts their legal advisor, Lawyer Y, to say that 
they  may  have  an  issue with  an ex-employee who they  believe  has removed 
confidential company  material  such as  customer and price  lists prior to their 
departure and has now set up their own company in direct competition. The legal 
advisor contacts the digital forensic investigation team at BIG4.  
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Throughout  the  following  activities  Investigator  Z  and  Investigator  A 
maintain  contemporaneous  notes  of  all  their  activities  and  complete  the 
appropriate documentation as required by the procedures of BIG4. 
 
ADAM Stage 1 – Initial Planning 
  The  head  of  the  digital  forensic  investigation  team  at  BIG4, 
Investigator Z, sets up a meeting with Lawyer Y and Company X. 
During this meeting Investigator Z develops an understanding of the 
work required, which is to analyse a desktop computer running the 
Microsoft Windows Vista operating system that was last used by the 
ex-employee as well as Company X network data associated with that 
ex-employee. The outcome of the work is to determine if there is any 
evidence  indicating  that  the  ex-employee  accessed  and  copied 
company  confidential  information  prior  to  departure.  The  legal 
implications of the work are discussed with Lawyer Y.  
  Back  at  BIG4,  Investigator  Z  follows  the  in-house  procedure  for 
obtaining  internal  authorisation  to  do  the  work,  which  includes 
making sure that there are no conflicts issues
29, undertaking a risk 
assessment and confirming the availability of resources. Investigator 
Z also confirms that there are no other legal or external authorisations 
to consider. 
                                                 
 
 
29 Such as the potential client also being an existing audit client of the firm with restrictions on 
what further work can be undertaken by the firm.  
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  Investigator Z creates an Outline Plan  having considered the time, 
physical and data constraints as well as any safety issues (such as 
having to work out of normal office hours at a remote location). 
  BIG4  issues a  letter of engagement to Company X setting out the 
terms and conditions under which they will undertake the work as 
well as defining the scope of the work required. 
  Investigator Z confirms that all aspects of the ADAM Stage 1 have 
been  followed  by  reference  to  the  ADAM  Operation  Guide  for 
ADAM  Stage  1  or  BIG4  procedures  if  these  incorporate  ADAM 
Stage 1 activities. 
  As a record that all Stage 1 ADAM activities have been completed 
Investigator Z dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 1 Activity 
Diagram as a file note. 
 
ADAM Stage 2 – The Onsite Plan 
  Investigator Z and Investigator A attend the offices of Company X 
with  the  equipment  selected  as  part  of  the  Preliminary  Plan  and 
individual notebooks. They address any safety and/or security issues 
that may become apparent before starting work. 
  Through  discussions  with  the  IT  Manager  from  Company  X, 
Investigator Z determines where all sources of potential evidence are 
located and isolates them with the co-operation of the IT Manager. 
  Investigator Z tasks Investigator A to undertake a preliminary survey 
of the sources of potential evidence and the Outline Plan is updated to 
create  the  Onsite  Plan  now  that  all  the  required  information  is  
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available. The Onsite Plan includes ‘live’ acquisition of profile data 
stored on  Company  X’s  fileserver  for  the  ex-employee  and  onsite 
acquisition of the data on the ex-employee’s desktop computer which 
at this time is running and showing the login prompt. 
  Investigator Z tasks Investigator A with acquiring the data from the 
ex-employee’s computer. 
  Investigator Z confirms that all aspects of the ADAM Stage 2 have 
been followed by reference to the Operation Guide and UML Activity 
diagram for ADAM Stage 2 or BIG4 procedures if these incorporate 
ADAM Stage 2 activities. 
  As a record that all Stage 2 ADAM activities have been completed 
Investigator Z dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 2 Activity 
Diagram as a file note 
 
ADAM Stage 3 – Acquisition of Digital Data 
Network acquisition 
  Investigator  Z  refers  to  the  Operation  Guide  and  UML  Activity 
diagram for ADAM Stage 3 (or BIG4 procedures if these incorporate 
ADAM Stage 3 activities). 
  Investigator Z confirms that the acquisition will be taken onsite.  
  Investigator Z decides that a ‘live’ acquisition of the data is the most 
appropriate method in the circumstances and attaches a blank external 
disk  drive  (the  ‘master’  disk  for  this  forensic  acquisition)  to  a 
computer on Company X’s network that has been provided for the  
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purpose by the IT Manager. The blank hard disk has been checked for 
integrity and labelled based on the forensic procedures of BIG4. 
  Using  a  forensic  imaging  utility  in  accordance  with  BIG4’s 
procedures for obtaining ‘live’ network data, Investigator Z collects 
the profile data  for the ex-employee  from Company X’s  fileserver 
which  is  automatically  placed  in  a  forensic  ‘container’
30  on  the 
‘master’ disk.  
  A hash verification value for the container is calculated and recorded 
on  the  Evidence  Acquisition  Form  inn  accordance  with  BIG4 
procedures. 
 
Desktop PC acquisition 
  Investigator  A  refers  to  the  Operation  Guide  and  UML  Activity 
diagram for ADAM Stage 3 (or BIG4 procedures if these incorporate 
ADAM Stage 3 activities), photographs the computer used by the ex-
employee and records its model, serial number and other details on a 
BIG4 Evidence Acquisition Form.  
  Investigator A confirms that the acquisition will be undertaken onsite.  
  Following  the  BIG4  Company’s  digital  forensic  procedures  for 
shutting down a PC running Microsoft Windows Vista Investigator A 
turns off the ex-employee’s computer and follows BIG4 Company’s 
digital forensic procedures for obtaining a forensic image of the hard 
disk contained within (making notes of the serial/model details).  
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  Investigator A creates the image on a blank hard disk (the ‘master’ 
disk for this forensic acquisition) that has been checked for integrity 
and labelled based on the forensic procedures of BIG4.  
  A  hash  verification  value  for  the  acquired  data  is  calculated  and 
recorded on the  Evidence  Acquisition  Form  produced  by  BIG4  in 
accordance with BIG4 procedures. 
  Investigator  A  re-assembles  the  computer  and  returns  it  to  the  IT 
Manager who re-connects it to the Company X network and checks 
that it is operational. 
Transport 
  Investigator confirms that all documentation is correct and completes 
a Chain of Custody form for the two drives containing the acquired 
data. 
  The  two  drives  containing  the  acquired  data  are  booked  into  the 
secure storage facilities at BIG4. 
  Investigator  Z  tasks  Investigator  B  with  collecting  the  two  drives 
from storage and creating ‘working’ copies for analysis based on the 
operating procedures of BIG4. 
  As a record that all Stage 3 ADAM activities have been completed 
Investigator Z dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 3 Activity 
Diagram as a file note. 
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SCENARIO 2 
A  police  officer  seizes  a  computer  system  during  the  execution  of  a 
search warrant at private premises. The seized computer placed in an evidence 
bag and is removed to the police secure storage facility and booked in. The State 
Computer Crime Unit (CCU) is requested to analyse to contents of the hard disk 
drive contained in the computer for evidence of a criminal offence. The Unit has 
its own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). 
Throughout  the  following  activities  contemporaneous  notes  are 
maintained  and  the  appropriate  documentation  is  completed  as  required  by 
internal procedures. 
 
ADAM Stage 1 – Initial Planning 
  Officer  1  checks  that  the  documentation  supporting  the  request to 
analyse the computer is in order as well as chain of custody records. 
  Officer  1  considers  the  nature  of  the  material  that  may  be  on  the 
computer’s hard disk and makes a risk assessment. 
  Officer 1 allocates the work to Officer 2. 
  Officer1 confirms that all aspects of the ADAM Stage 1 have been 
followed  by  reference  to the  ADAM  Operation  Guide  for  ADAM 
Stage  1  and  CCU  SOPs  (or  just  CCU  SOPs  if  these  incorporate 
ADAM Stage 1 activities). 
  As a record that all Stage 1 ADAM activities have been completed 
Officer 1 dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 1 Activity Diagram 
as a file note. 
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ADAM Stage 2 – The Onsite Plan 
  Officer 1 simply checks that the activities of ADAM Stage 2 have 
been documented by the officers seizing the computer. 
  As a record that all Stage 2 ADAM activities have been completed 
Officer 1 dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 2 Activity Diagram 
as a file note. 
 
ADAM Stage 3 - Acquisition of Digital Data 
  Officer  2  takes  custody  of  the  computer  from  the  secure  storage 
facility. 
  Officer 2 refers to the ADAM Operation Guide for ADAM Stage 3 
and CCU SOPs (or just CCU SOPs if these incorporate the ADAM 
Stage 3 activities). 
  Based on the CCU Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) Officer 2 
determines the most appropriate method for acquiring the data. 
  Officer 2 completes the initial sections of the CCU Digital Evidence 
Acquisition form recording the model/serial numbers of the PC and 
hard disk drive. 
  The acquired master copy of the data is created on the CCU storage 
system. 
  A hash verification value for the acquired data is created and recorded 
on the CCU Digital Evidence Acquisition form. 
  A ‘working’ copy of the acquired data is created. 
  Officer  2  reassembles  the  computer  and  returns  it  to  the  secure 
storage facility.  
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  Officer2 confirms that all aspects of the ADAM Stage 3 have been 
followed  by  reference  to the  ADAM  Operation  Guide  for  ADAM 
Stage 3 and CCU SOPs (or just CCU SOPs if these incorporate the 
ADAM Stage 3 activities). 
  As a record that all Stage 3 ADAM activities have been completed, 
Officer 2 dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 3 Activity Diagram 
as a file note. 
At Trial 
  The case goes to trial and questions are raised regarding the reliability 
of the evidence being presented, since the accused denies that certain 
material ever existed on their computer system.  
  The officer that seized the computer is called to give evidence and 
refers  to  their  contemporaneous  notes  to  the  point  that  the  seized 
computer is placed into secure storage.  
  Officer 2 is called to give evidence.  
  Officer  2  produces  the  dated  and  signed  ADAM  Stage  3  Activity 
Diagram, the  ADAM Stage 3 Operational Guide, the CCU Digital 
Evidence Acquisition form and his contemporaneous notes.  
  Officer 2 uses the ADAM Stage 3 Activity Diagram to take the court 
through the process he followed to acquire a forensic image of the 
seized computer. When asked why a particular software application 
was  used  to  acquire  the  forensic  image  Officer  2  refers  to  his 
contemporaneous notes, the ADAM Stage 3 Operational Guide and 
the relevant Standard Operating Procedures. 
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SCENARIO 3 
The  managing  director  of  Company  W  is  notified  by  a  director  of 
Company M that they have been sent confidential material that seems to have 
originated from Company W. The MD of Company W tasks his IT Director to 
look into the likelihood of someone compromising the security of Company W’s 
network. The IT Director contacts the manager of his Incident Response Team 
(IRT) to investigate. 
Throughout  the  following  activities  contemporaneous  notes  are 
maintained  and  the  appropriate  documentation  is  completed  as  required  by 
internal procedures. 
 
ADAM Stage 1 – Initial Planning 
  The  IRT  Manager  meets  with  the  IT  director  to  understand  the 
requirements of the task and obtain background information relating 
to the material involved. 
  The IRT Manager considers the nature of the task and the constraints. 
  The IRT Manager decides that they will undertake the investigation 
and creates an Outline Plan. 
  As a record that all Stage 1 ADAM activities have been completed 
the IRT Manager dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 1 Activity 
Diagram as a file note. 
 
ADAM Stage 2 – The Onsite Plan 
  The  IRT  Manager  connects  to  the  network  and  carries  out  a 
preliminary survey that involves checking firewall and router logs,  
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anti-virus messages and other network data that is available to him 
and that could provide details of the suspected security breach. 
  Based on the information obtained from the Preliminary Survey the 
IRT  Manager  suspects  that  a  laptop  belonging  to  a  director  of 
Company W has been compromised and updates the Outline Plan to 
create the Onsite Plan. 
  The  IRT  Manager  tasks  IRT  Member1  with  acquiring  a  forensic 
image of the disk on the suspected laptop. 
  The IRT Manager refers to the ADAM Stage 2 Operation Guide and 
relevant Company W procedures to ensure all the necessary activities 
have been undertaken. 
  As a record that all Stage 1 ADAM activities have been completed 
the IRT Manager dates and signs a hard copy of the Stage 1 Activity 
Diagram as a file note 
 
ADAM Stage 3 - Acquisition of Digital Data 
Network acquisition 
  The  IRT  manager  acquires  the  appropriate  log  files  from  the 
Company W network and stores them in a forensic container on a 
blank hard disk using appropriate software. 
  The  IRT  manager  creates  a  hash  of  the  contents  of  the  forensic 
container  and  also  creates  a  working  copy  for  later  analysis.  The 
appropriate Evidence Acquisition form is completed during this work. 
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Laptop acquisition 
  IRT Member1 arranges to collect the laptop suspected of having been 
compromised. IRT Member1 refers to the Operation Guide and UML 
Activity diagram for ADAM Stage 3 (or Company W procedures if 
these  incorporate  ADAM  Stage  3  activities)  and  photographs  the 
laptop  computer  and  records  its  model,  serial  number  and  other 
details on a Company W Evidence Acquisition Form. 
  IRT Member1 confirms that the acquisition will be undertaken onsite.  
  IRT Member1 follows Company W’s digital forensic procedures for 
shutting down a laptop computer and follows Company W’s digital 
forensic procedures for obtaining a forensic image of the hard disk 
contained within (making notes of the serial/model details).  
  IRT Member1 creates the image on a blank hard disk (the ‘master’ 
disk for this forensic acquisition) that has been checked for integrity 
and labelled based on the forensic procedures of Company W.  
  A  hash  verification  value  for  the  acquired  data  is  calculated  and 
recorded on the Evidence Acquisition Form produced by Company W 
in accordance with Company W procedures. 
  IRT Member1 re-assembles the laptop computer and checks that it is 
operational before returning it to the user. 
  IRT Member 1 creates a working copy of the acquired laptop data to 
be  used  for  later  analysis  in  a  forensic  sandbox  to  determine  the 
nature  and  processes  associated  with  any  malware  that  may  be 
present.   
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  As a record that all Stage 3 ADAM activities have been completed 
the IRT Manager records the date and signs a hard copy of the Stage 
3 Activity Diagram as a file note. 
 
SCENARIO 4 
A  government  regulator  (BigReG)  with  powers  to  carry  out 
investigations, including the use of computer forensics, is notified of a possible 
breach of the Business Trading Act by Company A. Following enquiries Senior 
Investigator B decides to undertake a seizure of all company documents relating 
to the activities of Company A including data held on their fileserver. 
Throughout  the  following  activities  contemporaneous  notes  are 
maintained  and  the  appropriate  documentation  is  completed  as  required  by 
internal procedures. 
 
ADAM Stage 1 – Initial Planning 
  Senior Investigator B confirms that all the appropriate authorisations 
have  been  obtained  and  creates  an  Outline  Plan  based  on  the 
information  already  obtained  through  initial  enquiries.  This  plan 
includes the names of the team members to take part in a raid on the 
premises of Company A. 
  As a record that all Stage 1 ADAM activities have been completed 
Senior  Investigator  B  dates  and  signs  a  hard  copy  of  the  Stage  1 
Activity Diagram as a file note. 
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ADAM Stage 2 – The Onsite Plan 
  Senior  Investigator  B  and  his  team  arrive  unannounced  at  the 
premises of Company A. Senior Investigator B shows the court order 
to a director of Company A and requests that all personnel except the 
IT  Manager  leave  the  premises  having  turned  over  their  mobile 
phones and external  storage devices to Team  Member 2 who will 
provide a receipt. Senior Investigator B supervises the IT Manager 
who ensures that all external connections to the network are blocked. 
Senior  Investigator  B  tasks  his  team  members  to  undertake  a 
preliminary  survey  of  the  locations  of  potential  evidence  having 
considered security and safety issues. 
  Team Member 1 reports back that Company A outsources its main IT 
infrastructure,  such  as  its  fileserver,  to  CloudsRUS,  an  internet 
provider of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). 
  Team  Member  2  reports  back  that  all  senior  executives  have 
company-provided iPhones. 
  Team  Member  1  obtains  the  appropriate  login  credentials  for  the 
network 
  Team Member 3 reports back that all the laptops for the three senior 
executives run full disk encryption. 
  Senior  Investigator  B  updates  the  Preliminary  Plan  to  create  the 
Onsite  Plan  taking  into  consideration  the  new  circumstances 
identified by Team Members 1,2 and 3.  
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  As a record that all Stage 2 ADAM activities have been completed 
Senior  Investigator  B  dates  and  signs  a  hard  copy  of  the  Stage  2 
Activity Diagram as a file note. 
 
ADAM Stage 3 - Acquisition of Digital Data 
Acquiring cloud data 
  Senior  Investigator  B  determines  that  the  fileserver  on  the  host 
machine  of  CloudsRUS  will  be  imaged  remotely  using  the 
appropriate tools as set out in the Standard Procedures of BigReG. A 
record of this decision is made by Senior Investigator B in his notes. 
  Senior  Investigator  B  tasks  Team  Member  1  to  undertake  the 
acquisition as she has the necessary skills. 
  Team  Member  1  uses  the  appropriate  login  credentials  for  the 
network and follows BigReG Standard Procedures to run a remote 
process on the Company A fileserver located on the cloud platform. 
Team Member 1 creates a forensic copy of the fileserver data onto a 
blank hard disk (the ‘master’ disk for this forensic acquisition) that 
has  been  checked  for  integrity  and  labelled  based  on  the  forensic 
procedures of BigReG. 
  A  hash  verification  value  for  the  acquired  data  is  calculated  and 
recorded on the Evidence Acquisition Form produced by BigReG in 
accordance with BigReG procedures. 
  All  other  details  of  the  acquisition  process  are  recorded  on  the 
Evidence Acquisition Form. 
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Mobile phone devices 
  Senior  Investigator  1  determines  that  the  senior  executive  iPhones 
will be seized and transported back to the forensic lab of BigReG for 
processing by their specialist forensic investigator. 
  Senior Investigator 1 tasks Team Member 2 with collecting all the 
iPhones,  securing  them  in  evidence  bags  and  completing  the 
appropriate chain of custody records before transporting them back to 
the forensic lab for imaging. 
  Team Member 2 transports the seized equipment to the forensic lab 
and hands them over to Mobile Device Investigator A who signs the 
chain of custody form. 
  Mobile Device Investigator A processes each of the iPhones using the 
appropriate software and techniques as set out in BigReG procedures 
for acquiring iPhone data and records his activities on an Evidence 
Acquisition Form for each device. The acquired iPhone data is stored 
within  the  relevant  directory  on  the  BigReG  Forensic  Network 
Attached  Storage  (NAS)  device  and  hash  values  are  taken  and 
recorded. 
  After all the iPhone data has been acquired Team Member 2 takes 
possession of them, completes the chain of custody record and returns 
to Company A where the iPhones are returned to the IT Manager who 
signs for them by completing the chain of custody record. 
Encrypted laptop drives 
  Senior  Investigator  B  obtains  a  copy  of  the  encryption  recovery 
software and appropriate recovery data for each laptop.  
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  Senior  Investigator  B  determines  that  the  task  of  acquiring  the 
forensic images and then decrypting them onsite is not practical and 
therefore  tasks  Team  Member  3  with  seizing  the  three  laptop 
computers for processing back at the forensic lab. 
  Team Member 3 provides a receipt for the three laptop computers and 
completes  the  Chain  of  Custody  record  before  placing  them  in 
separate evidence bags. 
  Team Member 3 transports the three laptop computers to the forensic 
lab where he reviews the BigReG Operating Procedures for dealing 
with the encryption being used. 
  Team  Member  3  follows  the  BigReG  Operating  Procedures  and 
stores the decrypted drive images on the Forensic NAS in the relevant 
directory.  The  process  used  and  the  resulting  hash  values  of  the 
decrypted drives are stored on the Evidence Acquisition Form used 
by BigReG. 
  Senior Investigator B remains supervising onsite until the acquisition 
of  the  fileserver  data  is  completed  and  the  iPhones  have  been 
returned. He then checks the Evidence Acquisition Forms and then 
dates and signs the ADAM Stage 3 Activity diagram for the fileserver 
and each of the iPhones as a record that all of the activities have been 
carried  out.  Once  the  laptop  drives  have  been  decrypted  and  the 
laptops  have  been  returned  Investigator  B  checks  the  Chain  of 
Custody records and the Evidence Acquisition Forms for the laptop 
images.  
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Working  copies  of  all  the  acquired  images  and  logical  containers  are 
created  in  accordance  with  the  ADAM  and  as  per  BigReG  Policies  and 
Procedures. Senior Investigator B dates and signs the ADAM Stage 3 Activity 
Diagram for each of the laptops as a record that all of the activities have been 
completed. 
5.3.1  Results of the scenario walkthroughs 
Although  there  were  different  types  of  device  and  environment 
encountered by the investigators in the four scenarios they were able to apply a 
consistent process using the ADAM that could be described in court. The model 
also provided a useful framework for ensuring that all the activities were carried 
out and recorded. 
5.4  Summary 
This chapter has discussed the Demonstration activity stage of the DSRP 
followed  in  this  thesis.  The  Demonstration  activity  involved  reviewing  the 
contemporaneous documentation from three previous in-house investigations and 
comparing the activities described therein against the ADAM, following which 
some  amendments  were  made  to  the  ADAM.  A  ‘walkthrough’  using  four 
scenarios was also undertaken that successfully mapped the three stages of the 
ADAM to representative activities undertaken by a DFP working in different 
environments covered by the environment scope of this research.  
Having completed the Demonstration activity the next step in the DSRP 
is  the  evaluation  activity  which  is  undertaken  by  a  number  of  external 
researchers and practitioners and is described in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Evaluation 
6.1  Introduction 
Evaluating a process model can be summarised as normally focusing on 
three high-level aspects (Barlas, 1996; Groesser & Schwaninger, 2012; Kleijnen, 
1995): 
 
1.  Is  the  model  theoretical  valid?  (the  model  should  be  logical  and 
consistent with some theory of the topic) 
2.  Is  the  model  usable?    (the  model  can  be  applied  in  a  real  life 
environment) 
3.  Does the  model  provide  explanatory  or  prescriptive  power  for  the 
user? 
 
For  a  process  model,  the  validity  comes  from  the  degree  to  which  it 
adheres to guiding principles around which the process is organised. The model 
is usable  if people can use  it  in real scenarios to arrange and sequence their 
activities to move through the process and generate the required outcomes easily 
and  efficiently.  The  model  has  prescriptive  power  if  it  steers  the  process, 
recommends some courses of action and cautions against others. Chapter 4 has 
described the theoretical basis for the model development and Chapter 5 started 
the process of determining if the model is useful through in-house assessment 
and scenario walk-throughs. The prescriptive power of the model comes from 
the UML Activity diagrams for the three stages of the ADAM and the associated  
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Operation Guides that are intended to guide the practitioner through the process 
of  acquiring  digital  evidence.  However,  the  model  needs  to  undergo  an 
independent  evaluation  of  this  prescriptive  power  that  also  builds  on  the 
activities  of  Chapter  5 to  determine  if  the  model  is  usable.  The  independent 
evaluation is the topic for this chapter and continues the Peffers et al (2006) 
Design Science Research Process that requires the artefact to be used to address 
one or more instances of the research problem. The chapter begins by discussing 
the external review process involving two panels of reviewers and then covers 
the  makeup  of  the  review  panels  followed  by  details  of  the  feedback  and 
comments received. The chapter concludes with details of how the ADAM was 
amended following a review of this feedback. 
6.2  Use of expert and peer reviewers 
Pace and Sheehan  (2002) note that a primary  validation technique  for 
models and simulations incorporates some form of review by experts and peers. 
This approach has been supported by other researchers in different environments 
but  the  common  theme  is  to  draw  upon  knowledge  that  cannot  be  obtained 
through  reference  to  other  data  sources  and  applying  this  knowledge  to  the 
evaluation of an artefact such as a model (Balci, 2003; Hayardeny, et al., 2007; 
Macal, 2005). 
6.3  The Expert Panel 
In order to address the first research goal (the development of a formal 
model)  a  group  of  internationally  renowned  practitioners  and  academics, 
hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Expert  Panel,  were  asked  if  they  would  provide  
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feedback on a new formal digital forensic process model for the acquisition of 
digital data. The Panel recruitment process was deemed to be complete once a 
diverse group had agreed to take part that would bring different perspectives to 
bear  on  the  evaluation  (Cornelissen,  Berg,  Koops,  &  Kaymak,  2002). 
Considerations for the selection of potential panel members were: 
 
  The  person’s  period  of  learning  and  experience  in  the  domain  of 
digital forensics was greater than 10 years; and 
  The  conditions  in  which  the  experience  had  been  gained,  e.g.  in 
theoretical or practical circumstances, to ensure a mix of theorists and 
current practitioners. 
 
The Expert Panel comprises of the following members: 
  A Professor of Computer Science 
  An Associate Professor of Computer Science and Engineering  
  The  Director  of  a  commercial  computer  forensic  company  and  an 
internationally recognised authority in the field of computer forensics 
who also holds a Ph.D. in Computer Forensics 
  A licensed attorney who advises, researches, publishes, and speaks on 
prevailing and  forthcoming  issues at the crossroads of  information 
technology  law who holds  Juris Doctorate and  Master of  Forensic 
Sciences degrees 
  The author of a book on collecting and preserving computer evidence 
with over 20 years’ experience of computer security. 
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The Guidance Notes, ADAM Principles and the UML Activity diagrams 
were provided to the Expert Panel for them to evaluate the new model of the 
digital  forensic acquisition process  and provide  comment or feedback  on any 
aspect of the  model  from the  documents that had  been  supplied. The Expert 
Panel  were  not  required  to  structure their  feedback  in  a  particular  way,  thus 
leaving them free to express their views in whatever manner they felt was most 
appropriate. 
6.4  The Practitioner Panel 
The  second  goal  of  the  research  objective  is  (the  development  of  a 
generic model relevant to the fields of commerce, law enforcement and incident 
response). In relation to this objective Ford and Sterman (1998) suggest that an 
effective  way  of  eliciting  information  in  relation  to  this  type  of  knowledge-
intensive process is to employ expert knowledge from those that are routinely 
involved  in  the  process.  In  order  to  utilise  expert  knowledge  for  a  practical 
evaluation of the ADAM, a group of peers (working in different areas of the 
research environment scope) were recruited to form the Practitioner Panel. These 
practitioners were asked to assist in this research either directly, via email or via 
a  request  from  the  High  Technology  Crime  Investigators  Association 
(Asia/Pacific region). The practitioners were identified as being representative of 
their particular areas of activity based on their roles, experience and involvement 
with relevant national and international associations. The recruitment process for 
the Practitioner Panel was deemed to be complete once at least one practitioner 
had agreed to assist from each of the three fields covered by the research scope 
(i.e. law enforcement, commerce and incident response).   
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To  ensure  relevance  to  the  three  fields,  two  attributes,  utility  and 
usability,  were  considered.  Utility  might  also  be  expressed  as  ‘usefulness’, 
‘functionality’ and ‘fitness for purpose’ (Blandford, Green, Furniss, & Makri, 
2008; Gill & Hevner, 2011; ISO, 2001; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009). Assessing 
this involves the ADAM being evaluated by the Practitioner Panel with respect 
to how suitable it is for describing the forensic data acquisition process in each 
of their particular fields (A. Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; March & Smith, 1995). 
The usability
31 testing employs the Practitioner Panel as ‘representative 
users’ (Folmer & Bosch, 2004; Heo, Ham, Park, Song, & Yoon, 2009; Karat, 
1997) who are asked to review typical tasks associated with acquiring digital 
data in their own environments through using the ADAM and to then to provide 
a subjective rating based on how easy it would be to adopt and use the model. 
This subjective rating will be taken into consideration for improvements to the 
model. The Practitioner Panel comprised the following members: 
 
  A representative of commercial practice who is the National Director 
of computer forensics for a professional services company and who 
has  instructed  a  number  of  law  enforcement  agencies  including 
Scotland  Yard,  Hong  Kong  Police,  ICE  Immigration  Customs 
Enforcement,  the  Australian  Federal  Police,  the  FBI’s  Regional 
Computer Forensics Labs and the Australia High Tech Crime Centre 
  A representative of incident response with 15 years of Information 
Technology  experience  who  is  a  certified  Computer  Information 
                                                 
 
 
31 Defined in the ISO Quality Model 9126-1 (ISO, 2001) as “A set of attributes that bear on the 
effort needed for use, and on the individual assessment of such use, by a stated or implied set of 
users”   
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Systems Security Professional (CISSP) and a Certified Information 
Systems  Auditor  (CISA)  and  who  was  a  Technical  Trainer  at  the 
2007  Malaysia  Forum  of  Incident  Response  and  Security  Teams 
Technical Colloquia 
  A  representative  of  law  enforcement  who  heads  a  State  Police 
Computer Crime Squad  
  A  representative  of  law  enforcement  who  is  a  Digital  Forensics 
Examiner  at  a  government  ministry    who  is  a  certified  Computer 
Information  Systems  Security  Professional  (CISSP)  and  a  certified 
Information Systems Auditor (CISA)   
  A representative of commercial practice who is a committee member 
of the High Technology Crime Investigators Association  
  Both the descriptive narrative and the UML activity diagrams were 
provided  to  the  Practitioner  Panel.  Panel  members  were  asked  to 
provide  answers  to  the  following  questions  (with  the  evaluation 
attribute shown in brackets): 
  In reviewing this model please identify any aspects that would NOT 
be representative of the process as carried out in your environment 
(‘utility’) 
  In  reviewing  this  model  please  identify  any  aspects  of  your  data 
acquisition process that are NOT covered (‘utility’) 
  Please  identify  any  aspects  of  the  model  that  you  feel  could  be 
improved (‘utility’)  
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  Please rate this model in terms of the usability of the model from 1 to 
10 with ‘1’ being very difficult to use and adopt and ‘10’ being very 
easy to use and adopt (‘usability’). 
 
In relation to Question 4 above, the determination of usability based on a 
perception  scale  and  does  not  provide  an  objective  measure  but  simply  an 
indication of whether there were any inherent problems in using the model in a 
particular environment. 
6.5  Feedback from Panels 
6.5.1  Feedback from the Expert Panel 
The feedback from the Expert Panel is presented in the form of extracts 
from  correspondence  together  with  specific  comments  from  the  researcher  in 
response  to  detailed  feedback.  Where  the  researcher  has  implemented  a 
modification  in  response  to  feedback  this  is  indicated  by  a  reference  in  the 
following  format:  ‘ref  MOD  #n’  (where  n  is  the  number  of  an  implemented 
modification). 
 
All general comments from the Expert Panel 
 
  I read through the materials you provided and found helpful value-
add  in  the  synthesizing  of  the  state  of  affairs  with  respect  to  the 
evolution, or lack thereof, of models in this space.  Your approach 
does a nice job of providing a substantive and longitudinal overview 
of same.  Trying to draw common threads throughout the "leading" 
models is a necessary step to move the ball forward.  
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  I have completed a "Quick Review" of your model and overall I do 
believe  that  your  work  provides  some  great  promise.  Noting  that 
finding  a  level  of  detail  and  specificity  in  a  project  like  this  that 
satisfies all is a daunting task. While I do believe that you are close, I 
feel that there is room for more in the supporting documentation. 
  I have looked over your model - I think it generally looks good. 
 
 
All detailed feedback from Experts (and thesis author comments) 
 
Feedback E-1:   The  one  area  that  I  saw  that  could  use  some  more 
‘direction’ is the topic of Identification which appears in 
stage 1 and 2. More specifically in 2.3 you identify that a 
preliminary survey should be conducted to identify data 
locations. While section 2.3 does cover some detail, I find 
this  to  be  an  area  that  is  rarely  accomplished  early 
enough,  or  thoroughly  enough.  For  instance  surveys  of 
this type should be accomplished far before the collection 
itself if at all possible. Granted, it's not always possible. 
 
  Comment:  This  issue  is  important  but  the  detail  included  in  the 
ADAM is considered sufficient as the feedback is more relevant to 
the practice of eDiscovery rather than digital forensic investigations 
in which the subjects of the investigation do not generally disclose the 
location of potential evidence. 
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Feedback E-2:   Essentially  I  feel  that  the  early  interview  process  and 
review of past audits and policies is of great value here. 
For instance, an investigator may think they are doing a 
great job by reviewing a set of IT Management guidelines 
that state certain types of data will be stored in XXXX, so 
they include the collection of XXXX in the process. In that 
same situation the investigator might have found that that 
data was actually kept somewhere else entirely by 90 % of 
users if an interview was conducted, or maybe the results 
of  a  recent  audit.  I  have  found  over  time  that  most 
organizations don't really know where their data is and in 
some cases what their knowledge workers true workflow 
process is. It is for this reason that I stress the importance 
of this step. 
 
  Comment: This is a useful ‘operational’ point but is considered too 
specific  for  inclusion  as  a  step  in  the  generic  model  process  and 
would be better as part of an organisational procedure document or 
‘practice guide’. 
 
Feedback E-3:   During stage 3 there needs to be some explicit sense of 
protecting all equipment and personnel — especially lab 
equipment. 
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  Comment: An addition will be made to the ADAM Principles to add 
‘equipment safety’ in addition to personal safety. (REF: MOD #1) 
 
Feedback E-4:   During stage 3 there needs to be some explicit sense of 
protecting any legal rights, and of keeping objectivity in 
the exam. 
 
  Comment: A new Principle will be added to consider legal rights. 
The explicit requirement to maintain objectivity is not considered to 
be appropriate for the Stage 3 process as this should form part of a 
practitioners approach. (REF: MOD #2) 
 
Feedback E-5:   In  stage  1  there  should  be  some  input  of  study  and 
familiarization with the milieu. 
 
  Comment: This is considered to be too generic to probably warrant a 
specific task within the preparation of the Outline Plan which already 
requires consideration of constraints. 
 
Feedback E-6:   In  stage  3,  there  should  be  some  branch  if  unexpected 
contraband or material is discovered. 
 
  Comment: This will be explicitly added to the ADAM as a Principle 
relating  to  organisational  policies  and  procedures  and  a  branch  in 
Stage  2  where  the  data  may  have  been  reviewed  as  part  of  the  
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‘preliminary survey’. An amendment for Stage 3 will cover both this 
situation and Feedback E-7 (covered in the next paragraph). For law 
enforcement  the  presence  of  illegal  material  may  have  been 
anticipated. (REF: MOD #3) 
 
Feedback E-7:   In  stage  3,  seized  equipment  is  not  always  returned, 
especially  if  it  contains  items  such  as  child  porn  or 
classified information. 
 
  Comment: The ADAM will be amended to take this into account. 
(REF: MOD #4) 
 
Feedback E-8:   Stage  2  might  be  the  right  place  to  seek  and  obtain 
additional  resources  and  personnel  to  handle  the 
confiscation and examination of the material (or that may 
go  in  multiple  places?)      Not  every  organization  has 
everything they need in-house. 
 
  Comment:  Stage  2  explicitly  requires  consideration  of  personnel 
needs and it is left to the practitioner to determine how this is to be 
addressed. 
 
Feedback E-9:   From experience, there is often on-going communications 
between  the  examiner  and  both  prosecutors  and  other 
investigators.   I don't see that represented. 
 
  Comment:  This will be added to the ADAM. (REF: MOD #5)  
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Feedback E-10:   Every case should have a "lessons learned" post-mortem 
that feeds back into the system. 
 
  Comment: Although this is a good idea in practice it should form 
part of the organisation’s overall procedures and outside the intended 
scope of the process model, which finishes at the point that the data 
has been acquired, duplicated and stored. 
6.5.2  Feedback from the Practitioner Panel 
The feedback from the Practitioner Panel is now presented in the form of 
quotes from correspondence together with comments from the thesis author in 
response to the detailed feedback. 
 
All general comments from the Practitioner Panel 
 
  Other than network forensics, our internal procedure for IR team to 
perform site raid and investigations is close to your workflow 
  This model that consists of 3 stages is representative of the process 
as carried out in our environment 
  For all the basic and important steps within a ‘forensically sound 
environment’, I think your model has these covered. 
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All detailed feedback from Practitioners (and thesis author comments) 
 
Feedback P-1:   Stage  1  -  Include  references  to  engagement  as 
‘Independent Expert’ or as ‘Consulting Expert’; this will 
prepared you for LPP situations as well as how your role 
might be restricted 
 
  Comment:  As  it  stands  this  is  a  valid  point  but  the  comment  is 
derived  from  a  commercial  perspective  where  the  practitioner  is 
engaged  by  a  third  party  to  undertake  work  involving  digital 
forensics. In this instance it is common practice, especially within the 
large professional service companies, to create an engagement letter 
which  clearly  states  the  role  in  which  the  practitioner  is  to  be 
engaged. This reference has therefore not been considered relevant 
for the ADAM as it forms part of the organisation’s administrative 
procedures for this type of work and does not impact the activities 
undertaken by the practitioner in acquiring the digital data using a 
generic process model. 
 
Feedback P-2:   Stage  2  –  Include  references  to  company  as  well  as 
contracting  company's  OH&S;  this  often  dictates  a 
minimal resource per site / work cover requirements. 
 
  Comment: For large service providers the minimal resources per site 
may be relevant but for smaller teams (sometimes consisting of only 
one practitioner) the constraint on the number of practitioners would  
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not be applicable. With regard to Occupational Health & Safety the 
organisation’s  policies  should  ensure  that  practitioners  are  not 
working  alone  in  circumstances  in  which  they  may  encounter  a 
hazard, for instance by always having at least one other person with 
them  who  may  or  may  not  be  a  digital  forensic  practitioner.  The 
ADAM Principles will be modified to incorporate relevant policies 
including the safety requirements (ADAM Principles items 4 and 6). 
 
Feedback P-3:   Stage 3 - Include reference to IT Evidence Management 
HB 171-2003. 
 
  Comment: The ‘IT Evidence Management HB 171-2003’ guidelines 
relate to the organisation that ‘owns’ the data and are  intended to 
prepare  them  for  litigation/investigations  on  their  systems  by 
adopting  proper  management  of  the  data,  and  these  guidelines  are 
therefore not considered to be relevant within the ADAM. 
 
Feedback P-4:   Stage 3 - Include time restrictions on acquisitions. 
 
  Comment: This is already considered to be appropriately covered in 
Stage 1 (the practitioner MUST consider time constraints – is the task 
achievable  within  the  time  allowed?)  and  Stage  3  (The  digital 
forensic  practitioner  MUST  identify  the  most  appropriate  way  of 
acquiring potential evidence given the constraints of time, resources, 
potential evidentiary value and technical limitations).  
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Feedback P-5:   Stage 3 - Include authorisation for devices to be taken off-
site 
 
  Comment: This will be added to the ADAM. (REF: MOD #6) 
 
Feedback P-6:   Stage 3 - Transportation requirements if devices are to be 
taken off-site 
 
  Comment: Equipment safety is now added to the ADAM Principles 
following previous feedback. (REF: MOD #7) 
 
Feedback P-7:   Stage 3 - Check criteria/conditions if LPP claim is made 
 
  Comment: Legal rights consideration is now added to the ADAM 
Principles following previous feedback. (REF: MOD #8) 
 
Feedback P-8:   Stage 3 - Check OH&S - food/drink requirements 
 
  Comment: As per item 2 of this list of detailed improvements, this is 
considered to be covered by the requirement in the ADAM Principles 
to  consider  all  aspects  of  personal  safety  (The  digital  forensic 
practitioner must take into consideration all aspects of personal and 
equipment safety whilst undertaking their work). 
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Feedback P-9:   Stage 3 - Include plans for Client/Team updates or project 
status 
 
  Comment: This is now added to the ADAM as part of a ‘maintain 
appropriate  communications  with  legal  team/client/other 
practitioners’ requirement following previous feedback. (REF: MOD 
#9) 
 
Feedback P-10:   “Stage 3 - Team/Project debrief on project completion - to 
check off Task list and lessons learnt” 
 
  Comment:  Whilst  being  a  vital  aspect  of  this  type  of  work  it  is 
considered to be part of the overall case management process. From 
the perspective of using the model to describe the process in court 
this activity would not be relevant. 
 
Feedback P-11:   In  relation  to  ‘Cloud  storage’  -  there  is  insufficient 
details on how the cloud providers service any search 
warrant from Court/LE, or any subpoena for litigation 
data evidence 
 
  Comment: An amendment has been made to the ADAM in the Stage 
3 Activity diagram  for the digital  forensic practitioner  (REF: Mod 
#10). The specific practices and techniques for this particular process 
are  covered  by  guidelines  and  other  material  which  is  outside  the  
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scope  of  the  ADAM.  In  terms  of  obtaining  the  appropriate 
authorisation, this is now covered by an earlier change made to the 
Stage 3 Activity diagram based on MOD #6. 
 
Feedback P-12:   Network forensic process needed to be extended 
 
  Comment: As for previous comment regarding cloud computing, an 
amendment  has  been  made  to the  ADAM  in  the  Stage  3  Activity 
diagram (REF: Mod #10). The specific practices and techniques for 
this particular process are covered by guidelines and other material 
which is outside the scope of the ADAM. 
6.5.3   Discussion of Evaluation 
6.5.3.1  Utility 
Design  science  aims  to  “…produce  and  apply  knowledge  of  tasks  or 
situations in order to create effective artefacts” (Simon, 1996, p. 253) including 
‘utility’ (Applegate, 1999; AR Hevner, et al., 2004). The utility requirement of 
the external review was to ensure that the ADAM captures all of the activities 
undertaken  by  practitioners  in  the  three  target  areas  of  commerce,  incident 
response and law enforcement. There were no steps within the ADAM that were 
identified as being unrepresentative of the process carried out in the experts or 
practitioners’ environment or in their experience. There were several instances of 
feedback  with  suggestions  for  some  additions  or  amendments  that  could  be 
incorporated  into  the  ADAM.  Each  instance  of  feedback,  consisting  of  23 
detailed improvements, was considered and ten changes have been made to the  
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ADAM,  some  of  which  incorporate  more  than  one  instance  of  suggested 
improvement. 
The ADAM has now been through a process of review, feedback and 
modification in order to address the issue of utility. 
6.5.3.2  Usability 
All the Practitioners provided simple perception scores of between 8 and 
10 in response to the request:  
 
“Please rate this model in terms of the usability of the model from 1 to 10 
with ‘1’ being very difficult to use and adopt and ‘10’ being very easy to 
use and adopt”.  
 
The mean score was 9 and the following comments were also provided: 
  It would be very easy to incorporate or formalise for our use if need 
be 
  Very straight forward, and there are very few cross-over feedback 
loops.  This  is  good from  a  business  process  management  point  of 
view 
  Reasonably easy to use and adopt 
 
There were no negative comments.  
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6.5.4.2  Changes to the activity diagrams. 
The  next  few  pages  show  the  changes  made  to  the  UML  activity 
diagrams in response to the evaluation feedback. 
 
Amendments to ADAM Stage 2 Activity diagram for MOD #3 (shaded) - To 
cater for equipment not being returned  
 
 
Figure 22  The ADAM Stage 2 amended (within shaded area) for MOD #3 
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Amendment  to  ADAM  Stage  3  Activity  diagram  for  MODs  #  3  &  #  4 
(shaded) – to cater for equipment not being returned 
 
 
 
Figure 23  The ADAM Stage 3 amended (within shaded area) for MODs #3 and 
#4  
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Amendment to ADAM Stage 3 Activity diagram for MOD #6 (shaded) – to 
cater for obtaining appropriate authorisations for equipment to be taken 
offsite 
 
 
Figure 24  The ADAM Stage 3 amended (within shaded area) for MOD #6 
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Amendment  to  ADAM  Stage  3  Activity  diagram  catering  for  MOD  #10 
(shaded)  –  to  cater  for  capturing  network/cloud/live  data  (incorporating 
previous  change  for  MOD  #6  in  relation  to  obtaining  appropriate 
authorisation) 
 
 
Figure  25    The  ADAM  Stage  3  amendments  catering  for  network/cloud/live 
acquisition 
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6.6  Completed ADAM 
The final version of the ADAM is provided at Appendix 2. This comprises 
of the following: 
 
  The formal model representation in the form of three UML Activity 
diagrams, one for each stage of the model 
  The  Operation  representation  in  the  form  of  a  statement  of  the 
ADAM Principles and the Adam Operation guide. 
 
Appendix 3 contains the Background Information for the three stage model 
that will assist organisations with implementing the ADAM and integrating their 
own policies and procedures. 
6.7  Summary 
This  chapter  has  described  the  evaluation  stage  of  the  DSRP  model  as 
interpreted in this thesis. The feedback received from both the Expert Panel and 
the Practitioner Panel regarding the ADAM was generally positive. There were, 
however, several improvements suggested (23 from both the Expert panel and 
the Practitioner Panel) and whilst some are considered outside the scope of the 
ADAM, ten changes were made to either the UML diagrams or the Operational 
presentation. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  includes  discussion  of  the  final  stage  of  the  DSRP 
(Communication) that has been followed in this research, summarises how this 
thesis has brought about the development of the ADAM and discusses how it 
might be used in its intended environment. The ADAM and its development are 
also placed in context with future research in the field of digital forensics. 
7.2  Communication 
The final stage of the Peffers et al DSRP is communication of the results. 
This began with the background and rational for the model being presented to 27 
attendees  in December 2010 at the HTCIA Asia Pacific Training Conference 
held in Hong Kong. 
Following on from the process of seeking feedback from practitioners for 
the ADAM a National Director and experienced trainer for two of the leading 
computer forensic products has indicated that they will be adopting the ADAM 
as part of their own in-house procedures. In addition: 
 
  The ADAM is introduced in a peer-reviewed book chapter to be 
published  in  December  2012  by  IGI  Global:  Chapter  5  –  “The 
Emergence of Cloud Storage Highlights the Need for a New Digital 
Forensic Process Model” (Adams, 2012a)  
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  Extracts from this thesis and the ADAM have been published as an 
article in the Australian Security Magazine (Adams, 2012b) as the 
first in a series of articles that will cover all aspects of the model  
  The ADAM is incorporated into a University postgraduate unit on 
Forensics and Information Technology (Adams, 2012c)  
  The ADAM is to be presented in its final form to members of the 
High Technology Crime Investigators Association through the vice-
president of the Asia-Pacific chapter. 
7.3  Research summary 
This research was initiated to address the problem that there is no formal 
generic process model for the acquisition of digital data that encompasses the 
activities  of  practitioners  working  in  the  different  environments  of  law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response and which can assist courts of law 
in  determining  the  reliability  of  the  acquisition  process  employed  to  collect 
potential digital evidence.  
 
  Chapter 1 introduced the research objective which was: 
 
To develop a formal model of the process for the forensic acquisition of 
digital data that is generic in that it can be employed by digital forensic 
practitioners in the fields of commerce, law enforcement and incident 
response. 
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From the research objective three research questions were raised: 
 
1.  What  are  the  essential  components  necessary  in  a  model  that 
describes a generic and forensically sound digital data acquisition 
process? 
2.  How can the identified components for a generic and forensically 
sound  digital  data  acquisition  process  be  organised  into  an 
operational model? 
3.  What is a suitable way for describing, presenting and using model 
for acquiring digital data? 
 
In order to answer the research questions a suitable methodology, 
the Peffers et al Design Science Research Process (2006), was identified, 
justified and used to guide the activities of this research.  The  first of 
those  activities  involved  ‘problem  identification  and  motivation’  for 
which an extensive review of relevant literature was undertaken. 
 
  Chapter 2 contained a review of the field of digital evidence followed by 
extensive review of relevant literature involving previous process models 
associated with the  forensic acquisition of digital data. The review of 
previous  models  suggested  three  central  themes  which  provide  the 
framework for the review. These themes are: 
 
o  The use of ad hoc design elements 
o  Adopting a process flow approach 
o  Employing some ‘scientific’ approach  
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The  literature  review  identified  a  set  of  criteria  for  assessing 
previous process models that involved the acquisition of digital data and 
from the subsequent model assessment the key features and requirements 
of a new model were identified. Peffers states that the resources required 
to define the objectives of a solution include a “…knowledge of the state 
of the problems and current solutions and their efficacy, if any” (Peffers, 
et al., 2006, p. 90). The ‘knowledge of the state of the problem’ and the 
‘current solutions’  for this research  has  been covered  by the  literature 
review of Chapter 2.  
 
  Chapter 3 embodied the DSRP ‘define objectives’ activity and sets out 
the  new  model’s  elements  and  scope,  the  assessment  criteria  for  the 
evaluation  of  previous  models  and  then  the  analysis  of  those  models 
against the criteria with a summary of the results leading to a statement of 
the essential elements for the Advanced Data Acquisition Model. 
 
  Chapter 4 covered the DSRP ‘design and development’ activity starting 
with  addressing  the  research  questions  and  then  detailing  the  model 
design elements together with the development assumptions. The ADAM 
was also presented in both its formal and ‘operational’ forms prior to the 
evaluation activity. 
 
  Chapter 5 discussed the methods used for evaluating the ADAM, the 
makeup of the review panels and the feedback and comments received.  
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Also discussed is the how the ADAM was amended following a review 
of the feedback. 
 
  Chapter  6  discussed  how  the  ADAM  will  be  used  in  its  intended 
environment and places it in context with future research in the field of 
digital forensics. 
 
7.4  Research questions revisited 
The three research questions are: 
 
 
1.  What are the essential components necessary in a model that describes a 
generic and forensically sound digital data acquisition process? 
2.  How can the identified components for a generic and forensically sound 
digital data acquisition process be organised into an operational model? 
3.  What is a suitable way for describing, presenting and using model for 
acquiring digital data? 
 
The  first  question  has  been  addressed  by  reviewing  the  results  of  the 
Carrier  and  Spafford  criteria  applied  to  each  of  the  models  covered  in  the 
literature  review  of  Chapter  2.  This  identified  several  researchers  whose 
particular contributions influenced the creation of the ADAM by helping identify 
the  essential  components  necessary  for  modelling  a  generic  and  forensically 
sound digital data acquisition process.   
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The  second  question  was  addressed  by  the  Design  and  Development 
stage (Chapter 4) in which the information gathered through the literature review 
was used as the basis for the three-stage ADAM.  
The third question was addressed in Chapter 5 in which an evaluation 
process involving external panels of experts and practitioners was undertaken to 
determine  the  suitability  of  the  ADAM  for  the  environment  in  which  it  is 
intended to be used based on the attributes of ‘utility’ and ‘usability’.  
7.5  Research objective achieved 
The overall research objective is: 
 
To develop a formal model of the process for the forensic acquisition of 
digital data that is generic in that it can be employed by digital forensic 
practitioners in the fields of commerce, law enforcement and incident 
response. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, in order to achieve the research objective the three 
research questions needed to be answered and this has been covered in 6.1.2. In 
addition, also stated in Chapter 1, the ADAM must satisfy the following criteria: 
 
  There must be a formal representation of the model  
  The  model  must  be  relevant  to  the  fields  of  commerce,  law 
enforcement and incident response. 
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The formal representation requirement has been addressed through the 
adoption of activity diagrams  from the UML which  have  been reviewed and 
evaluated by a panel of experts and practitioners. 
The  requirement  for  the  model  to  be  relevant  has  been  addressed  by 
synthesising  the  aspects  of  existing  models  in  a  generic  fashion  after  a 
substantial review of current literature in the field. The resulting model has been 
evaluated  for  relevance  by  expert  practitioners  with  backgrounds  in  law 
enforcement, commerce and incident response. 
7.6  Research contribution 
This work provides a generic model of the digital forensic acquisition 
process where none previously existed thereby creating a common framework 
that  can  be  adopted  by  practitioners  working  in  three  key  areas  of  digital 
forensics.  The  new  model  can  also  be  used  as  the  basis  for  further  research 
relating  to  the  other  aspects  of  digital  forensic  activities;  ‘analysis’  and 
‘presentation’.  
This work also suggests that the use of the Daubert test for determining 
the reliability of digital evidence is not appropriate for the acquisition stage of 
the digital  forensic process. This  assertion  is supported through the  literature 
review in which the Daubert test is applied to previous models and found to be 
currently  incompatible with digital  forensic process  models  in two of  its key 
aspects, namely the existence of a ‘known potential rate of error’ and the ‘degree 
of acceptance within the relevant scientific community’, neither of which can be 
determined  through  a  recognised  measure.  Finally,  in  defining  the  Advanced 
Data  Acquisition  Model,  this  research  has  shown  how  the  digital  forensic  
216 
acquisition process can be described using a proven formal notation, the Unified 
Modelling  Language,  which  will  add  to  the  ‘scientific’  credentials  of  digital 
forensics  and  from  a  practical  perspective  aid  the  courts  in  relation  to  the 
presentation of digital evidence through a better understanding of the process. 
7.7  Limitations and future work 
7.7.1  Limitations 
For the in-house evaluation only a small number of cases were selected 
and these are not claimed to be representative of all the activities undertaken by 
the organisation. This activity provides only a preliminary ‘proof-of-concept’ to 
determine if there were any serious issues with the model structure and contents 
prior to the more substantive evaluation carried out by external reviewers. 
Although each of the three areas - commercial practice, incident response 
and law enforcement - were represented by at least one external reviewer, this 
cannot be considered as being a significant sample of the population of digital 
forensic practitioners working in Australia as, for example, the Linked-In group 
‘Digital Forensics Association’ has around 90 practitioners registered. However, 
the  external  reviewers  that  participated  were  made  up  of  both  ‘Experts’  and 
‘Practitioners’ who have extensive skills, interest and experience in the area of 
digital forensics. In terms of feedback that is directly relevant in this research, 
several of the reviewers are the authors of previous process models. 
The  members  of  the  Practitioners  Panel  all  work  within  the  digital 
forensic environment in Australia. Whilst the work of digital forensics has many 
common features on an international level, the fact that other practitioners are  
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operating  in  different  jurisdictions  under  different  laws  means  that  for  this 
research  it  was  deemed  inappropriate  to  attempt  to  cater  for  many  different 
environments  requiring  a  much  larger  sample  of  practitioner  reviewers.  This 
decision was partly based on experience of being a member of a working group 
on  digital  evidence  that  is  trying  to  take  into  account  the  activities  of 
practitioners  from  many  different  countries.  However,  despite  the  focus  on 
Australia, this research could be used as the basis of a process model that is 
applicable in other jurisdictions with only minor alterations. 
An assumption  has  been  made that  the courts will  not be required to 
conform to a new international standard to determine the reliability of digital 
evidence that is incompatible with the new model developed in this research. As 
a member and contributor of the Australian Standards Working Group for the 
international guideline  being developed  in relation to the collection of digital 
evidence (ISO/IEC DIS 27037) the thesis author has endeavoured to ensure that 
there  are  no  aspects  of  the  model  that  would  be  incompatible  with  those 
guidelines. Although the author is not aware of any other international guidelines 
being developed, potentially from a legal rather than a technical perspective, the 
processes  described  in  the  ADAM  can  be  readily  adapted  to  accommodate 
additional requirements. 
7.7.2  Future work 
As the ADAM has yet to be independently evaluated in the field, future 
work could include a more comprehensive trial by practitioners as part of a wider 
study.  The  current  focus  on  Australia  could  also  be  extended  to  other 
jurisdictions  by  seeking  input  and  feedback  from  overseas  practitioners,  
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potentially  through  one  of  the  international  organisations  such  as  the  High 
Technology Crime Investigators Association. 
Having established a formal process model for the initial stages of digital 
forensics,  future research could  be undertaken that would  build on the UML 
Activity diagrams and textual representations of the ADAM to incorporate other 
aspects  of  the  UML  (such  as  Sequence  diagrams)  to  provide  a  more 
comprehensive  model.  Ultimately  the  other  activities  of  digital  forensic 
practitioners (such as analysis and presentation) could  be  incorporated  in the 
same format in order to provide a complete formal model of digital forensics. 
One of the risks associated with developing a process model in a fast-
changing environment such as digital forensics is that it may quickly become 
obsolete  as  new  technology  is  adopted.  By  identifying  the  key  high-level 
processes  and  leaving  implementation  of  detailed  policies  and  low-level 
procedures to the digital  forensic practitioners the  ADAM  has addressed this 
weakness and  its adaptability  is  indicated by  its  inclusion  in a peer-reviewed 
book chapter where it is applied to the ‘cloud’ environment (Adams, 2012a). 
7.8  Summary 
The  model  has  been  discussed  in  its  operational  context  and  its  key 
benefits to practitioners have been highlighted. The limitations of this research 
have been identified as have the potential future research opportunities that can 
stem from the approach adopted in developing the ADAM. The forums in which 
this research has been, or will be, communicated have been identified. 
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Appendix 1 – Demonstration results 
(Discrepancies highlighted in red italics) 
 
ADAM Demonstration STAGE ONE 
ADAM Activity  Investigation 1  Investigation 2  Investigation 3 
Understand requirements 
of the task 
Meeting held with client 
and notes taken. Official 
request for services 
received with scope. 
Scope confirmed with 
engagement letter to 
client. 
Meeting held with 
client and engagement 
letter created with 
detailed scope. 
Meeting held with 
client and engagement 
letter created with 
detailed scope. 
Assistance provided 
with the wording of 
the application for the 
Anton Pillar order. 
Determine overall picture  Covered in client 
briefing 
Covered in client 
briefing 
Covered in client 
briefing 
Determine required 
outcomes 
Covered in client 
briefing 
Covered in client 
briefing 
Covered in client 
briefing 
Determine parameters  Copy of court order 
obtained detailing 
limitations. 
Covered in client 
briefing 
Copy of court order 
obtained detailing 
limitations. 
Consider Constraints       
Authorisation  Internal - All internal 
engagement acceptance 
documents completed. 
External - Confirmed 
names of personnel 
involved in the 
acquisition are included 
on the court order. 
Signed engagement 
letter taken as 
authorisation to 
undertake the work. In 
addition, the client 
provided the laptops 
involved. 
Internal - All internal 
engagement 
acceptance documents 
completed. External - 
Confirmed names of 
personnel involved in 
the acquisition are 
included on the court 
order. 
Physical  Confirmed single 
location. No pre-site 
inspection undertaken. 
Public access available 
to reception and then 
reliant on court order to 
permit access to 
computers.  
Out of hour’s access not 
arranged at this stage. 
Not applicable – client 
handed over the 
laptops to be imaged in 
the forensic lab offsite. 
Confirmed single 
location. No pre-site 
inspection undertaken. 
Reliant on court order 
to permit access to 
premises and any 
computers/data storage 
devices. 
Timing  Start time confirmed. 
No end time set as the 
court order was flexible. 
Engagement letter 
included details of the 
time constraints in 
relation to after-hours 
and weekend working. 
Start and end times 
noted from court 
order. 
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Data  No site inspection 
possible so type, amount 
and location of data 
unknown. 
Specifications of the laptops 
were provided. 
Due to the 
nature of the 
task no site 
inspection is 
possible so 
type, amount 
and location of 
data unknown. 
Plan logistics  Logistics planning 
limited to an estimate of 
the number of 
computers involved and 
allocating three 
personnel for the data 
acquisition. An initial 
quantity of hard disk 
drives for image storage 
was allocated with a 
plan to purchase more if 
required. Held as file 
notes not as a separate 
document. 
No record of logistics 
planning. 
Logistics 
planning limited 
to an estimate of 
the likely 
number of 
computers. An 
initial quantity 
of hard disk 
drives for image 
storage was 
allocated. 
Details held as 
file notes not as 
a separate 
document. 
Create Outline Plan  Outline plan created as 
a  file note’ and not as a 
formal document. 
Outline plan created but this 
was based around the time 
constraints and the delivery of 
interim and final reports. 
Outline plan 
created as a 
file note’ and 
not as a formal 
document. 
Additional 
information 
recorded on 
acquisition 
documentation 
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ADAM Demonstration STAGE TWO 
 
ADAM Activity  Investigation 1  Investigation 2  Investigation 3 
Attend site  Completed – 
contemporaneous notes 
Completed – 
contemporaneous notes 
Completed – 
contemporaneous notes 
Address safety 
issues 
Not documented  Not documented  Not documented 
Carry out 
preliminary survey 
Undertaken with client and 
a list of rooms and 
computers formed the basis 
of our work plan.  
Not labelled as Onsite 
survey. 
Undertaken with client, 
sources of potential 
evidence identified as 
laptops belonging to 
five employees held in 
an IT room with 
restricted access. 
Undertaken with the 
Independent Solicitor and 
property owner. A list of 
rooms and computers 
formed the basis of the 
work plan.  
Not labelled as Onsite 
survey. 
Maintain 
documentation of 
activities 
Each person kept a record 
of their activities either in 
the form of 
contemporaneous notes in 
a workbook or using an 
acquisition form template. 
Continuity of evidence was 
maintained by the client 
who received the disks 
containing the image files 
whilst onsite, recorded the 
disk details and contents 
then passed them back to 
us. 
Contemporaneous notes 
maintained in a 
workbook. Individual 
notes of acquisition 
details kept. Custody 
record maintained. 
Contemporaneous notes 
maintained in a workbook. 
Individual notes of 
acquisition details kept. 
Custody record 
maintained. 
Update Outline Plan  Not done as the Outline 
Plan was a file note 
maintained on our server 
in the office. 
Not required – initial 
scope accurately 
reflected the situation 
which was to take 
custody of five laptop 
computers for imaging 
prior to further analysis. 
Not done as the Outline 
Plan was a file note 
maintained on our server 
in the office. 
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ADAM Demonstration STAGE THREE 
 
ADAM Activity  Investigation 1  Investigation 2  Investigation 3 
Confirm data to be 
acquired 
Confirmed with client 
using Onsite survey 
notes 
Confirmed with client 
and documented in 
scope. 
Confirmed with 
Independent 
Solicitor and 
documented in 
contemporaneous 
notes. 
For Offsite Acquisition       
Decision: Device already 
seized? 
Not applicable  Yes  No 
Decision: Live acquisition 
appropriate? 
Consideration not stated 
in notes 
No  No 
Decision: Onsite or offsite 
acquisition? 
Consideration not stated 
in notes 
Through documented 
discussion with client 
the decision was taken 
to image the laptop 
computer hard disks 
offsite. 
Documented 
discussion with 
Independent 
Solicitor regarding 
decision to acquire 
data onsite. 
Determine if equipment is 
running 
Record made in 
acquisition template for 
all devices 
Record made in 
acquisition template 
for all devices 
Record made in 
acquisition template 
for all devices 
Decide on most appropriate 
method of shutdown 
Action recorded but not 
decision process. 
Action recorded but 
not decision process. 
Action and decision 
process documented 
in contemporaneous 
notes. 
Shutdown equipment  Date and time recorded 
in acquisition template 
for all relevant devices. 
Date and time 
recorded in acquisition 
template for all 
relevant devices. 
Date and time 
recorded in 
acquisition template 
for all relevant 
devices. 
Record connections  Data recorded in 
acquisition template for 
all devices. 
Details recorded in 
acquisition template 
for all devices. 
Details recorded in 
acquisition template 
for all relevant 
devices. 
Label and remove 
connections 
Data recorded in 
acquisition template for 
all devices. 
Data recorded in 
acquisition template 
for all devices. 
Data recorded in 
acquisition template 
for all devices. 
Package equipment  No details of packaging 
recorded 
No details of 
packaging recorded 
N/A 
Arrange for transportation  No transportation 
details recorded 
separately – recorded 
as part of continuity 
documentation. 
No transportation 
details recorded 
separately – recorded 
as part of continuity 
documentation. 
N/A  
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(if device already seized 
check documentation and 
state of device) 
 
Not applicable  Documentation 
provided by IT 
practitioner. 
N/A 
For onsite acquisition       
Determine if equipment is 
running 
Recorded on acquisition 
template for all devices 
N/A  Recorded on 
acquisition template 
for all devices 
Decide on most appropriate 
shutdown method (if 
applicable, i.e. if not 
performing a ‘live’ 
acquisition) 
Decision not 
documented 
N/A  Decision 
documented in 
contemporaneous 
notes. 
For onsite or Lab 
acquisition 
     
Decision: Most appropriate 
means of acquiring data 
Decision not 
documented but 
outcome is recorded on 
acquisition template 
Decision not 
documented but 
outcome is recorded 
on acquisition 
template 
Decision not 
documented but 
outcome is recorded 
on acquisition 
template 
Acquire data  Details recorded on 
acquisition template 
together with hash value 
and verification result. 
Details recorded on 
acquisition template 
together with hash 
value and verification 
result. 
Details recorded on 
acquisition template 
together with hash 
value and 
verification result. 
Maintain appropriate 
documentation 
Details recorded on 
acquisition template and 
in contemporaneous 
notes. 
Details recorded on 
acquisition template 
and in 
contemporaneous 
notes. 
Details recorded on 
acquisition template 
and in 
contemporaneous 
notes. 
Create working copy and 
maintain appropriate notes 
Details recorded in 
contemporaneous notes. 
Details recorded in 
contemporaneous 
notes. 
Working copy not 
created onsite but 
later on return to 
forensic lab as first 
action – documented 
in contemporaneous 
notes. 
In all cases       
Place working papers in 
storage  
Engagement folder with 
working papers stored 
in document 
management system 
Engagement folder 
with working papers 
stored in document 
management system 
Engagement folder 
with working papers 
stored in document 
management system 
Return any seized 
equipment 
Details recorded on 
Custody form 
Details recorded on 
Custody form and in 
contemporaneous 
notes. 
N/A 
Maintain documentation 
for above 
Covered above with 
exceptions highlighted 
Covered above with 
exceptions highlighted 
Covered above with 
exceptions highlighted  
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Appendix 2 - The ADAM 
Formal presentation 
 
The two aspects of the ADAM are now presented in their final  form. 
Firstly the UML Activity diagrams for each of the three stages are shown in 
Figures 26, 27 and 28. 
 
Figure 26  The ADAM STAGE 1 (Initial Planning)  
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Figure 27  The ADAM STAGE 2 (Creating the Onsite Plan) 
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Figure 28  The ADAM STAGE 3 (Acquiring Digital Data) 
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Operational presentation 
 
The Operational presentation consists of a statement of the overriding 
ADAM Principles and  ADAM Operation Guides enabling them to follow the 
ADAM process model: 
 
 
ADAM PRINCIPLES 
 
The following overriding principles must be followed by the digital forensic 
practitioner: 
 
1.  The activities of the digital forensic practitioner should 
not alter the original data. If the requirements of the 
work mean that this is not possible then the effect of 
the practitioner’s actions on the original data should be 
clearly identified and the process that caused any 
changes justified 
2.  A complete record of all activities associated with the acquisition and 
handling of the original data and any copies of the original data must 
be maintained. This includes compliance with the appropriate rules of 
evidence, such as maintaining a chain of custody record, and 
verification processes such as hashing 
3.  The digital forensic practitioner must not undertake any activities 
which are beyond their ability or knowledge 
4.  The digital forensic practitioner must take into consideration all aspects 
of personal and equipment safety whilst undertaking their work 
5.  At all times the legal rights of anyone affected by your actions should 
be considered 
6.  The practitioner must be aware of all organisational policies and 
procedures relating to their activities 
7.  Communication must be maintained as appropriate with the client, 
legal practitioners, supervisors and other team members. 
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ADAM OPERATION GUIDE 
 
Stage 1 – Initial Planning 
 
The digital forensic practitioner: 
  MUST understand the requirements of the task, document the work 
to be performed and have this confirmed by the client or person 
providing the instructions to undertake the acquisition task 
 
  MUST consider if the work can be undertaken by confirming that 
you have the appropriate: 
 
1.  internal authorisation and/or 
2.  external authorisation and/or 
3.  authority in law 
 
  MUST consider 
 
1.  time constraints – is the task achievable within the 
time allowed? 
2.  physical constraints – access to the data and 
physical/logical locations 
3.  data constraints – how will the potential evidence be 
identified, how much is there likely to be? 
 
  MUST consider safety issues 
 
  SHOULD create the Outline Plan (an exception being in-house 
acquisition from devices already obtained, e.g. at law enforcement 
computer crime laboratories). 
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ADAM OPERATION GUIDE 
 
Stage 2 - Creating the Onsite Plan 
 
The digital forensic practitioner: 
  MUST identify and address any security or safety issues 
 
  MUST secure access to all potential sources of evidence, either 
directly or remotely 
 
  MUST undertake a preliminary survey and document changes to the 
Outline Plan 
 
  MUST consider 
1.  all the locations that might need to 
be searched 
2.  any issues that must be addressed 
relating to hardware and software 
3.  personnel and equipment needs for 
the investigation 
4.  whether onsite acquisition, offsite 
acquisition or a mixture of both is 
appropriate and possible. 
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ADAM OPERATION GUIDE 
 
Stage 3 - Acquisition of Digital Data (per device) 
 
The digital forensic practitioner MUST identify the most appropriate way of 
acquiring potential evidence given the constraints of time, resources, potential 
evidentiary value and technical limitations. 
In order to do this the digital forensic practitioner: 
  MUST consider 
1.  The most appropriate method of shutting down system(s) if 
applicable 
2.  Write-protection method including interface, e.g. via 
USB/FireWire/eSATA 
3.  Addressing encryption issues 
4.  The appropriateness of undertaking live acquisition  
5.  Acquisition software to be used 
6.  Source device interface(s) – e.g. boot device on host, storage 
device removed and attached to acquisition system, network 
acquisition, operating system (live acquisition) 
7.  Potential volume of data 
8.  Target storage capacity 
9.  Target interface (speed-related) 
10. Prioritising acquisition if more than one source 
  MUST maintain comprehensive notes 
  SHOULD consider photographing  and/or sketching the equipment 
and storage device locations 
  MUST consider the requirements or benefits of an initial review of 
potential evidence devices and decide if it is appropriate for this to be 
carried out ‘live’ or write-blocked 
  SHOULD create a ‘working copy’ of acquired data as quickly as 
possible and concurrent with the creation of the master copy if 
possible 
  MUST keep all copies of acquired data secure 
  MUST be able to verify the integrity of acquired data. 
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Appendix 3 Background Information  
The  ADAM  Principles,  UML  activity  diagrams  for  each  of  the  three 
ADAM Stages together with the  ADAM Operation Guide  for each stage are 
designed to be a simple high-level description of the activities to be undertaken 
by experienced digital forensic practitioners. Practitioners may also want to date 
and sign hard copies of the appropriate ADAM Stage as a file note confirming 
that all the activities have been carried out. 
The following sections are intended to provide background information 
relating to the activities for each stage but the detail is deliberately left for the 
digital forensic practitioner to apply as appropriate based on their own policies 
and procedures. 
 
Stage 1 - Initial Planning 
a. Authorisation constraints 
The primary consideration, before any of the process detail is considered, 
must  be  ensuring  that  you  have  the  authority  to  undertake  the  work.  This 
authority  can  be  made  up  of  several  discrete  aspects;  authority  from  the 
organisation providing the services (internal authorisation), authority in law and 
authority from the owner of the resources containing the material to be acquired 
(external authorisation).  
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Internal authorisation 
This can range from simply a verbal instruction from a superior to the 
completion of a comprehensive series of documents requiring numerous checks 
and signatures. 
 
External authorisation 
There  may  be  instances,  particularly  in  commercial  practice,  whereby 
access  to  equipment  holding  potential  evidence  may  be  owned  or  under  the 
control of  someone other than the person or entity providing the  instructions 
such as a provider of IT services storing the data to be acquired on one of their 
own systems. This may be particularly relevant in the case of cloud computing. 
 
Authorisation in law 
The computer  forensic practitioner  must ensure  that all work  must be 
carried  out  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  laws.  For  example,  commercial 
practitioners in cases such as the serving of Anton Pillar orders or helping with 
matters where government bodies have ‘search and seize’ powers need to ensure 
that they have the legal authority to provide the services in the manner in which 
they  have  been requested. This  may  involve  being  named on court orders or 
other documents. 
Law  enforcement  practitioners  will  need  to  confirm  the  details  of  the 
appropriate warrant and any limitations imposed. 
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b. Timing constraints 
An  important  aspect  of  the  planning  stage  is  determining  constraints 
based on time, of which there are three aspects. In addition, for relevant data that 
is held at multiple sites a suitable time frame needs to be allowed such that all 
forensic teams are able to co-ordinate their arrival to ensure that no one is alerted 
to the investigation before a team arrives. The three aspects to be considered 
under  timing  constraints  are  in  relation  to  Court  Orders/Warrants,  Private 
Premises and Commercial Premises. 
 
Court orders and warrants 
Court  orders  often  place  strict  time  limits  on  when  the  acquisition 
activities can take place and at what point they must be terminated regardless of 
whether the processing has been completed or not.  
 
Private premises 
If private premises are involved this may require getting to the premises 
before the subject of the court order leaves for work (or some other activity) but 
preferably after their partners and /or children have left the building. 
 
Commercial premises 
If commercial premises  are involved this may require a key holder to 
arrive  and  provide  access.  There  may  be  the  requirement  to  gain  access  to 
commercial  premises  after  normal  working  hours  and  have  the  acquisition 
completed prior to employees turning up the following day. This may be to avoid  
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business disruption or to ensure that employees suspected of some activity are 
not  alerted  to  the  investigation  nor  do  they  have  the  potential  to  destroy  or 
remove data.  
 
c. Physical constraints 
There are two physical constraints to consider: access and location. These 
constraints may also have an impact on other constraints: 
 
Access 
The first aspect of physical constraints to consider is that physical access 
to the resources containing the data to be acquired is needed in the majority of 
cases, obvious exceptions  being data that can be accessed  via the  internet or 
internal/external networks. 
Commercial premises may be located on a site that is security controlled 
and require the appropriate authorisation to enter or there may be door access 
codes. Commercial premises may also be shared with other legal entities that 
may restrict access and private premises may have limited access or restricted 
parking.  
 
Layout 
Data  may  be  held  on  resources  at  more  than  one  location,  either  on 
separate sites or scattered between different offices or floors within the same 
building. This aspect may determine how many team members are required and 
how many sets of equipment are needed.   
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e. Data constraints 
The data are the digital information that is the target of the acquisition 
process and can take many forms. There are three constraints to be considered in 
this activity: 
 
Identification  
If  data  needs  to  be  previewed  prior  to  acquisition  then  the  means  of 
identifying any relevant data needs to be addressed, for instance if relevant data 
is  likely to be  in the  form of graphical  images,  i.e. pictures, then a keyword 
search will not be appropriate.   
There may be the need to have specialist software installed on a forensic 
workstation (such as a CAD application) if this is being used to preview the data 
in native format ‘offline’ via a write-blocking device. The processes undertaken 
in relation to this constraint may have a significant impact on the time required 
to carry out the work. 
 
Amount 
The  amount  of  data  to  be  acquired  will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the 
amount of storage space required for the acquisition disks and also the amount of 
time that will be involved in the acquisition process itself. Consideration of the 
impact  on  other  resources  also  needs  to  take  place  such  as  the  effect  on  a 
business network if large volumes of data are being transferred for an extended 
period during normal work hours.  
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Location 
If the data to be reviewed and acquired are stored on backup tapes, e.g. 
the time period of interest is  such that the data are not likely to be currently 
residing on any ‘live’ systems, access to a means of restoring the relevant backup 
tapes will need to be considered or a plan put in place to remove and duplicate 
the  tapes  offsite.  In  the  case  of  ‘cloud  computing’  the  data  may  reside  on 
equipment that is not owned or controlled by the owner of the data. 
 
f. Creating the Outline Plan 
Based on the outcome of the previous considerations the logistics of the 
acquisition exercise can be considered. Without a survey of the site(s), which is 
normally not practical due to the urgency of the work, only a reasonable estimate 
can be made at this stage with certain contingency measures put in place, e.g. 
somebody placed on ‘standby’ to collect and deliver additional storage media or 
other resources.  
The  output  of  the  initial  planning  stage  should  be  the  Outline  Plan 
detailing: 
1.  Personnel  required  (with  site  allocations  if  applicable)  and  team 
composition 
2.  Equipment required at each site (including software, dongles, write-
blockers and image storage media) 
3.  Start time at each site  
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4.  Estimate of duration of acquisition stage 
5.  Details of external personnel involved 
6.  Contact numbers of team leaders/lawyers/client liaison distributed (if 
applicable) 
7.  Details of known target storage locations, protocols and key words (if 
applicable) 
8.  Applicable constraints – authorisation, physical, timing and data. 
 
The composition of the acquisition equipment to be used should to be 
determined  by  the  computer  forensic  professional  based  on  their  knowledge, 
experience and resources. 
 
Stage 2 - the Onsite plan 
 
Once  on  site  there  are  two  activities  that  need  to  be  undertaken 
immediately and then the Preliminary Survey should be completed to address 
any shortcomings in the Outline Plan now that it is possible to obtain more detail 
of the actual environment. 
 
  a. Address safety issues 
The  first  action  upon  arrival  on  site  is  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the 
computer forensic practitioner(s).  
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b. Secure the scene 
Having  gained  access  to  the  site(s)  in  which  relevant  digital  data  is 
thought to be stored, steps  must be taken to ensure that the risk of potential 
evidentiary data being destroyed or removed is reduced as much as possible. 
 
  c. Carry out a preliminary survey 
If possible and appropriate take photographs and/or sketches of the scene. 
The preliminary survey should be undertaken in order to complete the planning 
process started with the creation of the Outline Plan. This survey should include 
the following activities: 
 
1.  Determine all the locations that might need to be searched 
2.  Look  for  any  specifics  that  must  be  addressed  relating  to 
hardware and software 
3.  Identify  possible  personnel  and  equipment  needs  for  the 
acquisition process 
4.  Determine which devices can be physically removed from the 
site 
5.  Identify  all  individuals  who  had  access  to  the  equipment 
containing potential evidence.   
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  d. Updating the Outline Plan 
Once the computer forensic practitioner is on site the Outline Plan needs 
to be reviewed and updated. If more than one site is involved there will be the 
need  to  have  separate  Onsite  Plans  to  take  account  of  the  specific  local 
circumstances. The overall goals will likely remain the same but the steps to be 
taken in order to achieve them may have to be altered.  
 
 
Stage 3 - Acquisition of Digital Data 
Confirm the details of the data to be acquired and any procedures to be 
followed or constraints. Each device  whose data  is to be acquired  should  be 
considered separately and it is vitally important to ensure that comprehensive 
documentation is maintained. 
The ADAM Stage 3 Activity Diagram should be used as the framework 
for  acquiring  digital  data  but  specific  guidance  should  be  sought  from  the 
organisations’ own standard operating procedures (or similar document), ACPO 
Guidelines and the ISO/IEC 27037. 
 
Key decision elements of ADAM Stage 3  
a. Device already seized? 
The model allows for the fact that this stage may not necessarily follow 
on from Stage 2 in situations where another agency or department has already 
obtained the equipment containing the data storage device(s). This could occur, 
for instance, where a law enforcement officer has seized the equipment during a  
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non-computer  forensic  operation  prior  to  approaching  the  computer  forensic 
division for assistance or where the client of a commercial practitioner hands 
over a device used by a previous employee. If this is the case the process starts at 
the computer forensic laboratory. 
 
b. Acquisition to be undertaken onsite? 
If the device has NOT already been seized a decision is required as to 
whether it is appropriate to acquire the data onsite or offsite. 
 
c. Is equipment running? 
The running status of a device needs to be determined and may involve 
some activity that could potentially alter data, reference appropriate guidelines. 
 
d. Has all the data from the device been acquired? 
The acquisition of volatile data from a particular item of equipment may 
require that the device has to be accessed on more than one occasion, first whilst 
still running and then after it has been shut down. The model allows for this 
particular situation so that the process for acquiring the non-volatile data may be 
completed following on from the acquisition of the volatile data. If only non-
volatile  data  is  required  then  the  loop  is  not  required  and  the  equipment  is 
returned. 
The first forensic image acquired from a device is described in the model 
as the ‘master copy’. In some situations two copies of the acquired data may be 
created simultaneously  in which case one should be  identified as the ‘master 
copy’  and  the  other  identified  as  the  ‘working  copy’.  Where  it  is  not  
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possible/practical to create the working copies of acquired data onsite then this 
process  should  be  carried  out  as  soon  as  is  practical  to  mitigate  the  risk  of 
hardware failure of the master copy storage device. 
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